

GROUP – A
WESTERN PHILOSOPHY
(40 marks)

Chapter – 1

CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY

(4 marks allotted)

MCQ – 1X2 = 2

SAQ -- 1X2 = 2

(a) Nature of Philosophy: The word 'Philosophy' is originated from two Greek words 'Philos' and 'Sophia'. The meaning of the first word is love and the meaning of the second is wisdom. So, etymologically the word means love for wisdom. From this view point philosopher is a person who has love for wisdom or higher knowledge. Philosophy is very difficult to be defined without any doubt or controversy. There are so many definitions of philosophy given by different philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Paulsen, Herbart Spencer, Fichte, Kant, Comte, Russell, Ayer and many others in different times. Some of the important definitions are given below.

- (i) Philosophy is the Knowledge of reality; it is the knowledge of the universal, unchangeable, eternal. – Plato
- (ii) Philosophy is the science which investigated the nature of being as it is in itself.– Aristotle
- (iii) Philosophy is the sum total of all Scientific Knowledge. – Paulsen
- (iv) Philosophy is the synthesis of the sciences. –Herbert Spencer
- (v) Philosophy is the science of Knowledge. – Fichte
- (vi) Philosophy is the science and criticism of cognition. – Kant
- (vii) Philosophy is the science of sciences. – Comte
- (viii) Philosophy is the logical study of the foundations of the science.—Russell
- (ix) Philosophy is the theoretical discussion about the absolute conscious self.--- Hegel
- (x) Philosophy is the criticism of language. -- Ayer

(b) Main branches of Philosophy: Philosophy is an all-round discussion about life and world. These discussions are made in different branches of Philosophy. These branches have separate subject matters and different viewpoints. Primarily Philosophy has three main branches: (i) Epistemology, (ii) Metaphysics and (iii) Axiology. Axiology can again be subdivided into three branches: (a) Logic, (b) Social Philosophy and (c) Ethics.

Epistemology: –Epistemology is a branch of philosophy in which all aspects related to knowledge are discuss. These include the nature, possibility, origin, conditions, limits,

validity and many other aspects of knowledge. The word epistemology is derived from two Greek words 'Episteme' and 'Logos'. The meaning of the first is knowledge and the meaning of the second is science. So, etymologically the word epistemology means science of knowledge.

The main functions of Epistemology are: (i) making the term 'knowledge' or 'knowing' clear; (ii) differentiate knowledge and belief, (iii) find out necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge, (iv) determine the source, limit and validity of knowledge, (v) discussing the role of sense experience, reason, intellect etc. as the source of knowledge.

For preparing a human mind ready for philosophical discussions epistemological maturity acts as a pre-condition. Kant has put stress on epistemology while giving definition of philosophy. To him, "Philosophy is the science and criticism of cognition." Similarly Fichte has defined Philosophy following Kant as "Philosophy is the science of knowledge."

But epistemology cannot be considered synonymous with Philosophy. Rather we have to consider epistemology as an essential part of philosophy. For getting philosophical knowledge of higher kind we have to deal with epistemological knowledge seriously. This acts as the pre-condition of philosophical knowledge.

Metaphysics: – It is a branch of philosophy which deals with the nature of reality and other objects of transcendental world. The nature of reality and its relation with matter, mind, life etc. are discussed in this branch of philosophy. The word 'Metaphysics' is derived from the combination of two Greek words 'Meta' and 'Physics'. The first word means beyond and the second word means physical world. So, etymologically it means the discussion beyond the physical world.

For knowing the nature and function of Metaphysics, we have to distinguish Reality or Noumenon and Appearance or Phenomenon. Every object of this external world has two aspects: one is the external appearance of the object and the other is the real form of object. The first form is changing and temporary; but on the other hand the nature of reality is unchanging and permanent.

Metaphysics tries to determine the nature of reality and its relation with this world, and different objects of this world. Some philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, Bradley consider Metaphysics as identical with philosophy. On the other philosophers like Hume, Comte etc. consider that metaphysics is impossible. Recent philosophers like Ayer, Carnap consider metaphysics as non-sense. From a third view we see that philosophers like Spencer, Hamilton consider that the world of metaphysics is unknown and unknowable.

But none of this view can be regarded as totally correct. Metaphysics is a main branch of philosophy which tries to find out the real nature of the world and life in the light of metaphysics. The scope of philosopher is higher than the scope of metaphysics. We find the discussion of reality and an additional discussion of the nature of external objects, different aspects of knowledge in metaphysics.

Ethics:– The word ‘Ethics’ is derived from the Greek word ‘Ethos’ which means character – this again is related to social custom, rituals, habits etc. So, etymologically the word means science related to human character or behaviour. Ethics is a normative science which judges good or bad, right or wrong of actions or behaviours of men.

William Lillie said that, ethics is the normative science of the conduct of human beings living in societies, which judges this conduct to be right or wrong, to be good or bad, or in some similar ways. Ethics is a normative science as it scientifically discusses good or bad aspects of human actions on the basis of certain ideal or standard. Ethics admits three pre-suppositions like freedom of will, individual soul and rationality.

Philosophy and Ethics are closely related to each other. These are complimentary to each other. The explanation of the nature of human soul is necessary while judging the value of human behaviour. Moreover, for discussing the nature of individual soul ethics admits the existence of God or supreme reality. In this way ethics is related to philosophy. Philosophy is dependent upon ethics as philosophy deals with the nature of supreme reality.

But in reality ethics is a part of philosophy though one is complementary to the other. Moral life of man and his ultimate aim are the subject matter of ethics. On the other, the whole world, God, soul, life, mind, matter etc. are subject matters of philosophy. So, the scope of philosophy is greater than that of the scope of ethics.

Social Philosophy: – Social philosophy is a branch of philosophy which systematically discusses individual as well as society from the view point of philosophy. It tries to find out the aim of society and social life of individual and to determine its ideal and value. According to Gisbert, social philosophy is the meeting point of Sociology and Philosophy. Ginsberg thought that social philosophy does not analyse social events, rather it tries to evaluate them synthetically. Social philosophy synthetically evaluates different aspects of sociology from philosophical and all-round view point.

Social science discusses a social aspect of human being living in the society. Social philosophy is the synthesis of all social sciences. The knowledge of social philosophy is partial. But social philosophy unifies different social sciences and puts light upon the whole aspect of human beings. From this view point it is said that

social philosophy is the co-ordination between social science and philosophy. Recently it is said that for knowing human beings as social beings we have to consider different social relations.

But the view points of sociologists are viewpoints of scientists. Sociologists are objective and descriptive. But the viewpoint of social philosophy is formative, descriptive and evaluative. Social philosophy not only discusses various concepts of social change, social relation and other aspects of social life, but evaluates them from the view points of some standards or ideals. For this reason sociologist Ginsberg mentioned two aspects of social life. These are (i) critical and (ii) synthetic aspects of social life. From critical viewpoint social philosophy discusses main principles of social sciences and tries to find out the truth of the methods followed in social sciences. Besides, from synthetic viewpoint social philosophy evaluates the nature and value of social ideals.

Logic: -- Logic is a branch of philosophy which deals with the formal laws of thought and with the methods of distinction between valid and invalid argument. Logic is a science of thought about inference expressed in language. Its main function is to formulate some laws to test the validity of arguments. According to Copi, Logic is the study of the methods and principles used to distinguish good from bad reasoning. Mill considered logic as the science about methods of reason necessary for justifying instances.

The word 'Logic' is originated from a Greek word 'Logike'. The word is the adjective of the word 'Logos'. The meaning of the word 'Logos' is thought. So, etymologically logic means science of thought. But the word 'thought' is too wide. Thought includes mental processes like perception, inference, imagination, memory etc. But all mental processes are not the subject matter of logic. Argument and its different aspects are the subject matter of logic and argument is inference expressed in language.

Logic is the science about the validity of thought expressed in language. The bearer of thought is language. The language is composed of propositions or sentences and these compose arguments. Inference is a kind of mental process through which we go from known to unknown. When this inference is expressed in language it is called argument. Argument has two parts: (a) premise and (b) conclusion. We express the known fact through premise and we express the unknown fact through conclusion. In our thought process we follow some laws of thought. We try to follow these laws for making our thought valid. We keep these laws before our thought process and in these way we try to make our thought valid or we try to distinguish between valid and invalid.

Logic and philosophy cannot be synonymous, but the former is a part of philosophy. Logic deals with argument and its different aspects. But philosophy deals with all round view about the world. So, in this way logic and philosophy can be considered as part and whole. While discussing different aspects philosophy considers different rules of logic. Logic supplies different materials for philosophical discussions.

Exercise

- **Find out the correct alternative:**

- 1) The word 'Philosophy' is originated from two _____ words.
(i) Greek (ii) German (iii) English (iv) French
- 2) Philosophy deals with _____ world.
(i) External (ii) Internal (iii) Both external and internal (iv) Logical
- 3) _____ has described philosopher as lover of wisdom.
(i) Plato (ii) Aristotle (iii) Kant (iv) Russell
- 4) According to _____ Philosophy originates from doubt.
(i) Plato (ii) Kant (iii) Descartes (iv) Russell
- 5) _____ deals with the definition, type, conditions, validity of knowledge.
(i) Epistemology (ii) Metaphysics (iii) Logic (iv) Ethics
- 6) _____ considers Philosophy and Metaphysics as synonymous.
(i) Plato (ii) Locke (iii) Kant (iv) Russell
- 7) The writer of the book Metaphysics is _____ .
(i) Plato (ii) Aristotle (iii) Kant (iv) Copi
- 8) _____ is the father of modern western philosophy.
(i) Bacon (ii) Kant (iii) Descartes (iv) Locke
- 9) _____ is the writer of the book 'Critique of Pure Reason'?
(i) Locke (ii) Descartes (iii) Hume (iv) Kant
- 10) In _____ we find the discussions of the main principles of thought of men.
(i) Epistemology (ii) Metaphysics (iii) Logic (iv) Ethics
- 11) Greek philosopher _____ used the term 'Philosophy' for the first time.
(i) Socrates (ii) Plato (iii) Parmenides (iv) Aristotle
- 12) According to _____ philosophy is the science and criticism of cognition.

- (i) Locke (ii) Hume (iii) Kant (iv) Copi
- 13) Philosophy and Science are _____ to each other.
- (i) Complimentary (ii) Supplementary (iii) Contradictory (iv) Identical
- 14) The inventor of Symbolic Logic is _____.
- (i) Aristotle (ii) Copi (iii) Boole (iv) Mill
- 15) According to _____ Philosophy is the meeting point of social science and philosophy.
- (i) Mackenzie (ii) Ginsberg (iii) Gisbert (iv) Frankana
- 16) According to _____, metaphysics is not possible.
- (i) Aristotle (ii) Locke (iii) Hume (iv) Russell
- 17) _____ is the science of reasoning as expressed in language.
- (i) Epistemology (ii) Metaphysics (iii) Logic (iv) Ethics
- 18) According to _____ Philosophy is the science of knowledge.
- (i) Descartes (ii) Hume (iii) Kant (iv) Fichte
- 19) The writer of the book 'Language, Truth and Logic' is _____.
- (i) Plato (ii) Aristotle (iii) Kant (iv) Ayer
- 20) The principle of Verification is forwarded by _____.
- (i) Kant (ii) Bacon (iii) Ayer (iv) Russell

• **Answer the following questions very short:**

1. How does the word 'Philosophy' originate?
2. What is the feature of philosophical knowledge?
3. How do the Western Philosophers distinguish between 'appearance' and 'reality'?
4. How does Aristotle define Philosophy?
5. What is the definition of Philosophy according to Kant?
6. What is the nature of Philosophy according to Logical Positivists?
7. Who considers that 'Philosophy begins with wonder'?
8. Name some philosophers who consider Philosophy and Metaphysics as synonymous.
9. What are the subject matters of Epistemology?
10. How does the word 'Metaphysics' originate?
11. What is the definition of Social Philosophy?
12. Name some subject matter of meta-ethics.
13. What is the difference between scientific and philosophical knowledge?
14. Who is the writer of the book 'The Republic'?
15. Who is considered as the first philosopher of western philosophy?
16. Who considered philosophy as completely unified knowledge?

17. What is the meaning of 'Ethics'?
18. What is the definition of Logic?
19. What is the difference between Social Philosophy and Sociology?
20. Point out some of the subject matter of Social Philosophy.

Chapter – 2

NATURE AND THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE

(10 marks allotted)

MCQ – 1X2 = 2

DAQ – 1X8 = 8

Introduction: Philosophy tries to determine the nature of world and life and also tries to evaluate them. So, philosophy is the love for knowledge. For discussing philosophy we have to know what knowledge is, what the nature of knowledge is, what is the source of knowledge, what is the limit of knowledge etc? Generally knowledge means the relation of the mind of the knower with the object of knowledge. Plato in his book Theaetetus said that perception is not knowledge and knowledge is not true belief. To him knowledge actually has two features: (i) knowledge is infallible, (ii) the object of knowledge is eternal and unchangeable. So, the object of knowledge is eternal ideas according to Plato. Knowledge is not identical with belief. Belief can be true or false, but knowledge cannot be false.

(a) Three principal uses of the verb 'to know': The word 'knowledge' can be used in different senses like identification, ability, become aware, acquaintance, skill etc. But John Hospers in his book An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis has mentioned three different senses of the word 'know'. These are (i) knowledge by acquaintance, (ii) knowledge by ability and (iii) Propositional knowledge. These are discussed in the following manner:

(i) Knowledge by acquaintance: In some cases the word 'know' is used in the sense of acquaintance. In these cases we must know the person directly. For example, when we say 'I know Rambabu' then it would be that case of knowledge by acquaintance. In this case we have to say that I have much information about Rambabu. But in this case I may not have all information about him. But I may know the person without having much information about him.

This kind of knowledge has following features: (a) this knowledge always depends upon sense perception; (b) we may not have much information about a person or thing, though we must have information which are necessary for knowing the person

or thing; (c) If we have much information about a person but I do not direct acquaintance with him we cannot say that we have knowledge by acquaintance.

(ii) **Knowledge by ability:** The word 'know' is used in the sense of ability or capacity. Gilbert Ryle in his book 'The Concept of Mind' has used the word 'know' in the sense of power or ability to act in some action under necessity. When we say that 'I know how to swim' then it means that I know the process of swimming or I have the knowledge how to swim. This knowledge is called 'knowing how'.

This kind of knowledge has following features: (a) knowledge by ability involves the power or capacity to perform an action; (b) this knowledge involves propensity; (c) this knowledge presupposes some informative knowledge; (d) repeated practice or exercise is helpful or necessary for this kind of knowledge.

(iii) **Propositional Knowledge:** This is the most important use of the term 'knowledge'. In this case we find the mention of a proposition as the subject of knowledge. The proposition is expressed as true in this type of knowledge. This knowledge is called 'knowing that'. Here the knowledge is expressed in the form 'I know that'. For example, 'I know that Descartes is a rationalist'. In this case the subject matter of knowledge is the proposition 'Descartes is a rationalist' and I claim that the proposition is true.

Propositional knowledge has following features: (a) this knowledge is a kind of certain mental state which is different from doubting, believing, imagining, hoping, memorizing etc.; (b) the proposition which is claimed to be known must be true; (c) the claim about the truth of the proposition of this knowledge must have sufficient arguments to support; (d) this kind of knowledge is different from belief as belief may be true or false, but propositional knowledge must be true.

(b) Propositional Knowledge: Propositional knowledge means knowing the fact expressed in the proposition as true. In this proposition the subject matter is a proposition. For example, 'I know that the earth moves round the sun.' In this case the proposition 'the earth moves round the sun' is taken as true. Generally propositions become true or false. But the proposition used in propositional knowledge cannot be false because in that case it will not be propositional knowledge. Propositional knowledge is expressed in the form 'I know that'. Gilbert Ryle has mentioned propositional knowledge as 'Knowing that' in his book 'The Concept of Mind'.

(c) Conditions of propositional knowledge: While discussing the issue of conditions of propositional knowledge we will distinguish between Sufficient, Necessary and Necessary-sufficient Conditions.

Sufficient Condition: If two events are related in such a way that if the first occurs then the second occurs, but if the first does not occur then also the second may occur, then the first event will be the sufficient condition of the second. For example, rain is the sufficient condition of wet of soil because if it rains then there will be wetting of soil and if there is no rain then also there may be wet of soil.

Necessary Condition: If two events are related in such a way that if the first does not occur then the second does not occur, but if the first occurs then also the second may not occur, then the first event will be the necessary condition of the second. For example, oxygen is the necessary condition of fire because if there is no oxygen then there will be no fire and if there is oxygen then also there may not be fire.

Necessary-sufficient Condition: : If two events are related in such a way that if the first occurs then the second occurs, but if the first does not occur then the second does not occur, then the first event will be the sufficient condition of the second. For example, presence of wet fuel is the necessary-sufficient condition of the presence of smoke.

(d) Rationalism – Origin of knowledge according to Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz

* **Descartes' view of knowledge:** According to Descartes, knowledge through experience is not universal, certain and correct. So, he considered reason or intellect as the primary source of our knowledge. Only through reason we can get the reach of certain knowledge. From the natural light of reason we can get sure and certain knowledge. Descartes has mentioned three kinds of ideas: (a) Adventitious ideas, (b) Fictitious idea and (c) Innate ideas. The first kind of idea is originated from external world through sense experience. We add our imagination with the first kind of ideas and thus we get the second kind of ideas. The third kind of ideas are rational and prior to our experience. As Descartes has admitted fictitious and adventitious ideas besides his innate ideas he is considered Moderate Rationalist. To him 'some ideas are innate'.

As a mathematician Descartes thought that mathematical knowledge is the best kind of knowledge because this knowledge is universal and certain. He also tried to make the philosophical knowledge universal and certain like mathematics. By following the method of mathematics Descartes has employed the deductive method to draw sure and universal knowledge of soul, god and world necessarily from some primarily true principles. Paulsen has considered this kind of rationalism of Descartes Mathematical Rationalism. Descartes has established the principle 'I think, therefore, I am' (Cogito Ergo Sum) and from this principle he has tried to establish the existence of the world and substance.

But in reality mathematical knowledge is not identical with philosophical knowledge. The first is abstract, but the second is concrete. So, the method of mathematics cannot be same as philosophy. Besides, the innate ideas of Descartes are not admitted by all philosophers. Locke has criticized the existence of innate ideas and according to him there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses.

Descartes' view of the nature and origin of knowledge becomes the **subject of criticism** for the following reasons: (i) the admission of two kinds of ideas cannot be admitted from the view point of rationalism because these two are dependent upon our experience.

(ii) Descartes has considered mathematics as the basis of philosophical knowledge. But in reality these two types of knowledge cannot be same and similar. The first is certain, but the second is probable.

*** Spinoza's view of knowledge:** Like rationalist Descartes Spinoza also thought that some innate ideas present in our mind are the source of knowledge. According to Spinoza, the idea of God is innate idea. God is the only self-dependent substance. Consciousness and extension are the two qualities among innumerable qualities of God. Material substance and human soul are expositions of extension and consciousness respectively. After admitting the idea of God Spinoza deduced the existence of human soul and material substance with the help of his geometrical method. Spinoza has mentioned three levels of knowledge: (a) systematic rational knowledge which is the basis of fundamental rules of physics and geometry; (b) demonstrative knowledge which can understand substance as the basis of total world; in this level of knowledge we get a relation of equity between world and substance; (c) sensitive knowledge is obscure, separate, incomplete and systemless. Though Spinoza has put stress upon rational knowledge and demonstrative knowledge consistently with the principle of rationalism, he has also admitted sensitive knowledge. For this reason Spinoza is also considered Moderate Rationalist.

Spinoza's view of the nature and origin of knowledge becomes the **subject of criticism** for the following reasons: (i) Spinoza's admission of sensitive knowledge is not consistent with the rational principle because this kind of knowledge is originated through experience.

(ii) Application of the geometrical method of Spinoza in philosophical discussions cannot be considered tenable. These two subjects have two different kinds of objects of discussion. So, these two types of discussions cannot be equated with each other.

*** Leibnitz's view of knowledge:** Leibnitz has a different view than Descartes and Spinoza. He thought that only universal and necessary knowledge are known through reason. To him, sensitive knowledge and rational knowledge are not different from each other. Sensitive knowledge is less obscure and reliable than rational knowledge. Sense is an undeveloped form of reason. Leibnitz has admitted innumerable number of living conscious atoms or 'Monads' and thought that one monad is different and independent from another monad. All ideas remain implied in these monads. According to him, all our ideas are innate. Those ideas are not clear which presuppose unclear monads. Those unclear ideas are sensations or innate ideas. These unclear ideas gradually become clear and distinct. The ideas of colour, smell etc are examples of these. Besides these vague sensations Leibnitz admitted other abstract ideas. These ideas are very distinct. But sensations have a role for these to become knowledge. For this kind of difference Leibnitz has admitted two kinds of propositions: (a) necessary and truths of reason and (b) truths of facts. The truths expressed in geometrical axioms or knowledge expressed through analytic statements is expressed in the first types. On the other hand, the knowledge which is related to external world is called truths of facts. For example, chaina rose is red. Leibnitz has distinguished between these two types of propositions and evaluated the distinction between internal sensation or truths of objects and truths of reason from the view point of reality. Leibnitz thought that no knowledge is possible without reason. External sensation can never be the reliable source of universal and necessary knowledge. For this Leibnitz has corrected Locke and said, 'there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses except the intellect itself.' Leibnitz said that all ideas are innate.

Leibnitz's view of the nature and origin of knowledge becomes the **subject of criticism** for the following reasons: (i) Leibnitz's admission of necessary and truths of reason can reasonably be admitted by rationalist, but the admission of truths of facts cannot be admitted from the view point of rationalism. This is completely dependent upon sense experiences.

(ii) Leibnitz has considered all ideas innate. But this cannot be admitted. There must be other ideas than that of innate ideas in our world of knowledge. No ideas about the truths of facts can be called innate because these are always dependent upon experience.

(d) Empiricism – Origin of knowledge according to Locke, Berkeley and Hume

*** Locke's view of knowledge:** According to Locke, we are not born with any innate ideas in our mind. He has put forwarded some arguments to criticize the theory of innate ideas of Descartes.

(i) Locke said that if there could be anything like that in reality it could be equally present in everybody's mind. But the ideas of God, eternity and perfection do not remain present in child or idiots.

(ii) Some ideas might be universally accepted or those might remain present in everybody's mind. But from that it cannot be said that those ideas are innate. In reality these ideas can be originated in a different way.

(iii) If there could have anything like innate ideas then these could remain present in everybody's mind. But different people of different religion express different opinion regarding the nature of God, or people of same religion express different opinion in different times. Regarding the nature of other innate ideas except the idea of God people have different opinion. From this it is proved that there is no innate idea.

To present the positive aspect of his view Locke has said that at the time of birth our mind remains a tabula rasa or blank slate. Ideas come to our minds through sensations. Sensations give us knowledge about the external world and reflections give us knowledge of mental actions. No such idea is possible which is neither originated through sensation nor reflection. According to Locke, mind remains inactive while accepting ideas, especially simple ideas. Mind becomes active after the projection of external ideas on the screen of mind and mind creates complex ideas by comparing and combining various ideas. Therefore, according to Locke, all ideas are derived from experience, no ideas are prior to experience. For this he said, 'there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses'.

According to Locke, knowledge is the agreement and disagreement among ideas. Locke has mentioned three kinds of knowledge: (i) Intuitive knowledge: - this knowledge is rational and necessary. For example, 'red is red' – this is intuitive knowledge because relation of identity is expressed in this knowledge. (ii) Demonstrative knowledge: - this kind of knowledge is gained through many ideas and by applying deductive arguments. Mathematical knowledge is an example of this knowledge. This knowledge is also rational and necessary. (iii) Sensitive knowledge: - In case of this knowledge we observe similarity or difference between our ideas and real objects. This knowledge is related to the knowledge of the existence of external objects. From this above classification of knowledge we can consider Locke moderate empiricist.

Locke's view of the nature and origin of knowledge becomes the **subject of criticism** for the following reasons: (i) Locke thought that at the time of acceptance of ideas our mind remains inactive. But this view is not admitted by psychology. As per modern psychology sensations cannot create ideas without the active role of mind.

(ii) Locke's classification of knowledge is not consistent with the empiricist principle. He has put intuitive knowledge at the highest level; he has put demonstrative knowledge after that; but these two levels of knowledge are attainable through reason. The only knowledge which can be attained through experience is sensitive knowledge. He put it at the lowest level. This is very much inconsistent with the empirical principle.

* **Berkeley's view of knowledge:** Locke has only admitted concrete ideas of particular substances. But he admitted that though abstract ideas have no material reality we form such abstract ideas. By following this view of Locke Berkeley said that if perceptual knowledge of anything is not possible then the mind cannot form the idea of that thing. We have no power in our mind to form such idea because abstract, formless universal ideas cannot be perceived. In Berkeley's opinion our thought cannot deny the scope of perceptual experiences. Our thought and ideas are limited within the ideas of man and substance. No thought of formless universal is possible. Abstract universals are only names. General ideas can live neither in external nor in internal places. Whenever we consider the universal of man then we can think either of any particular man or woman and consider those individual as representative of that class or universal. No abstract ideas can be formed without any particular object or individual. For this Berkeley has denied abstract general ideas in place of general ideas. For example, to form the abstract idea of triangle we present a particular triangle before our mind as the representative of all objects of the class. Only particular ideas are the objects of our thought. Universal ideas do not exist because no mental image corresponding to these ideas are not possible. Berkeley has admitted mind or soul and the existence of God. For this reason Berkeley is considered moderate empiricist.

Berkeley's view of the nature and origin of knowledge becomes the **subject of criticism** for the following reasons: (i) Berkeley has said that our thought can never supersede the scope of sense experience. But this view is not acceptable. Through our thinking process we can sometimes cross the scope or limit of our sense perception. (ii) According to Berkeley, universal has no existence because we cannot form any mental image similar to that universal. But in reality this argument is insufficient and untenable. We must admit the existence of an entity like universal to forward the process of our knowledge.

* **Hume's view of knowledge:** Hume for the first time has admitted the extreme form of empiricism. To him, the only object of direct knowledge is impression. When our sense organ comes in contact with any object then our mind receives an impression of that object. Hume has considered this impression. When this impression becomes hazy and obscure then it will become idea. According to Hume, no idea is possible

without impression. So, he said that impressions and ideas are sources of all knowledge. The difference between impression and idea is that of vivacity and distinctness. Impressions are more clear and distinct than ideas. As no impression of soul, substance and God is possible through any sense organ, so no idea is possible. The existence of these objects is not possible as their knowledge is not possible. According to Hume, substance is the combination of real and probable sensations. For this reason he does not admit any substance as the container of sensations. Similarly he said that mind or soul is the mental events like thought, emotion, will etc which we can know. Besides, we can know the world through our experience. As the creator of all these, we do not need to admit God.

According to Hume, knowledge is possible only when some separate and isolated sensations are connected through some laws of Association. Hume has admitted three kinds of laws of Association: - contiguity, similarity and cause and effect. If there are similarities between two ideas they become connected. If two events are connected in respect to spatio-temporal contiguity they become connected. Again, if two events are related as cause and effect they become connected. No innate ideas or a priori form of reason are necessary for the combination of two events. According to Hume, there is no material necessity between cause and effect. Hume has divided our knowledge into two types: (i) knowledge concerning matters of facts and (ii) knowledge concerning relations of ideas. The first kind of knowledge is dependent upon experience. These propositions are a posteriori. On the other hand, the second kind of knowledge is independent upon experience. These propositions are a priori. The first kind of proposition does not have necessity, but it has novelty. But the second kind of proposition has only necessity, but it does not have novelty.

Therefore, it can be said that by denying the existence of substance, soul and God Hume has given a complete and consistent representation of empiricism. He said that the object which does not have sensation cannot have knowledge. Even Hume has admitted the existence of universal knowledge as necessary affirmation because sensation does not give us such knowledge. To him, all knowledge is probable. In this way Hume's view has reached to scepticism.

Hume's view of the nature and origin of knowledge becomes the **subject of criticism** for the following reasons: (i) Hume has committed mistake by considering 'sensation' and 'idea' separate and 'isolated'. If we do not admit that isolated sensations and ideas are contained in a permanent mind we cannot explain the connection among the sensations and ideas. Even there must be a permanent mind to explain the principles of association. Unless this permanent mind is there, these

principles cannot become active. (ii) Hume's admission of 'knowledge concerning relations of ideas' is against the principle of empiricism because this kind of knowledge is dependent upon reason.

(e) Kant's critical view about origin of knowledge in brief

* **Kant's view of knowledge:** Kant has reconciled the views of rationalists and empiricists and established view of Critical theory. According to Kant, knowledge must have two features: universality and novelty. Scientific knowledge must have universal and certain and with that it must have novelty. Kant has tried to find out whether there is any possibility of a third kind of proposition except a priori universal proposition and a posteriori synthetic proposition. So, the basic question of Kant is 'if there is any possibility of synthetic a priori proposition?'

Kant thought that, knowledge like objects of universe has two sides: matter and form. Matter of knowledge is gathered through experience. Sensations obtained through experience are the components of knowledge. But if isolated sensations are collected then these do not become knowledge. If these isolated sensations are systematically arranged or if these received 'form', then that become knowledge. Reason gives this form of knowledge. So, according to Kant, knowledge becomes possible by the joint combination of reason and experience. This kind of knowledge is the expression of universal and novelty at the same time. Kant has commented this kind of knowledge 'synthetic a priori' knowledge.

According to Kant, the world of science and experience cannot be established on the two kinds of knowledge a priori analytic and a posteriori as admitted by rationalist and empiricist. He has tried to establish a third kind of proposition which is a priori synthetic. In sciences, particularly in physics, we find a kind of proposition which is universally and necessarily true. These propositions are universal, so a priori and expression of novelty or synthetic. For example, the proposition 'all events have cause' is necessarily true. It cannot be conceived that events are taking place, but there are no cause. The statement is synthetic, because the idea of 'cause' does not contain the idea of 'event'.

Kant thought that mind does not accept external sensations as they presented before us. Mind imposes forms of reasons and categories of understanding on them to form knowledge. Many philosophers previously thought that mind accepts components of knowledge passively and for this passivity we observe objects as they are in appearance. But according to Kant, external objects are perceived as per forms and categories of mind. These forms and categories are pre-conditions of knowledge without the application of which knowledge is not possible. For this reason Kant thought that without the analysis of these forms and categories philosophical

discussions are not possible. So, according to Kant, the main method of philosophical analysis is the critical analysis of these forms and categories of knowledge. Mainly for this reason Kant's philosophical discussion is called Critical method.

By analyzing the various pre-conditions of knowledge Kant has shown that metaphysics is not possible though there are realities. As our minds have active role in case of knowledge our world of knowledge is different from that of world of reality. Empiricists dogmatically discarded realities and rationalists have accepted realities dogmatically. According to Kant, we can only know the phenomenal world covered with different forms and categories of minds, but the world of realities remains unknown and unknowable.

Kant's view of the nature and origin of knowledge becomes the **subject of criticism** for the following reasons: (i) The main objection against the Critical theory of Kant is that the contradiction between the world of realities and phenomenal world is not rational. Two objects like reality and appearance are not isolated from each other; realities become phenomenal and phenomenon becomes real. Therefore, if phenomenal objects are logically called knowable then realities cannot be logically called 'unknowable'.

(ii) According to Kant, two components of knowledge – matter and form are opposite to each other as the source of the first is supernatural entity and the source of the second is mind. But the question is: how can the rational form of mind be applied on the different types of sensations? If the two become similar then only one can be applied to another. But according to Kant, knowledge is originated from two actions of opposite nature. Kant has created a problem creating a difference between the matter and form of knowledge.

(iii) Kant has created a dualism by making a unnecessary distinction between sensible and supernatural entities. Kant has failed to realize the truth that supernatural entity expresses itself through sensible objects. If we know only the phenomenal objects then it can be said that object has a reality behind it.

Exercise

- **Find out the correct alternative:**

1) The object of real knowledge according to Plato is _____.

- (i) Form (ii) Matter (iii) Both form and matter (iv) None of form and matter

2) The writer of 'An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis' is _____.

- (i) Kant (ii) Russell (iii) Ayer (iv) Hospers
- 3) 'I knew late Sunil Gangyopadhyay' – here the word 'know' is used in _____ sense.
- (i) Knowing how (ii) Ability (iii) Knowing that (iv) Logical
- 4) The writer of the book 'The Concept of Mind' is _____ .
- (i) Russell (ii) Hospers (iii) Ryle (iv) Stace
- 5) Among the knowledge by acquaintance, knowledge by ability and Knowledge by proposition _____ is the most fundamental.
- (i) Knowledge by acquaintance (ii) Knowledge by ability
(iii) Knowledge by proposition (iv) Knowledge by inference
- 6) Propositional knowledge has _____ conditions.
- (i) One (ii) Two (iii) Three (iv) Four
- 7) The conditions the presence of which make knowledge possible is called _____ conditions.
- (i) Sufficient (ii) Necessary (iii) Necessary-sufficient (iv) Logical
- 8) The _____ condition of Propositional knowledge is Truth condition.
- (i) First (ii) Second (iii) Third (iv) Fourth
- 9) The second condition of Propositional knowledge is _____.
- (i) the proposition must be true (ii) the knower must believe the truth of the proposition
(iii) there must be arguments in support of the believe (iv) the proposition may be true or false
- 10) The denial of synthetic proposition is _____ proposition.
- (i) Analytic (ii) Contradictory (iii) Contrary (iv) Negative
- 11) Philosopher _____ has used the word 'know' in the sense of 'knowing how'.
- l) The proposition 'All effects have cause' is a _____ proposition.
- (12) Synthetic a priori (ii) Synthetic a posteriori
(iii) A priori analytic (iv) A posteriori
- (13) The rationalism of _____ is mathematical rationalism.
- (i) Descartes (ii) Spinoza (iii) Kant (iv) Leibnitz
- (14) The rationalism of _____ is formal rationalism.
- (i) Descartes (ii) Spinoza (iii) Kant (iv) Leibnitz
- (15) _____ is called extreme empiricist.
- (i) Locke (ii) Berkeley (iii) Hume (iv) Mill
- (16) According to _____ knowledge through sense experience is uncertain.

(i) Rationalists (ii) Empiricists (iii) Phenomenologists (iv) Critical Philosophers

(17) According to _____ knowledge is perception of agreement and disagreement among ideas.

(i) Locke (ii) Berkeley (iii) Hume (iv) Kant

(18) _____ has admitted the possibility of Synthetic a priori statement.

(i) Locke (ii) Hume (iii) Leibnitz (iv) Kant

(19) According to _____, no ideas without impression.

(i) Locke (ii) Hume (iii) Leibnitz (iv) Kant

(20) According to _____, necessary knowledge is not possible. (i) Locke

(ii) Berkeley (iii) Hume (iv) Mill

*** Answer the following questions (not more than 200 words):**

1. Explain the different meaning of the word 'knowledge' with example.
2. What is Propositional knowledge? What are different features of Propositional knowledge?
3. Explain different conditions for Propositional knowledge with example.
4. What is the difference between Strong sense and Weak sense of knowledge? Explain with example.
5. Distinguish between the following pairs:
 - (i) Necessary and Contingent Statement
 - (ii) A Priori and A Posteriori Statement
 - (iii) Analytic and Synthetic Statement
 - (iv) Universal and Particular Statement
6. How does Locke define Knowledge? Critically discuss the view of Locke.
7. Explain critically the view of Berkeley regarding the nature and origin of knowledge.
8. Explain Hume's view of knowledge critically. Can he be called extreme empiricist?
9. Explain critically Descartes' view about the nature and origin of knowledge.
10. What is the nature of innate ideas? How does Locke criticize innate ideas?
11. What is the nature of monad according to Leibnitz? Explain critically.
12. What is the difference between extreme rationalism and moderate rationalism? Explain.
13. What is the difference between extreme empiricism and moderate empiricism? Explain.

14. Explain the critical theory of Kant about the nature and origin of knowledge?

Chapter – 3

SUBSTANCE

(6marks allotted)

MCQ -- 1X2 = 2

SAQ -- 1X4 = 4

(a) Concept of Substance: The idea or concept of substance is important to form the knowledge about life and world. The word 'Substance' is originated from the Latin word 'Substantia' which means that which stands behind or underlying. So, etymologically the word means something which becomes the container or substratum of quality or action.

Substance is something that we see or that we touch. We believe that the external world is made with many objects or substances. Common people consider objects like houses, trees, chair, table, wood, stone and many other things as Substance. These objects are independent to each other and all of them have specific features of their own. But these qualities cannot be thought flying in air. These qualities must have a container or substratum. These containers are considered as substance by common people. This view is called Common Sense view of Substance. From this view some features of substance can be illustrated in the following manner:

(i) Substance is the substratum of qualities: We perceive all objects through its qualities. A piece of sugar has qualities like whiteness, sweetness square form etc. But none of these qualities are independent. These qualities cannot exist without any container. So, for thinking about any composition or combination of qualities we have to think about a container or substratum.

(ii) Substance is the source of action or force: We can sense some force or action in all our actions or objects. When a fan runs we can see its force or action. We a moving ball hits another static ball the second becomes moving. We consider that the force or movement of the first ball makes the second ball moving. This action or force or movement actually comes from the container or substratum.

(iii) Substance is an unchangeable entity: We find different changes in the qualities of substance. But among these changes the container or substratum does not change. It remains unchanged. A man becomes changed with the change of time or his age, but he remains the same man at the end of his existence. So, we can say that an object or substance remains the same though different changes take place in and around it.

(iv) Substance is a formation of unification: Substance is a formation of unification among different diversities. There can be no pure substance without

qualities. Similarly there can be no qualities without substance. There is an inseparable relation between substance and qualities. Substance is a unification of many as it becomes the container or substratum of qualities and actions.

But some questions are raised regarding the commonsense view of substance. What is the relation of substance with its qualities? Is substance the combination of qualities or something extra? What is the real nature of substance? Is substance one or many? How can we know substance? The answers of these metaphysical questions are not found in the commonsense view of substance. So, this view cannot be regarded satisfactory.

(b) Different views of Substance – Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume

(i) View of Aristotle regarding the nature of Substance: Aristotle's view of substance is the developed form of Plato's view. Plato considered substance as universal. He admitted two worlds: the first is the world of Ideas and the second is the world of appearance. But Aristotle criticized this view and said that universal cannot exist without particular. He used the term 'substance' in the following ways:

a) Substance is self-dependent. Substance does not depend upon any other thing for its existence. From this feature Universal cannot be Substance. So, according to Aristotle –

b) Substance is individual or concrete object. Aristotle said that, no qualitative feature of substance can be regarded as substance as individual is different from qualities qualitative word can be used as the predicate of a sentence. From this point Aristotle thought that –

c) The word denoting substance must be the subject of a sentence; it can never be the predicate of a sentence. For this Aristotle said –

d) Substance is the substratum or container of all qualities or actions. If this is said then substance has to be said 'permanent entity' because quality or action is changeable. So, no explanation of change without substance-reality can be received. For this Aristotle said –

e) Substance is an unchangeable reality underlying changes. According to Aristotle, humanity or manliness cannot exist without admitting individual man as its container. Besides, particular also cannot be substance because particular or individual man cannot exist without manliness. For this Aristotle said –

f) Substance is the combination of universal or particular. Universal is not substance and particular is not substance as well. In Aristotle's philosophy this is the primary sense or meaning of the term 'Substance'.

(ii) View of Descartes regarding the nature of Substance: Descartes has said that substance is something which exists without depending upon other. So, according to him, substance is self-dependent. In this sense substance is infinite and for this it is one and unity. Descartes has considered this substance 'God'. Substance can be known only through the natural light of reason.

If self-dependence is the definition of substance the no other substance can be admitted except God because no substance of this universe cannot be said independently self-dependent. But Descartes has admitted two more substances in addition to God. These are 'soul' and 'matter'. According to Descartes, the essence of soul is thinking process and the essence of matter is extension. But for distinguishing soul and matter with God Descartes has divided substances into two types: primary or independent and secondary or dependent. God is an independent substance because God is only completely self-dependent. But soul and matter are relative substances and these are created by God. For this reason Descartes has considered these two substances created substances.

In a special sense Descartes can be said a dualist philosopher because he has admitted two separate and opposite substances like matter and soul. Matter and soul has two essential features like extension and thought respectively. But these two have some secondary features. Descartes has considered these 'secondary features' 'modes' or 'accidental qualities'. These accidental qualities sometimes lie in these substances and sometimes these do not lie there. Position, form, motion etc are accidental qualities of matters and will, feeling etc are accidental qualities of souls.

As Descartes has admitted self-dependence as the definition of substance so he cannot admit anything other as substance except God. But he has admitted matter and soul except God. This indicates a self-contradiction in Descartes' view. For this Spinoza has made this dualism into monism. Besides, Descartes has considered these two substances separate and contrary to each other. This had created a complication in Descartes' view. The way in which these two substances are connected as described by Descartes is not satisfactory.

Descartes' view of substance becomes the **subject of criticism** for the following reasons: (i) As Descartes has admitted self-dependence as the definition of substance, he should not admit any other substance except God. But he has admitted two more substances: matter and soul. It has created a contradiction in Descartes' view.

(ii) Descartes has considered soul and matter as distinct and isolated from each other. This has created a complication in his discussion. There can be no interaction between these two substances as they are contradictory to each other. But in our

daily life we find these interactions between mind and body. Descartes has tried to explain these interactions through his admission of pineal gland. But this admission is not tenable to explain this interaction.

(iii) View of Spinoza regarding the nature of Substance: Spinoza defines substance thus: 'by substance, I mean that which is (exists) in itself and is conceived through itself; in other words that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.' The definition of substance given by Spinoza shows that substance is self-dependent and the concept of substance can be formed without the help of any other concept. Certain deductions follow necessarily from the definition of substance given by Spinoza. As for example, Substance is its own cause – *causa sui*. Substance is infinite, one, eternal, unchangeable. Substance is absolutely free. Substance is the absolutely indeterminate being. Substance being infinite, nothing exists out of it.

Having made the following deductions from the definition given by Spinoza, he concludes that the substance must be one and this infinite, eternal, self-dependent substance is God. Spinoza admits the Cartesian definition of substance, but he points out that if Cartesian definition of substance is admitted, substance can only be one and not three. Substance cannot depend upon any other thing. But according to Descartes matter and mind are two substances which are dependent on God. Spinoza holds that matter and mind are not two substances; they are two attributes of God. They are the two different ways of conceiving one and the same substance, two different names for one and the same thing. Matter and mind or more technically, thought and extension are the two parallel manifestations of the same substance, God. According to Spinoza, God is not a transcendental personal spirit, like the God of religion. He is the immanent indwelling cause of the world. God is the permanent substratum of all things, mental and material. Whatever is, is in god. Nothing can be conceived without the concept of God. According to Frank Thilly, 'God is in the world and the world in Him. He is the source of everything that is (pantheism). God and the world are one.' In Spinoza's philosophy the world, God and Substance designate one and the same thing. So according to Spinoza, there cannot be more than one substance.

Spinoza's view of substance becomes the **subject of criticism** for the following reasons: (i) Spinoza has denied the monistic nature of this world by admitting one and identical substance. But in reality we cannot deny the variety of objects and nature of this universe.

(ii) If we admit the claim of Spinoza that there is only one substance as supreme reality then we cannot admit or explain the question of individual-liberty.

(iv) View of Leibnitz regarding the nature of Substance: Leibnitz has not admitted the views of Descartes and Spinoza. To him, if we admit self-dependence as the definition of substance then we have to conclude monism of Spinoza. But from this view point of monism we cannot explain the diversity, particularly the freedom of individual. So, according to Leibnitz, we have to admit self-activity as the definition of substance in place of self-dependence. Self-activity means becoming active without depending upon others. So, Leibnitz defined substance as something which becomes active without depending upon any other thing.

Leibnitz described substance as partless because whatever has parts has origin and destruction and substance does not have origin and destruction. That which has no part cannot have origin and destruction. As substance is permanent, it cannot have origin and destruction. So, Leibnitz considered that substance must be considered partless. Compound objects are composed of various parts. These objects destroy with the destruction of parts. Compound objects are self-active. They become active due to the effect of external factors. Substance cannot be like this.

According to Leibnitz, substance cannot be one and infinite. Substance is many and innumerable. From this point of view Descartes is dualist, Spinoza is monist and Leibnitz is monist. Following the atomism of the Greeks Leibnitz has considered substance as 'similar to atom'. But these atoms are not material atoms; these are living conscious atoms or spiritual monads. Leibnitz considered these monads as the main cause of the nature of this universe. Monads have following features: (i) Monads are simple and indivisible. These are spiritual, conscious and active objects. (ii) No influence from outside can enter inside these monads as these monads are windowless. One monad cannot influence the other. Every monad is self-sufficient. (iii) Every monad is infinitely powerful. Every monad has the power to reflect the universe in its own womb. (iv) Monads are always active. But all monads are not equally active. Leibnitz has divided monads according to power of reflection. There are three levels of monads: (a) unconscious, (b) conscious and (c) self-conscious. God is, according to Leibnitz, 'Monad of all monads' or highest monad.

Leibnitz's view of substance becomes the **subject of criticism** for the following reasons: (i) The existence of Monads as admitted by Leibnitz is not perceptible. We can think about the existence of these monads, similarly we can think about their non-existence. So, we cannot know the existence of these monads either through experience or through reason.

(ii) Leibnitz is a pluralist. He has admitted the existence of many substances or monads. But the question is: how can we explain the relation among these monads? Leibnitz has said that God has explained the consistency among these

monads with His supreme reason and for this purpose he has forwarded 'the doctrine of pre-established harmony'. But in reality this is a hypothesis, it is not a proved aspect.

(v) View of Locke regarding the nature of Substance: Locke has understood the idea of substance as the substratum of qualities. To him, when we know any substance directly through external perception we cannot know anything other than qualities. But these qualities do not become placed independently. A substratum or container of these qualities must be admitted. So, substance is the substratum of qualities. Locke has described substance as unknown and unknowable because we cannot know any such thing when we know different qualities.

According to Locke, the idea of particular substance means combination of ideas as well as container of these qualities. Locke has put more stress upon combination of qualities while describing clear and distinct idea of particular idea. Locke has mentioned two kinds of substances: Cognitive and Incognitive. According to him, though soul substance cannot be the object of perception, but as the unknown and unknowable container of mental processes the existence of soul has to be admitted. Locke said that though the existence of God cannot be known through perception, the existence of God has to be admitted as the substratum of qualities like omnipotence, omnipresence etc.

Locke has admitted two qualities of substance: primary qualities and secondary qualities. Primary qualities lie in the object in reality. These qualities are objective. Extension, form, volume etc are examples of primary qualities. Secondary qualities on the other hand are subjective. These qualities do not lie in the object, rather these lie in the human mind. Colour, taste, smell etc are examples of secondary qualities. Primary qualities do not differ from man to man, but secondary qualities differ from man to man.

Locke's view of substance becomes the subject of criticism for the following reason: (i) Locke was an empiricist and he has admitted additional container or substratum of qualities as unknown and unknowable. But we cannot admit such substance from the view point of empiricism.

(ii) The distinction between primary and secondary qualities as made by Locke cannot be admitted because these qualities cannot be separated from each other from the view point of modern psychology.

(vi) View of Berkeley regarding the nature of Substance: Berkeley has denied the existence of material substance, but has admitted the existence spiritual substance. According to Berkeley, the existence of a thing consists in its being perceived. As material substance cannot be perceived by the mind it cannot be real.

Locke's unknown and unknowable substratum underlying and supporting the primary qualities revealed in sensations is a meaningless abstraction, for such substratum cannot be perceived by the mind. Berkeley does not acknowledge the existence of any substance in the material world, only qualities are perceptible. According to Berkeley material substance is the sumtotal of some sensible qualities or sensations. But only mind can perceive sensations. So the existence of mind or self must be admitted. If existence consists in being perceived, then the existence of the perceiving mind cannot be denied. Regarding the nature of mind or self Berkeley denies self or mind as a simple, indivisible, indestructible, incorporeal active being which can perceive and produce ideas. Berkeley holds that we can know our self through immediate self-consciousness. This immediate self-consciousness is not similar to ideas or sensations. We have ideas of sensible qualities or sensations but we have a notion of mind or spirit. Notion is non-sensuous apprehension or intuition. Mind or self cannot be known as an object. So, Berkeley denies the existence of material substance but acknowledges the existence of self or mind or soul-substance.

Berkeley's view of substance becomes the **subject of criticism** for the following reasons: (i) According to Berkeley, the existence of everything depends upon perception. But this view is not admitted by neo-realist philosophers. According to them, it cannot be believed that an object becomes existent only if it becomes perceptible and if it is not perceptible then it is not existent. To them, an object can be an object of perception as it exists in reality. The existence of object does not depend upon the knower.

(ii) Berkeley has not admitted the existence of substance, but he has admitted the existence of qualities. Berkeley has not admitted the existence of substance as it does not become the object of perception. But the explanation of qualities cannot be explained without the admission of substance.

(vii) View of Hume regarding the nature of Substance: According to Hume, sense experience is the only source of knowledge. The existence of anything cannot be admitted which is not known through sense experience. According to Hume, the content of the mind is perception. Hume divides perceptions into impressions and ideas. Impressions are the immediate data of experience. By an impression Hume means, 'any sensation, passion or emotion as it makes its first appearance in our minds.' By impressions Hume refers to actual external and internal sensations. An idea is a faint copy of an impression. Every idea is the image and copy of an impression. The difference between an impression and its idea consists in the 'greater force, vividness of the former'. According to Hume impressions and ideas are the only contents of the mind.

Hume denies the existence of **material substance**. He argues that any genuine idea must be derived either from the impressions of sensation or reflection. If substance were a genuine idea, it would also be derived either from any one of these two sources. If impressions of sensations be thought to be the source of substance, then it will be found that sense impressions can never give us the knowledge of material substance. It can simply give us knowledge of qualities like colour, smell, taste, temperature etc. If it is said that the idea of a material substance is derived from the impressions of reflection then it can be found that the impressions of reflection are impressions of passions and emotions, none of which denotes a substance. So a material substance has no existence in reality. A substance is a collection of certain simple ideas always found combined and to this combination we give a name to recall it according to our requirements. So for Hume the notion of substance is a fiction of the mind. It is a product of human imagination. There is no existence of any permanent material substance underlying these qualities.

Hume also denies the existence of **spiritual or mental substance** as an infinite, eternal, simple, undivided and permanent substance. According to him, all our ideas are derived from impressions. Neither external nor internal impressions can give us any knowledge of soul substance.

Hume has denied the existence of unknown and unknowable substratum as described by Locke because such a substratum underlying the mental states and processes can never be found. The self in Hume's view, is nothing more than the sum of our mental states and processes. It is nothing more than 'a collection of ideas which flow on in a continuous and regular stream'. There is no existence of any permanent and abiding soul-substance that gives unity among the discrete mental states and processes.

So, according to Hume we find that the self is nothing more than a series of mental states. The idea of unchanging permanent self underlying mental states is a figment of imagination. There is no existence of a permanent and abiding spiritual substance. The self is the sumtotal of changing mental states, and nothing more.

Hume's view of substance becomes the **subject of criticism** for the following reasons: (i) Hume has considered material substance as the combination of qualities and he has considered soul as the flow of mental actions. But if we do not admit extra existence of material substance we cannot explain that no object is identical.

(ii) Philosophers have doubts whether only on the basis of sense experience we can have the knowledge of combination of qualities. According to

some, no experience of containerless qualities is possible. Besides, only with the help of sense experience or sensations we cannot name a substance.

Exercise

- **Find out the correct alternative:**

1. John Hospers has mentioned _____ different senses of the word 'knowledge'.
(i) Two (ii) Three (iii) Four (iv) Five
2. In his philosophy _____ has mentioned two worlds: external world and internal world.
(i) Plato (ii) Aristotle (iii) Locke (iv) Descartes
3. According to _____ the objects of the external world is the mere imitation of the universal reality.
(i) Aristotle (ii) Plato (iii) Descartes (iv) Leibnitz
4. According to _____ the external world is mere imitation of the world of universal.
(i) Aristotle (ii) Plato (iii) Descartes (iv) Leibnitz
5. _____ is a dualist philosopher.
(i) Aristotle (ii) Plato (iii) Descartes (iv) Leibnitz
6. According to _____, substance is a combination of universal and particular.
(i) Aristotle (ii) Plato (iii) Descartes (iv) Leibnitz
7. According to _____, substance is individual or concrete object.
(i) Aristotle (ii) Plato (iii) Descartes (iv) Leibnitz
8. From the theory of substance of Descartes theory of _____ is deduced.
(i) Interactionism (ii) Parallelism (iii) Identity (iv) Phenomenolism
9. According to _____, god is the only substance.
(i) Plato (ii) Descartes (iii) Spinoza (iv) Berkeley
10. According to _____, matter and soul cannot be regarded as substance.
(i) Aristotle (ii) Plato (iii) Descartes (iv) Spinoza
11. _____ has tried to implement geometrical method in philosophy.
(i) Aristotle (ii) Spinoza (iii) Descartes (iv) Leibnitz
12. _____ is a pluralist philosopher.
(i) Aristotle (ii) Plato (iii) Descartes (iv) Leibnitz
13. _____ is a supporter of monism.

(i) Aristotle (ii) Spinoza (iii) Descartes (iv) Leibnitz

14. According to _____, extension and consciousness are the two main qualities among innumerable qualities of God.

(i) Aristotle (ii) Plato (iii) Descartes (iv) Leibnitz

15. According to _____, substance is self-active.

(i) Aristotle (ii) Plato (iii) Descartes (iv) Leibnitz

16. _____ has considered God as 'Monad of all monads'.

(i) Aristotle (ii) Plato (iii) Descartes (iv) Leibnitz

17. _____ has given the equation 'Substance= God = Nature'.

(i) Aristotle (ii) Plato (iii) Descartes (iv) Spinoza

18. According to _____, substance is regarded as 'partless'.

(i) Aristotle (ii) Plato (iii) Descartes (iv) Leibnitz

19. According to _____, the knowledge of substance is indirect knowledge.

(i) Plato (ii) Descartes (iii) Locke (iv) Hume

20. According to _____, qualities like extension, form, shape etc are primary qualities.

(i) Plato (ii) Descartes (iii) Locke (iv) Hume

21. The name of _____ is associated with the doctrine of pre-established harmony.

(i) Locke (ii) Hume (iii) Spinoza (iv) Leibnitz

22. _____ has denied the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.

(i) Locke (ii) Hume (iii) Spinoza (iv) Berkeley

23. According to _____, substance is a combination of qualities.

(i) Locke (ii) Hume (iii) Spinoza (iv) Berkeley

24. According to _____, soul is the combination of sensations.

(i) Locke (ii) Hume (iii) Spinoza (iv) Berkeley

25. _____ has forwarded the principles of association to explain the unity of mental acts.

(i) Locke (ii) Hume (iii) Spinoza (iv) Leibnitz

• **Answer the following questions very short:**

1. What are the features of knowledge according to Plato?
2. Give two features substance from popular view point.
3. Which philosopher is known as pluralist?

4. Which portion of brain is mentioned by Descartes to explain the relation of mind and body?
5. How does Spinoza explain extension and thought?
6. How does Leibnitz explain God?
7. How does Spinoza place his equation of substance?
8. How does Locke define substance?
9. What is the definition of substance according to Descartes?
10. How does Leibnitz define substance?
11. What is the consequence of Spinoza's theory of substance?
12. How many substances are admitted by Descartes?
13. What is monad according to Leibnitz?
14. Which philosopher is called dualist?
15. Which philosopher has introduced the Doctrine of Pre-established Harmony?
16. How many monads are admitted by Leibnitz?
17. Give two features of substance according to Aristotle.
18. What is the basis of the doctrine of substance of Leibnitz?
19. Which rationalist philosopher is known as pantheist?
20. How many complex ideas are admitted by Locke?
21. What is the consequence of Spinoza's view?
22. Which rationalist philosopher is called monist?
23. Give some features of monad as forwarded by Leibnitz?
24. Which world is real according to Plato?
25. What is the nature of external world according to Plato?
26. Why do we call Descartes dualist?
27. Which philosopher has forwarded the interaction between mind and body?
28. How many monads are admitted in Leibnitz's philosophy?
29. Which rationalist philosopher is called pantheist?
30. How does Leibnitz identify God?

Chapter – 4

CAUSALITY

(10 marks allotted)

MCQ – 1X2 = 2

DAQ – 8X1 = 8

(a) General notion of Causal Relation: according to ordinary human conception, causal relation is an internal relation. In reality we believe that no events take place without any cause. If the condition of occurrence of cause and effect occurs in future the same cause will cause the same effect. Therefore, from the viewpoint of common people cause is a kind of force which actively produces effect and causal relation is a relation of producer and product. By analyzing the common view of cause we get the following features of cause: (a) cause is an event prior to effect; (b) effect will necessarily occur if cause occurs; (c) cause produces the effect.

Science also identifies cause as force being consistent with the ordinary or common notion of cause. With the help of the law of conservation of energy science says that there is no quantitative difference between cause and effect, only there is difference of quality. The relation of cause and effect is universal and necessary.

Therefore, causal relation is very much important in case of science and ordinary world. In case of science when we infer any unknown event from any known event then we are bound to take the help of the event of causal relation. The conclusions of inferences become universal in some cases and in some cases they are expressed as forecast of particular events. In both these cases we require the use of the concept of cause-effect.

The common sense view of causality has some limitations. As per this conception we can explain the causal relation among material objects. But this view cannot explain the causal relation between material body and spiritual mind. In the common sense view we cannot get the explanation how material energy becomes transformed into mental energy.

(b) Entailment theory of Causal Relation: Among the rationalist philosophers Descartes, Spinoza etc believe that there is a necessary relation between cause and effect. This view of rationalism is called necessary theory or Entailment theory of cause. It is considered that necessary theory of causation is based upon the common

sense view of cause. Besides, among the views of Locke and Berkeley causal relation is considered necessary relation. Locke considered cause such an active force which necessarily produces effect. Similarly Berkeley described mental force or energy as divine force or power and said that God is the only cause and everything of this universe is the effect created by God.

According to necessary or Entailment theory of cause there is always a necessary relation between cause and effect. If the relation between cause and effect is described only with the help of succession then we cannot explain the repetition of same effect after the occurrence of same cause. In that case we only can say that the event of death as effect follows the event of taking poison as cause. We will never be able to say that 'taking poison is the cause of death'. For this we have to say that the relation between cause and effect is universal and necessary. Rationalists considered this necessary relation between cause and effect the Entailment relation. According to them, in valid deductive inference there is a relation of necessity or Entailment. Almost similar kind of necessary relation prevails between cause and effect. In valid deductive inference the conclusion necessarily follows from the premise and if the premise is true then the conclusion can never be false. This necessary relation between the premise and the conclusion is called the relation of Entailment. Similarly the rationalists said that this like the Entailment relation between the premise and conclusion similar relation of Entailment can prevail between two events. But Entailment relation of logic and Entailment between cause and effect in our daily life are not identical, there is Entailment like relation between cause and effect. According to rationalism, the relation between cause and effect is like that of the relation between the premise and conclusion of a valid deductive argument. Descartes, Spinoza, Broad, Brand Blanshard, Ewing etc are some of the supporters of the Entailment theory of Causation.

Ewing has forwarded two arguments in support of the theory of Entailment: (i) In case of valid deductive argument we can infer the conclusion necessarily from the premise, similarly we can infer the effect from the cause. The statement which expresses the cause is the premise and the statement which expresses the effect is called the conclusion. Ewing said that if there could not be this kind of necessary relation between cause and effect, then we could not infer the effect from the cause.

(ii) Maintaining consistency with theory of succession or regularity if it is said that 'there is no necessary relation between cause and effect, there is only relation of regularity', then we cannot get any scientific explanation of cause and effect. If it is admitted that the reason of occurrence of effect is kept within the cause then only we can get reasonable explanation of cause and effect. So, if cause is responsible for

effect then we must admit that there is any necessary relation like logical entailment between cause and effect.

In case of logical entailment there is no temporal difference between cause and effect, but there must be temporal difference between cause and effect. For this reason rationalists said that the relation between cause and effect is not Entailment relation, but the relation is like entailment relation. In support of their view about cause and effect the rationalists at least said that there is a similar entailment relation like entailment between cause and effect.

For the following reasons the theory of Entailment relation between cause and effect has been criticized from various corners: (i) As cause and effect are two separate events we cannot get the effect by analyzing the cause. As the analytic propositions can only claim universal truth and as the causal statements are not analytic, so we cannot get the effect from our analysis of the idea of cause. Our bodies are nourished for drinking milk. By observing these facts it cannot be said that we will get the idea of 'nourishment' (effect) from the idea of 'drinking milk' (cause). From this view point empiricist Hume said that, as the idea of effect cannot be received from our analysis of cause, so there is no necessary relation between cause and effect.

(ii) The supporters of Entailment relation considered cause and effect identical. But in reality these two facts indicate two different meanings. Reason may mean 'as' or 'because' and in that case it may not mean 'cause'.

(iii) The main defect of Entailment theory is that this theory cannot explain the exact nature of causal entailment. Supporters of entailment theory only said that there is a relation like logical entailment between cause and effect. But in this way we cannot get any positive explanation of causal entailment only by saying 'there is similarity between logical entailment and causal relation'.

(c) Hume's Empirical View of Causal Relation: – In western philosophy Locke, Berkeley and Hume are the main supporters of empiricism. But Hume's view is different from that of the views of predecessors Locke and Berkeley. Being consistent with the principles of empiricism Hume said that there is no necessary relation between cause and effect, rather there is relation of constant conjunction between cause and effect. He has tried to prove this view from two angles. Negatively he has tried to refute the relation of necessity between cause and effect. Positively they have placed the relation of constant conjunction or regular succession between cause and effect.

(i) Denial of Necessary Connection between cause and effect: Negatively **Hume** said that causal relation is not necessary relation. By criticizing the common

sense view of causation Hume said that there is no material necessity between cause and effect, rather there is mental necessity between the two. Hume's argument can be placed in the following manner: (i) According to Hume, the knowledge about the real world in our daily life is only originated through sense experience. In this experience we get the cause and effect as two separate events. We see that cause is the universal unchangeable antecedent of the effect and effect is the universal unchangeable consequent of the cause. In addition to this we do not get any idea of 'power' or 'force' in the cause or we do not get any knowledge of 'necessary relation' among cause and effect in our experience. For this reason Hume said that it is meaningless to admit the real existence of what is not got in our experience.

(ii) Hume thought that the knowledge of necessary relation cannot be received through any rational or a priori reasoning. Only if two events are totally different then only we can get the knowledge of necessary relation through the help of a priori reasoning. Hume said that only in cases of mathematical propositions we can get identity of two propositions, because mathematical propositions are analytic and imagination of its opposite involves contradiction. But no events of our daily life are totally identical. It is true that drinking milk causes nourishment, but there is no harm in thinking its opposite. In reality if we analyse one idea between the two then cannot get the idea of the other because there is no causal relation between these two events. So, Hume said that if there could have any necessary relation between them in reality then we could have received the idea of the effect by analyzing the idea of the cause.

(ii) Causality as constant conjunction and regular succession: From the positive side Hume thought that there is a relation of constant conjunction or regularity between the cause and effect. When we observe two events to be repeatedly connected to one another, then the event which always becomes prior to the other is the cause and the event which always occurs after is the effect. So there is a relation of succession between cause and effect. Cause occurs first and effect occurs later on.

According to Hume, the traditional necessity which we speak to between cause and effect does not remain present in the material world; it remains present in the mental world. Hume considered this necessity as a kind of 'custom bred expectation'. In our experience we observe the repeated presence of fire and burning together and thus these two events are connected in such a way that when we observe the first one we expect the presence of the second.

(d) Evaluation of Hume's theory: From various corners Hume's view of causation is severely criticized: (i) There may be relation of regularity or constant conjunction between two events, but from this those two events cannot be

considered causally connected. For example, we can hear the sound of prayer in a mosque in Murshidabad at 4am in the morning and at the same time we can hear a prayer in a mosque in Kolkata. But from this we cannot conclude that the prayer in Murshidabad is the cause of the prayer in Kolkata.

(ii) Hume's view of causation cannot explain complex events like economic disaster or war as no relation of constant conjunction can be shown in these cases. For example, Hitler's attack on Poland is considered as an important cause of Second World War. But these two events cannot be said to be related with constant conjunction. For this reason Mill said that cause should be considered unconditional universal antecedent without considering it only universal antecedent. According to Mill, if we consider cause as universal antecedent of the effect then we have to consider day as the cause of night and vice versa. But there is no real causal relation between the two.

(iii) Kant has criticized the view of Hume regarding causation and said that the idea of causation is a priori; it is not empirical or a posteriori. The idea of causality acts as the basis of our experience as an a priori idea of knowledge. So, we do not get the knowledge of causality through our sense experience because this knowledge remains present in our mind prior to our sense experience.

Exercise

- **Find out the correct alternative:**

1. The _____ theory Causal relation cannot explain the Causal relation between material body and conscious mind.
(i) Commonsense (ii) Entailment (iii) Regularity (iv) Identity
2. Generally _____ philosophers are supporters of Entailment theory of Causal relation.
(i) Rationalist (ii) Empiricist (iii) Critical (iv) Intuitionist
3. In valid _____ argument the conclusion necessarily follows from the premise.
(i) Inductive (ii) Deductive (iii) Commonsense (iv) Mathematical
4. According to _____, like two propositions entailment relation is there in cases of relations between two events.
(i) Empiricism (ii) Rationalism (iii) Critical Philosophy (iv) Phenomenolism
5. Descartes, Spinoza, Broad, Blanshard etc are the supporters of _____ theory of Causation.

- (i) Regularity (ii) Entailment (iii) Identity (iv) Interactive
6. According to _____ effect can be inferred from cause as there is necessary relation between cause and effect.
(i) Hume (ii) Kant (iii) Ewing (iv) Leibnitz
7. According to _____ philosophy, Causal relation is not Entailment, like-entailment.
(i) Empiricist (ii) Rationalist (iii) Intuitionist (iv) Critical
8. According to _____, cause is an 'active force' which necessarily produces effect.
(i) Locke (ii) Berkeley (iii) Hume (iv) Ewing
9. According to _____, God is the only cause and everything in this universe is His effect.
(i) Locke (ii) Berkeley (iii) Hume (iv) Ewing
10. _____ said that there is no 'material necessity' in Causal relation, there is 'mental necessity'.
(i) Locke (ii) Berkeley (iii) Hume (iv) Ewing
11. According to _____, the traditional necessity between cause and effect lies in our mental world.
(i) Locke (ii) Berkeley (iii) Hume (iv) Ewing
12. _____ thought that the traditional necessity between cause and effect is nothing but mental breed expectation.
(i) Locke (ii) Berkeley (iii) Hume (iv) Ewing
13. According to _____, if there could have any necessity between cause and effect then we could have received the idea of effect by analyzing the idea of cause.
(i) Locke (ii) Berkeley (iii) Hume (iv) Ewing
14. The _____ theory of Causation cannot explain complex events like economic disaster or war.
(i) Entailment (ii) Regularity (iii) Identity (iv) Commonsense
15. According to _____, Cause should be considered unconditional, universal antecedent without considering it only universal antecedent.
(i) Locke (ii) Berkeley (iii) Hume (iv) Mill
16. According to _____ theory, memory cannot be explained.
(i) Regularity (ii) Identity (iii) Entailment (iv) Interactive
17. According to _____, the idea of Cause and Effect is a priori, not a posteriori.
(i) Locke (ii) Hume (iii) Mill (iv) Kant

18. According to _____, the knowledge of cause and effect remains present in our mind prior to our sense experience.
(i) Locke (ii) Hume (iii) Kant (iv) Mill
19. In case of _____ entailment there is no temporal difference between premise and conclusion.
(i) Logical (ii) Temporal (iii) Causal (iv) Interactive
20. _____ said that the knowledge of necessary relation cannot be obtained through a priori reasoning.
(i) Locke (ii) Berkeley (iii) Hume (iv) Ewing
21. The basis of the Causal relation of _____ is Commonsense view.
(i) Rationalism (ii) Empiricism (iii) Critical theory (iv) Intuitionism
22. If the premise of valid deductive argument is _____ then the conclusion can never be false.
(i) True (ii) False (iii) Uncertain (iv) Certain
23. According to _____, the law of causal relation is a 'form of law'.
(i) Locke (ii) Hume (iii) Kant (iv) Mill
24. According to _____, the necessary relation between cause and effect is originated from custom breed expectation.
(i) Rationalism (ii) Empiricism (iii) Critical theory (iv) Idealist
25. According to _____, cause and effect are two separate events.
(i) Locke (ii) Berkeley (iii) Hume (iv) Mill

• **Give the answer of the following questions (within almost 200 words)**

1. Describe the commonsense view of Causal relation critically. Mention some features of Cause in this regard.
2. What is the meaning of Entailment? Explain critically the rationalist view of causation.
3. Discuss the Entailment theory of Causal relation critically.
4. Critically evaluate Hume's view of Causation.
5. What is the meaning of regularity of causation? Explain critically Hume's theory of Causation in this regard.

Chapter – 5

REALISM AND IDEALISM

(10 marks allotted)

MCQ – 1X2 = 2

DAQ -- 8X1 = 8

(i) Realism: Knowledge always expresses relation between knower and knowing object. But the question is: What is the nature of knowing object? Whether the knowing object has existence independent to knowledge or, its existence dependent upon knowing or unknowing of the knower? On the basis of this question philosophers are divided into many categories. According to a portion, the object of knowledge has existence independent to knowledge of value. The object of knowledge is no way dependent upon knowledge. Object comes to us only as they appear to us in the external world. These philosophers are known as realists.

(a) Notion of Realism: Among the realist philosophers some believe that the existence, quality and all features are independent to our knowledge. We directly get those objects in our knowledge. This view is known as Naïve Realism. On the other hand some realists believe that among the qualities of the object only primary qualities are existent independent to our mind. Besides, we do not get objects directly in our experience. Our knowledge of objects starts indirectly through the knowledge of the ideas of the objects. This form of realism is known as Representative realism or scientific realism. Locke is the main propounder of this kind of realism.

Following are the basic tenets of Realism: (i) In our external world many objects have independent existence which become the object of our knowledge. But for that we cannot say that the existence of those objects does not depend upon the knowing or unknowing of the knower. So, according to realism, the existence of objects in no way is dependent or influenced by knowledge, rather knowledge is influenced by objects.

(ii) Realists think that there is no internal relation between the object and knowledge. An object can exist without being the subject matter of knowledge. For this realists believe in the external relation between object and knowledge and said that an object can independently exist without being the subject matter of knowledge.

(iii) Realists preach the plurality of realities. As per this view in the external world many external objects are independently existent.

(iv) According to realism, we can know the external objects either directly or indirectly. But whatever be the process of knowing, knowledge cannot create its object; rather object creates the knowledge. For this realists say that objects are not consequent to knowledge, rather knowledge is consequent to object.

(v) According to realism, sometimes we know such objects which do not have existence in reality. These happen in cases of illusory perceptions. From this angle also it can be said that knowledge and its objects are not identical.

(vi) According to realism, there are many objects which are unknown to us, which are not discovered yet. From this realists conclude that when we know any object then only that object cannot be existent, even when we do not know that object that may be existent.

* **Naïve Realism:** This kind of realism takes for granted that there is a world external to and independent of mind. It also holds that world is full of independent objects possessing qualities. The mind exactly knows the things of the world and its qualities as they are in themselves. The physical objects and their qualities are known in their true character by our sense organs. Our consciousness is like a searchlight which reveals the things in their exact form and the mode of our knowing does not in any way bring about any change in the nature of the things perceived or known. The existence of objects and their qualities do not depend on their being known by any mind, finite and infinite. Objects or things of the world have extra-mental reality. The independent existence of the object is not in any way lost by the fact of their being known by any mind. Though things of the world exist independently of all knowledge, they are directly presented to consciousness and not through any images or copies of the objects. Our ideas of the objects are exact copies of external real things much in the same sense in which pictures are copies of the originals or in which images in a mirror reflect their causes.

This view is known as commonsense view. Common people think that there is a world of things, existing outside and independent of mind. They also believe that this world will exist all the same whether there is any mind to perceive it or not. Commonsense also takes for granted that we perceive this world directly and we perceive this world as it is in itself. As these contentions are the object of popular belief, Naïve realism is also called Popular realism.

This realistic view of the common people or Naïve realism is found to have many shortcomings. Some of its major inconsistencies may be stated below.

(i) This theory fails to explain cases of erroneous perceptions. If in perception things are revealed to us in their true character, then, how is it that we take a piece of rope to be a snake? This is a case of illusion. Besides, how is it possible to see a

disembodied ghost or apparition when there is none present nearby in the darkness of night? This is also a case of erroneous perception, known as hallucination having no objective or sensory basis but caused by subjective factors. In dreams also, we have many experiences which prove false in waking state. So in dream there is no real perception. Naïve realism cannot explain erroneous perceptions, like illusions, hallucinations and dreams.

(ii) If we analyse our ordinary case of perception, we find a thing may appear tasteful to one perception, but may appear tasteless to another. So the view of the naïve realists, that all qualities are seated in the objects does not seem to be correct. This also proves that what we perceive does not depend on the nature of the object but on the mind that perceives. Hospers observes, "As long as the content of perceptions depends so much on the nature of perceiving organ, and as long as we are unable to shed our perceiving organs as we do spectacles to try out other ones, how can we be so sure that we are perceiving things as they are?"

(iii) Perceptions also vary according to change of circumstances. The size of an object varies if perceived from different perceptions. A stick looks bent when half-immersed in water but looks straight when taken out of it.

For these above reasons Naïve realism or Commonsense realism is proved to be an unsatisfactory theory.

* **Representative Realism:** The branch of realism which considers independent existence of objects and the branch which admits the knowledge of objects as indirect through ideas or images are called Representative realism or Scientific realism. John Locke was the main supporter of this view. Representative realism has following features: (i) many objects are there in the external world; (ii) the existence of external objects does not depend upon our sense organ; (iii) in our sense experience we do not get the object directly, but we get the idea or image of the object; (iv) if we get the idea of primary qualities then that will be similar to the features of the object and if we get the idea of secondary qualities then that will not be similar to the features of the object; (v) the qualities or features of the objects are sensible, not the knowledge of objects.

(b) Main tenets of Locke's Representative Realism: Locke showed that naïve realism cannot properly explain false perception, hallucination, dream etc. For this he tried to explain these events and he tried to put his view on the basis of contemporary scientific thoughts. This view is called 'Representative realism' because as per this view we cannot get the objects directly, we get the objects indirectly through ideas or images. Through these images we can know the objects. This theory is called scientific realism because this view is based upon contemporary scientific thinking.

According to Locke, our mind is like a visible screen on which ideas or images of objects are reflected. We know objects through these ideas. When these ideas or images become consistent or similar to the objects then our knowledge become true; when these objects do not become similar or consistent with the objects then our knowledge becomes false.

Locke divided the qualities into two types: primary and secondary. The qualities which really remain present in the object are called primary qualities. For example, extension, form, volume etc are examples of primary qualities. Primary qualities are objective, because these qualities are really images of the object. On the other hand, the qualities which do not remain present in the object in reality, rather these qualities are imposed upon the object by human mind. For example, colour, smell, taste etc are examples of secondary qualities. These qualities are subjective because these qualities remain present in human mind and become different man to man.

Locke said that we get the idea or image of qualities through our sense organs. These ideas differ twice as primary and secondary qualities. The ideas of primary qualities are similar to the objective features, but the ideas of secondary qualities are different from objective features. Locke said that as the qualities cannot be positioned in the vacant place, so, there must be some container of these qualities. This container or substratum is substance.

Though representative realism is an improved form of realism, it has following shortcomings: (i) Locke's representative realism cannot judge the truth or falsity of knowledge. According to Locke, if the object has similarity with its idea then the knowledge will be true and if the object is not similar to its idea then the knowledge will be false. But in reality if the object is not perceived at least once then it is not possible to know whether the object is similar or consistent to the idea or not.

(ii) Many philosophers have considered Locke's view as 'iron curtain theory' because here it is said that only ideas can be known directly and the object does not directly come in contact with our sense organs. In this view a curtain of iron is imagined which cannot be overcome. There is no scope of knowing what is there on the opposite side.

(iii) Regarding the distinction of primary and secondary qualities as forwarded by Locke, Berkeley has said that like the secondary qualities primary qualities also are dependent upon the knowing mind, condition and distance of sense organs etc. So, if secondary qualities become ideas of mind for being dependent upon sense organs, then the primary qualities will be the ideas of minds. Besides, primary and secondary qualities are inseparable with each other. One cannot be known without the other.

(iv) Many philosophers said that subjective Idealism is the ultimate consequence of representative realism. If we cannot get immediate knowledge of external objects and we can get only ideas of mind then it cannot be said the external world is existent. For this our knowledge will become confined within the ideas of mind. From this source Berkeley has established his Subjective Idealism later on. For this it is said that Locke's representative realism has helped the creation of Berkeley's Subjective Idealism.

Locke and Berkeley's opinion about the distinction between Primary and Secondary qualities: Locke has divided the qualities of objects into two types: primary and secondary qualities. The qualities which actually remain present in the object are primary qualities. Extension, motion, form, volume etc are examples of primary qualities. Primary qualities are objective because these are really the nature of the objects and remain present in the objects in reality. The existence of these qualities does not depend upon the perception of any individual mind. On the other hand, there are some qualities which do not remain present in the objects in reality; rather these are imposed by the individual minds in the objects. These are secondary qualities. Colour, sound, taste, smell etc are examples of secondary qualities. Secondary qualities are subjective because these remain present as the qualities of our minds or sensations. These qualities are different from man to man. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities as made by Locke was admitted by the contemporary scientists of Europe. For this reason Locke's view is called Scientific realism.

Locke has put forwarded following arguments in support of the distinctions between primary and secondary qualities: (i) according to Locke, as the primary qualities are objective these qualities do not differ from man to man. But secondary qualities differ from man to man. For example, a green mango can be sweet to one, but the same mango can be sour to another. From this it is understood that the quality of 'taste' is secondary quality and that is subjective. But the form, size etc of the mango is not different to everyone. So these qualities are primary qualities.

(ii) Locke thought that primary qualities do not become different to a same person in different time. But the secondary qualities become different to a person in different times. For example, if a person is given 'sweet', his favourite food, continuously after a period of time that would become tasteless to him. From this it is proved that the quality of 'taste' is subjective.

(iii) the secondary qualities as admitted by Locke cannot remain present without sense organ, but the primary qualities can be there without the sense organs. Colour, sound etc cannot become existent without the senses of sight and ear respectively.

But the primary qualities can become existent without sense organs. So, primary qualities are objective and secondary qualities are subjective.

(iv) The primary qualities are not changeable, but the secondary qualities are changeable. For example, if butter is heated then its colour would change. But the primary qualities change in no way. So, it can be said that the secondary qualities do not remain present in the objects; rather these remain present in individual mind.

Berkeley has criticized the above views of Locke with the help of the following arguments: (i) according to Berkeley, if the secondary qualities become the ideas of minds for being dependent upon sense organs then the primary qualities are also subjective because the primary qualities are also perceptible through sense organs. For example, a circular coin is really circular though it appears different to different persons from different angles. So, qualities shape, size and form etc are also dependent upon sense organs and changeable.

(ii) Berkeley said that like the secondary qualities primary qualities also differ from man to man. For example, a certain object may appear light to a person and the same object may become heavy to another person. From this it can be said that primary qualities like 'weight', 'volume' etc may become different from man to man.

(iii) According to Berkeley, like the secondary qualities the primary qualities also become different to a person in different times. For example, a kite goes high up on the sky gradually and becomes small to smaller. From this it is proved that primary qualities like 'form', 'volume' etc are subjective.

(v) Berkeley thought that primary qualities and secondary qualities are inseparably related to each other. Without the one the other cannot be perceived. For example, the colour of an object cannot be perceived without the form of that object; besides colourless pure form cannot be perceived.

On the basis of the above arguments Berkeley concluded that there is no difference between primary qualities and secondary qualities. He considered both these qualities dependent upon perception and mind. Idealist Berkeley concluded that primary qualities and secondary qualities are nothing more than ideas of minds.

(ii) Idealism: According to Idealism there is no existence of any external object independent to mind and knowledge as the object of knowledge. Knowable objects are naturally dependent upon knowing minds. In Idealism nothing independent to mind or knowledge is admitted. No parts of the material world or mental world are composed with unconscious components. Mind or consciousness is the actual reality.

In Western Philosophy we find two forms of Idealism: Subjective Idealism and Objective Idealism. The propounder of the first is Berkeley and the propounder of the

second is Hegel. As per the first Idealism, the reality of object depends upon the knowledge of man. As per the second Idealism, both the material world and the mental world are mutually dependent parts of a supreme consciousness. As Berkeley has established his Idealism from the view point of epistemology his idealism is known as Epistemological Idealism. On the other hand, Hegel has tried to establish his idealism from the view point of Metaphysics. So, his idealism is known as Metaphysical Idealism.

(a) Notion of Idealism: The main tenets of Idealism can be explained in the following way: (i) The relation between the object and knowledge is internal relation. So, there can be no independent existence of object without knowledge. Whenever we know any object we know it in relation to its knowledge. Therefore, object has no independent existence without its knowledge.

(ii) According to Idealism, all objects are dependent upon knowledge. If we discuss about any object it becomes the object of our knowledge. In reality the imagination of thought or object independent to knowledge is an impossible event.

(iii) The Idealists criticized the Empiricist view that 'objects form the knowledge' and said that 'knowledge makes the objects'. Objects are influenced and controlled by knowledge. The formation of object becomes possible by following the consciousness or ideas of the knowledge.

(iv) As Idealists believe in the existence of a supreme reality they are known as Monists. According to Idealists, mind or consciousness is the supreme reality. In some cases we can doubt about the existence of the knowing objects, but we cannot doubt about the existence of mind or knowledge.

(v) According to Idealism, object and consciousness are identical. Object is the creation of consciousness. There can be nothing existent without the consciousness of the object. But according to Subjective Idealism, object is the consciousness of human mind; as per Objective Idealism, object is the consciousness of the universal mind.

(vi) The Idealists are supporters of Coherence theory of Truth. Being consistent with Coherence theory Idealists said that when a particular proposition becomes consistent with some other pre-established propositions, then that particular proposition will be considered true and if it does not become consistent it will be false.

(b) Berkeley's Subjective Idealism: "Esse Est Percipi": In Western philosophy Berkeley is the first and foremost propounder of Subjective Idealism. According to Subjective Idealism, the existence of object depends upon knowing mind and traditional object or features of object are mere ideas of knowing mind.

As a consequence of the epistemological view of Locke Berkeley has established his Subjective Idealism. Locke said that we can only perceive the ideas of mind and through these ideas we can indirectly infer the existence of objects. But Berkeley said that if we know the ideas of mind in place of the objects, then there is no logical ground of saying that there are objects behind these ideas.

In his view Locke has distinguished between primary and secondary qualities and admitted the existence of substance as the unknown and unknowable substratum of primary qualities. But Berkeley said that if we know the ideas of our minds then it is meaningless to admit the existence of any substance as the substratum of these qualities. Besides, Berkeley has denied the distinction between primary and secondary qualities and said that all qualities are secondary and all qualities are mental. Like secondary qualities primary qualities also are dependent upon the mind of the knower, the condition of the sense organ, distance etc. Moreover, the colour or smell of an object cannot be perceived without the form of that object. Besides, the perception of pure colourless form of an object is not possible. So, both these qualities are mental and dependent upon perception. If all qualities are mental, then there will not be any external and extra-mental existence of material substance as the 'substratum' of primary qualities. Everything will be converted to the ideas of mind. So, there is nothing like substance, whatever is that is only mind and the ideas of mind.

According to Berkeley, as without perception no knowledge is possible so whatever has quality of being perceived is true or real. Knowable objects are only collection of some qualities and those qualities are ideas of our minds. From this it can be said that the external world is mainly the world of ideas. So, Berkeley concluded 'Esse est Percipi' or, the meaning of being exist is being perceived as ideas of any particular mind. Whatever is known can be only existent. So, whatever is called substance or features of substance is nothing but the ideas of our minds.

When Berkeley said that when anything has existence it means that it is only perceptible then he only said about the sensible objects. For this it can be said that Berkeley's full dictum is: 'Esse est percipiout percipere'. So, existence means knowledge or knower. Therefore, according to Berkeley, existent objects are two types: known objects and knower or mind.

If we have to say as per the opinion of Berkeley that 'existence' means 'knowledge' then the continuity of the object cannot be explained. For solving this problem Berkeley has introduced the existence of God in his philosophy. To him, the continuous existence of object is not only dependent upon the perception of individual mind. As finite animal when we do not perceive any object, it becomes

existent as the matter of perception of God. God as infinite, omnipotent and omnipresent can perceive everything. Whenever anything becomes the object of our perception, then that becomes existent as the idea of God. From this view point Berkeley said that all objects exist as the ideas of God and our perception is the idea of God's mind perceived from a limited view point.

Berkeley's Subjective Idealism is severely charged with the following criticisms: (i) Among the modern philosophers Moore, Alexander, Russell, Perry etc have severely criticized Berkeley's Subjective Idealism. Moore in his essay '*Refutation of Idealism*' has said that Berkeley could not make the distinction between the process of sensation and its object. Sensation is a mental process because without process of sensation is not possible without mind. But the object of sensation may be possible without mind. Moore said that if there is no difference between the process of sensation and object of sensation then we cannot differentiate between two sensations.

(ii) British philosopher Alexander said that whenever we know any object we know its known object. But from this it cannot be said that no object can exist without being perceived.

(iii) Neo-realist Perry has forwarded some arguments against Berkeley. Among his criticisms the most important is Fallacy of ego-centric predicament. Knowledge always presupposes a knower. If we want to know any object we must know it previously because we cannot know anything about an object or we cannot form a statement about an object which is not known. From this Berkeley concluded that whatever is not known cannot be existent. In his theory if Berkeley said that 'its existence cannot be known' without saying 'it cannot have existence' then no fallacy took place in his theory. But his theory has committed the fallacy of ego-centricity not for saying so.

(iv) Russell in his criticism has said that the invalidity of Berkeley's theory could be understood if it is placed in the form of an argument. In support of his Subjective Idealism Berkeley's argument is: idea is such whose existence depends upon minds; objects are ideas; therefore, object is such whose existence depends upon minds. Russell said that in this argument the word 'idea' is used in two sentences in two different senses. In the first sentence the word 'idea' is used as sensation-process. But in the second sentence the word is used as the object of sensation. If a same word is used in a single argument twice in two different senses then the meaning of the term becomes obscure and the argument does not remain valid.

Role of God in Berkeley's philosophy: According to Berkeley, 'any object is existent' means it is perceived by anyone. But for admitting this, an abnormal

consequence has to be admitted. If the existence of external object depends upon the ideas of our minds then it has to be said that an object will not be there if its idea is not in the mind. Thus if we admit Berkeley's view then we have to say that the existence of all objects are momentary. They do not have continuous existence. Thus in Berkeley's philosophy we can become assured about the existence of human mind and the ideas of these minds. If the independent existence of the external world is dependent upon me in this way and if my mind becomes the only certain substance then Berkeley's opinion will be Solipsism. But Berkeley did not deny that whatever seems to be existent in the real world has continuous existence. So, though Berkeley admits that the existence of the world is not dependent upon the idea of our mind, he has tried to establish the continuous existence of reality. The existence of God helps the continuous existence of God and makes the view of opinion of Berkeley free from Solipsism.

According to Berkeley, God created different ideas in our minds. God influenced our minds by whatever I perceive. But I do not create the ideas of those objects in our minds what we call natural substances. As these are 'ideas' these must be ideas of any mind. But these are not created by me or not by the minds. Therefore, these must be supported to any other minds. This mind is not our finite minds, so Berkeley considered this as divine Infinite mind. The world is supported in the idea of the mind of God. The perception of God is universal. Through this universal perception the world gets a continuous existence.

Though Berkeley is admitted as Subjective Idealist, he has not admitted the external existence of sensible objects. When we do not perceive the world then also the world remains existent. He has not considered this statement meaningless.

Then also Berkeley's conclusion cannot be considered realists. 'There is a book on the table' – the realistic meaning of this that if a person enters in a room then he will see the book on the table. But Berkeley does not want to say that. To him, 'there is book on the table'- means when a person is not perceiving this object then also it becomes the object of God's mind.

Though Berkeley considered the existence of sensible object as dependent upon mind, then also dependence of mind is of two kinds. The existence of objects depends upon human mind and upon the mind of God. Though the existence of object depends upon human minds Berkeley considered that reality relative existence or reality. The existence or reality which is established through the perception of God is called universal reality or existence. The world remains universally present before the mind of God. But whatever the dependence of the

object for being existed it expresses dependence upon any mind. Therefore, Berkeley's philosophy is an idealistic philosopher.

Evaluation of the view: For explaining the problem of the continuity of objects Berkeley has admitted the existence of God. But a question rose whether he can admit the existence of God as an empiricist philosopher. As per the basic status of empiricism nothing like God can be admitted because entities like God are not the object of sense perception. So, the admission of God as made by Berkeley is very much inconsistent with the basic principle of Empiricism.

But if Berkeley could not take the help of the hypothesis of God for this purpose then the whole world would become the idea of human mind. This would follow the conclusion of Solipsism 'only I and my ideas are existent'. For this reason many philosophers said that necessary consequence of Berkeley's idealism is Solipsism.

Exercise

- **Find out the correct alternative:**

1. According to _____ the object of knowledge has existence independent to knowledge.
(i) Empiricism (ii) Rationalism (iii) Realism (iv) Idealism
2. According to _____, there is existence of many external objects.
(i) Empiricism (ii) Rationalism (iii) Realism (iv) Idealism
3. According to _____, there is no internal relation between object and its knowledge.
(i) Empiricism (ii) Rationalism (iii) Realism (iv) Idealism
4. According to _____, we can know external objects either directly or indirectly.
(i) Empiricism (ii) Rationalism (iii) Realism (iv) Idealism
5. The realism of Locke is known as _____ realism.
(i) Scientific (ii) Popular (iii) Unscientific (iv) Simple
6. According to _____, object is not consequent to knowledge; rather knowledge is consequent to object.
(i) Empiricism (ii) Rationalism (iii) Realism (iv) Idealism
7. According to _____ realism, qualities like colour, taste, smell etc. which we know are actual qualities of objects.
(i) Scientific (ii) Popular (iii) Representative (iv) Neo
8. According to _____ our mind is like a search light.
(i) Empiricism (ii) Rationalism (iii) Realism (iv) Idealism
9. _____ Realism is also known as 'Common sense view'.

- (i) Scientific (ii) Popular (iii) Representative (iv) Neo
 10. _____ Realism cannot give explanation of illusory perception or hallucination.
- (i) Scientific (ii) Popular (iii) Representative (iv) Neo
 11. According to _____ Realism, our mind is like a visible screen on which the idea or impression object is reflected.
- (i) Scientific (ii) Popular (iii) Representative (iv) Neo
 12. According to _____, when ideas or impressions assemble with the objects then our knowledge becomes true.
- (i) Locke (ii) Berkeley (iii) Hume (iv) Mill
 13. According to _____ realism, we do not directly get the objects through our sense experience; rather we get the ideas or images of those objects.
- (i) Scientific (ii) Popular (iii) Representative (iv) Neo
 14. According to _____ realism, we know the objects through their ideas or images.
- (i) Scientific (ii) Popular (iii) Representative (iv) Neo
 15. The main propounder of Scientific realism is _____.
- (i) Locke (ii) Berkeley (iii) Hume (iv) Mill
 16. _____ has denied the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
- (i) Locke (ii) Berkeley (iii) Hume (iv) Mill
 17. _____ has considered both primary and secondary qualities subjective.
- (i) Locke (ii) Berkeley (iii) Hume (iv) Mill
 18. Realists are generally considered _____.
- (i) Monists (ii) Pluralists (iii) Dualists (iv) Interactionists
 19. The way of Subjective Idealism is widened by _____.
- (i) Naïve realists (ii) Representative realists
 (iii) Objective Idealists (iv) Intuitionists
 20. According to _____, all qualities are secondary qualities.
- (i) Locke (ii) Berkeley (iii) Hume (iv) Mill
 21. According to _____, object and its consciousness are not different.
- (i) Realism (ii) Idealism (iii) Critical theory (iv) Phenomenologist
 22. According to _____ there is no existence of abstract material substance.
- (i) Locke (ii) Berkeley (iii) Descartes (iv) Spinoza
 23. According to _____ the world is the expression of the supreme reality.
- (i) Locke (ii) Berkeley (iii) Hume (iv) Mill

24. According to _____, primary qualities are also subjective.
 (i) Locke (ii) Berkeley (iii) Hume (iv) Mill
25. The view of _____ is called Epistemological Idealism.
 (i) Locke (ii) Berkeley (iii) Bradley (iv) Hegel
26. According to _____, the primary qualities are nothing other than ideas of minds.
 (i) Locke (ii) Berkeley (iii) Bradley (iv) Hegel
27. The view of _____ called Metaphysical Idealism.
 (i) Locke (ii) Berkeley (iii) Bradley (iv) Hegel
28. According to Idealism, the _____ existence of object depends upon the perception of minds.
 (i) Metaphysical (ii) Phenomenal (iii) Actual (iv) Logical
29. The supporters of _____ believe in the monistic reality.
 (i) Realism (ii) Idealism (iii) Critical theory (iv) Phenomenologists
30. 'The existence of objects depends upon the knowing minds.' – this is the view of _____.
 (i) Realists (ii) Idealists (iii) Critical philosophers (iv) Phenomenologists

• **Answer the following questions (answer within almost 200 words):**

1. What is Realism? What are the basic tenets of realism? Mention the different forms of realism in this regard.
2. What is Naïve realism? Are the basic tenets of Naïve realism satisfactory? Discuss critically.
3. What is representative realism? Who is the founder of this realism? Discuss the basic tenets of this realism critically.
4. What is Naïve realism? What is representative Realism? Make a comparative analysis of the two realisms.
5. How does Locke distinguish between primary qualities and secondary qualities? What are the criticisms of Berkeley against this distinction of Locke?
6. What is Idealism? What are the types of Idealism? Mention the basic tenets of Idealism.
7. Critically elaborate the subjective Idealism of Berkeley.

Or, 'Esse est percipi' – Who is the supporter of this view? Explain this view critically.

8. Explain the role of God in the Subjective Idealism of Berkeley. Can this admission of God be justified in Berkeley's philosophy?

GROUP – B

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

(40 marks)

Chapter -- 6
NOTION OF 'DARSHANA'
(5 marks allotted)

MCQ – 1X3 =3
SAQ – 1X2 =2

(a) Meaning of the term 'Darshana': The word '*Darshana*' has been derived from the Sanskrit root word 'Dris' which means to see. 'Darshana', at its initial stage was limited to intuitive truths, realized by the enlightened seers. But Darshana cannot be identified with intuitional experience alone. Intuitional experience, unless interpreted and explained through reason, cannot be regarded as 'Darshana'. So 'Darshana' is rational interpretation of realized truths.

Darshana is the direct realization of truth or reality. By truth, we mean the fundamental reality, which enables an individual to know the true nature of life and universe. The Indian philosophers aim at realizing this truth. For this Indian philosophers consider 'Darshana' to be the spiritual perception of reality. So, in Indian philosophy, a philosopher is one who has got a direct vision of truth, one who has realized the true nature of life and universe, one who has discovered the nature of the Ultimate Reality.

Indian philosophy is inherently spiritual and is has always laid emphasis on the practical realization of truth. In Indian philosophy, 'Darshana' signifies two things – realization of truth and discovering means for the realization of truth. That is why, Indian philosophers have insisted not only on the knowledge of the ultimate reality but have also attempted to discover or find out the necessary means that make this knowledge possible.

In search of the eternal truth, Indian philosophy has shifted its attention from the outside world to the inner self of the individual. According to Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, "A 'darshana' is a spiritual perception, a whole view revealed to the soul sense." This becomes possible to a

philosopher when 'Darshana' becomes identical with his life. So, according to Indian philosophers, that man alone can be a philosopher who has got inner purity of the heart which refers to an inner capacity of the philosopher. In order to possess this capacity or power, the philosopher not only perceives life, but also realizes it.

(b) Distinction in brief between the Indian Concept of 'Darshana' and Western Concept of 'Philosophy': The aim of both Indian and western Philosophy is to search for truth or reality, there are some differences between them.

(i) In Indian philosophy we find equal stress upon theory and practice. But in Western philosophy we find the presence of the search for knowledge of reality or truth. But there is no attempt to apply that knowledge in practical life. Indian philosophy always tries to apply theoretical knowledge into practical life. Indian philosophy considers such theoretical knowledge useless which is not at all related to our practical life. According to them, theory becomes meaningful and significant with its application. From this view point Western philosophers are considered as Wise persons, but Indian philosophers are considered as Wise sage.

(ii) The view point of Western philosophy is partial from a particular view point. Philosophical discussions are made on the basis of different issues. But the philosophers do not try to consider the discussion of truth or reality as a whole. But Indian philosophy has a view point of assimilation. Indian philosophers tried to discuss these issues and at the same time they tried to find out the underlying unity among these issues. For this reason the view point of Indian philosophers become fruitful and significant common people.

(iii) The basic tune of Indian philosophy is Spiritualism. They tried to go to the ultimate end of human life considering different aspects of Spiritualism. But Western philosophers do not put stress upon Spiritualism. They tried to consider different issues of philosophy from different viewpoints.

(iv) It is said that the basic feature of Indian philosophy is pessimism. But the main tune of Western philosophy is positive hope. Though in

reality Indian philosophers tried to find out the way to escape or overcome pain or suffering. So it cannot be said that Indian philosophy is pessimistic in nature. It explains pain, its nature, cause and the way through which this can be overcome. Western philosophers do not consider the nature and cause of pain. This does not discuss the method of overcoming pain or sufferings.

(c) The āstika and āstika Darshana; Names of the different schools of Indian Philosophy: The schools of Indian Philosophy are basically divided into two classes, viz., Vedic and Non-Vedic on the ground of their regard for the Vedas. The six systems of Indian philosophy recognize the authority of the Vedas and so they are regarded as Vedic. These are Samkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaisasika, Mimamsa and Vedanta. On the other hand, three schools of Indian philosophy, namely the Carvākā, the Buddha and the Jaina are regarded as Non-Vedic, because these Indian philosophical systems do not recognize the authority of the Vedas.

There is also a broad division according to which the schools of Indian philosophy are divided into Orthodox or āstika and Heterodox or Nastika. The two terms 'āstika' and 'nastika' have been used in Indian philosophy not in their original sense but in a special sense. Literally, the term 'āstika' means a theist, viz., a person who believes in God and the term 'nastika' means a person who does not believe in God. But in Indian philosophy 'āstika' means a person who believes in the authority of the Vedas and considers their statements as pramāna. On the other hand, the term 'nastika', in Indian philosophy, means a person who does not believe in the authority of the statements of the Vedas.

There are six āstika schools in Indian philosophy. They are Nyāya, Vaisesika, Sāmkhya and Yoga. Among these schools some are totally dependent upon the conclusions of the Vedas. They do not have any thought independent to the teachings of the Vedas. These include the schools of Mimāmsa and Vedānta. But there are some schools in Indian philosophy which believe in the teachings of the Vedas, but they have some independent thoughts of their own. These are called Vedaswatantra

or schools independent to Vedas. These include the schools of Nyāya and Vaisesika philosophy.

(d) Some basic concepts – Pramā, Pramāna, Prameya, Pramātā, Purushārthas

Pramā: In Indian philosophy Pramā means valid knowledge. Pramā is defined as '*Tatvati tatprakāraka anuvaba yathārtha*'. When we perceive an object and find the reality as very much consistent with its actual nature then the knowledge will be called Pramā. This kind of knowledge apprehends the real character of the object. It consists in knowing the object as it, for example, to know a jug as a jug. In Indian philosophy we find six Pramās. These include Pratyaksa, Anumiti, Upamiti, Sābda, Arthāpatti and Anupalabdhi.

Pramāna: In Indian philosophy the method or source of valid knowledge is called Pramāna. The definition of Pramā is '*Pramā karanam pramānam*'. This means that the karana or instrumental cause of valid knowledge is the source of valid knowledge. An instrumental cause or karana is that uncommon condition within the cluster of causal conditions which produces the effect through an operation or movement. Then the instrumental cause is that what is (a) uncommon among the causal conditions (*asādhāraṇa*) and (b) characterized by a movement called *Vyapāra*. *Vyapāra* is a movement or operation which arises from the cause and helps it to produce the final effect.

According to the modern Naiyāyikas, that uncommon condition which is qualified by a *vyapāra* is called karana. For example, the contact of axe with the tree arises from the axe and produces the final effect of the axe, i.e., felling of the tree. So, the axe is the instrumental cause of felling of the tree, according to the modern Naiyāyikas.

According to the Old Naiyāyikas, the instrumental cause of an effect is its immediate antecedent condition. That is, the operation or *Vyapāra* is the real instrumental cause and not the thing having that operation. As example, it may be said that the contact of axe with the tree and not the axe is the instrumental cause in respect of felling of the tree, because such contact immediately precedes the felling of the tree.

Prameya: The object of proper or valid knowledge is called Prameya. In Indian philosophy all prameyas are objects of knowledge or padārthas. That which has existence and that which can be known or that which can be the object of knowledge are called padārthas. Prameyas are objects about which we can get certain knowledge through pramānas. Though pramānas are objects of proper knowledge, prameyas are objects of proper knowledge except pramānas. Sage Gautama in his Nyaya philosophy has considered the object of superior knowledge as Prameya. In Nyāya philosophy twelve prameyas are admitted. These are ātmā or soul, sarira or body, indriya or sense organ, artha or money, buddhi or intellect, mind or mana, prabritti or desire, dosa or deficiency, pretyābhāva, fala or result, duksa or suffering and apabarga or Sumum Bonum. Among these ten from sarira to duksa are heya or condemnable and ātmā or apabarga are upādeya or desirable. Moreover prameyas like ātmā, sarira, buddhi, mind, sense organ, artha are prameyas as cause. Prabritti, dosa, pretyābhāva, duksa, fala and apabarga are prameyas as effect.

Pramātā: The person who knows the valid knowledge or pramā is called Pramātā. Anything cannot be knowledge if it has its object. Knowledge is the relation between knower and knowledge. This knower is called Pramātā. The person who tries either to attain or to leave an object after knowing the object is called Pramātā. In Nyaya- Vaisesika philosophy Jiva and isvara become the container pramā in the relation of Samavāya. They call these prameyas. After production of knowledge we get desire or prabritti and nibritti or detachment form these are called prameyas. But in this sense only jivās can be Pramātā. But in general Indian philosophers consider Pramātā as desirable or preferable knower or who gets knowledge preferably. In reality Pramāna, Prameya and Pramātā are the three necessary conditions of Pramā or valid knowledge. There cannot be valid knowledge or Pramā if any one of these three conditions becomes absent.

Purushārthas: By the term Purusārtha we mean the object of desirability. There are many objects which a man can desire. But all objects cannot be

desirable. Only some objects can be desirable and for obtaining those objects the man has to follow some rituals or actions. In Indian philosophy there are four types of Purushārthas. These are Dharma, Artha, Kāma and Moksa. In Indian tradition the rituals or actions which are to be followed for doing well to his own or for others are called Dharma. Living life in a truthful manner is called Dharma. For following these religious rituals we need artha. This is very much necessary for observing family functions or religious life. Kāma means feeling of pleasure. But in Indian philosophy limited or moderate attainment of pleasure is not criticized. Rather is controlled application is necessary. Moksa is making the soul free from the bondage of the body. Liberation of soul means liberation from pain and sufferings of life. All Indian philosophers except Carvākā have accepted Moksa as the Purusārtha of human life. Only the Carvākas accepted Kama or pleasure as the supreme or primary Purusārtha and Artha as the secondary Purusārtha of human life.

Exercise

- **Find out the correct alternative:**

1. What is the nature of 'Darshana' in Indian Philosophy?
(i) Perception (ii) Knowledge (iii) The realization of truth (iv) Knowledge of external world
2. According to _____ philosophy, philosophers want to realize that supreme truth which is implied in the whole world and from which everything of this world is originated.
(i) Indian (ii) Greek (iii) Roman (iv) English
3. According to _____ philosophy, the only aim of philosophy is not to know the truth, but to implement this truth in life.
(i) Indian (ii) Greek (iii) Roman (iv) English
4. _____ Philosophers have put stress upon the practical aspects of truth.
(i) Indian (ii) Greek (iii) Roman (iv) English
5. Indian philosophy is _____ philosophy.
(i) Materialist (ii) Spiritual (iii) Phenomenal (iv) Interactional
6. In Indian philosophy 'āstikas' means the believer of _____.

- (i) The Vedas (ii) God (iii) Life after death (iv) Karmavāda
7. _____ is the founder of Yoga philosophy.
(i) Gautama (ii) Samkara (iii) Vyasa (iv) Kapil
8. _____ is a āstika school in Indian philosophy.
(i) Carvākā (ii) Jaina (iii) Buddha (iv) Mimamsa
9. There are _____ nastika schools in Indian philosophy.
(i) Two (ii) Three (iii) Four (iv) Six
10. The writer of 'Sarvadarshansamgraha' is _____.
(i) Samkara (ii) Ramanuja (iii) Kapil (iv) Madhachayra
11. How many purushārthas are admitted in Indian philosophy?
(i) One (ii) Two (iii) Three (iv) Four
12. Valid knowledge in Indian philosophy is called _____.
(i) Pramā (ii) Pramāna (iii) Pramātā (iv) Prameya
13. The meaning of the term 'Veda' is _____.
(i) Knowledge of Brahma (ii) Nature of Brahma
(iii) The existence of Brahma (iv) The discussion of Brahma
14. In Indian philosophy the term for indicating invalid knowledge is _____.
(i) Pramā (ii) Prameya (iii) Apramā (iv) Pramāna
15. Jaina is kind of _____ nastika.
(i) Extreme (ii) Moderate (iii) Realistic (iv) Idealistic
16. Which Purusārtha is admitted by rest other Indian schools except the Carvākas?
(i) Dharma (ii) Artha (iii) Kama (iv) Moksa
17. In Indian philosophy _____ school admitted six pramānas.
(i) Nyāya (ii) Vedānta (iii) Bhatta Mimamsa (iv) Samkhya
18. Sage Jaimini is the founder of _____ philosophy.
(i) Yoga (ii) Samkhya (iii) Mimamsa (iv) Vedanta
19. In Indian philosophy karma is divided into _____ types.
(i) Two (ii) Three (iii) Four (iv) Five
20. In Indian philosophy _____ school is called Dualist school.
(i) Samkhya (ii) Yoga (iii) Mimamsa (iv) Vedanta
21. The founder of Modern Nyāya is _____.
(i) Kapil (ii) Gautama (iii) Gangesa (iv) Vātsāyana
22. Samkaracharya admitted _____ powers of Maya.
(i) Two (ii) Three (iii) Four (iv) Five
23. Nagarjuna is a _____ philosopher.
(i) Nyāya (ii) Buddha (iii) Jaina (iv) Cārvāka
24. The Jaina philosophy has admitted _____ pramānas.
(i) Two (ii) Three (iii) Four (iv) Five
25. Mimamsa philosophy is divided into _____ types.

- (i) Two (iii) Three (iii) Four (iv) Five
26. *Anupalabdhi* pramāna is admitted by _____ philosophy.
(i) Nyāya (ii) Pravākara (iii) Jaina (iv) Bhatta
27. In Indian philosophy _____ is the secondary purusārtha.
(i) Nyāya (ii) Buddha (iii) Jaina (iv) Cārvāka
28. In Indian philosophy _____ is admitted as supreme purusārtha by all Indian schools.
(i) Dharma (ii) Artha (iii) Kama (iv) Moksa
29. In _____ philosophy two pramānas are admitted.
(i) Nyāya (ii) Buddha (iii) Jaina (iv) Cārvāka
30. In _____ philosophy twelve prameyas are admitted.
(i) Nyāya (ii) Buddha (iii) Jaina (iv) Cārvāka

• **Answer the following questions:**

- 1) How was the term 'Darshana' originated in Sanskrit?
- 2) What do the Indian philosophers understand by 'Darshana'?
- 3) What is the aim of an Indian philosopher?
- 4) Who is a philosopher according to Indian belief?
- 5) Which Indian philosophers do not consider soul as the ultimate reality?
- 6) How many Purushārthas or Sumum Bonum are admitted in Indian philosophy?
- 7) How is human life considered in Indian philosophy?
- 8) What is the basis upon which Indian philosophers are divided into āstikas and Nastikas?
- 9) What are the meaning of the terms āstika and Nastikas in Indian philosophy?
- 10) Which Indian schools are called āstika schools?
- 11) Which Indian schools are called Nastikas schools?
- 12) How can we classify āstika schools in Indian philosophy?
- 13) What is the meaning of Vedanugata schools in Indian philosophy?
- 14) Which Indian schools are called Vedanugata schools in Indian philosophy?
- 15) Why do we call Mimamsa and Vedanta philosophy as Vedanugata philosophy?
- 16) What is the meaning of Vedaswatantra School?
- 17) Which Indian schools are called Vedaswatantra School?
- 18) Why do we call Nyāya-Vaisasika and Samkhya-Yoga schools as Vedaswatantra schools?
- 19) How can we classify Nāsikā schools?
- 20) Which Indian school is called extreme Nastikas School?

- 21) What is the meaning of extreme Nāsikā?
- 22) What is the meaning of moderate Nastikas?
- 23) Which Indian schools are called Moderate Nastikas?
- 24) Why do we call Carvākas the extreme Nastikas?
- 25) Why do we call Jaina and Buddha schools moderate Nastikas?
- 26) What are the features of 'pramā' in Indian philosophy?
- 27) What is the meaning of the term 'Pramāna' in Indian philosophy?
- 28) What is the definition of 'Karana' in Indian philosophy?
- 29) How many pramānas are admitted by the Carvākas?
- 30) Which Indian philosophers admitted perception and Inference as the pramāna?
- 31) Which pramānas are not admitted by the Carvākas?
- 32) What are the pramānas accepted by the Naiyāyikas?
- 33) What is the difference between Pramā and Pramāna?
- 34) How many pramānas are admitted by Pravākara Mimamsa?
- 35) How many pramānas are admitted by Bhatta-Mimamsa and Vedanta?
- 36) What is Prameya?
- 37) What is the meaning of Prameya according to sage Gautama?
- 38) How many prameyas are admitted by the Nyāya philosophy?
- 39) What are the prameyas admitted by the Nyāya philosophy?
- 40) What is the meaning of Pramātā in Indian philosophy?

Chapter – 7

CĀRVĀKAS

(4 marks allotted)

MCQ--1X2 =2

SAQ – 1X4 =4

(a) Introduction and meaning of the term ‘Cārvāka’: We do not know the actual founder of *Cārvāka* philosophy. Similarly we do not know any systematic and authoritative work on *Cārvāka* philosophy and if there was any it had unfortunately been perished. In Indian philosophy the word ‘*Cārvāka*’ has become synonymous with ‘materialist’ which considers matter to be the only reality and denies the existence of all transcendental realities like self, God etc. The views of the *Cārvākas* are found in the Vedas, the early Buddhist literature, the *Jaina* literature, the epics like Mahabharata as well as other Hindu *Sāstras*. Accounts of the *Cārvāka* system are found in *Sarvadarsana-samgraha* and *Saddarsanasamuccaya*.

Opinion varies as regards the original meaning of the word ‘*Cārvāka*’. According to one view, a sage called *Cārvāka* was the original founder of the *Cārvāka* School. According to another view the word ‘*Cārvāka*’ is not a proper name but a common name given to a materialist, either because he believes in the doctrine of ‘eat, drink and be merry’ or, because his words are nice, pleasant and attractive to ears. Some regards *Brhaspati*, a sage, as the founder of the school and it is therefore also known as the philosophy of *Brhaspati*. About a dozen sutras and verses which contain materialistic views are attributed to him by different authors. The ancient sutras of *Cārvāka* philosophy are called *Brhaspati Sutra*. Whatever may be the original meaning of the word ‘*Cārvāka*’ the word has become synonymous with materialist. Another synonym of *Cārvāka* is *Lokāyata*. The *Cārvāka* view which propagates materialism is the view of the common people. It regards this world to be the only world and denies the existence of any other transcendental world.

In Indian philosophy we find three sects of *Cārvāka* philosophy: (a) *ādi Cārvāka*, (b) *dhurta Cārvāka* and (c) *sushiksita Cārvāka*. Among them the *ādi Cārvākas* were sceptic and antagonistic. These philosophers did not believe the authenticity of any kind of *pramāna* or reality. Their only duty

was to criticize the views of others. They did not have any positive view. These philosophers were not only Nastikas, but also they did not believe the authenticity of perception. Even they discarded the teachings of Brhaspati, the so called founder of this philosophy. Dhurta *Cārvākas* admitted perception as the only *pramāna* and to them pleasure or *kāma* is the only or supreme end or *purusārtha*. Also according to them, there are nothing like God, life after death, sin, paradise etc. They are also critics of the Vedas. Generally the '*Cārvāka* philosophy' means the views of dhurta *Cārvākas*. On the other hand sushiksita *Cārvākas* considered artha and *kāma* as the two *purusārthas*. Besides perception they also believed *anumāna* or inference under necessity of our daily life. Sushiksita *Cārvākas* like *Purandara* etc admitted *lokāyata sāshatra* like *arthasāshtra*, *kāmasāshatra*, *āyurveda* and *dandaniti* etc. But these *Cārvākas* also are materialist and against the Vedas and they did not admit God as the creator of this universe.

(b) Pratyaksa as the only pramāna: The most important tenet of the *Cārvākā* philosophy is the recognition of perception or *Pratyaksa* as the only *pramāna* or source of valid knowledge. *Pratyaksa* or perceptual knowledge is valid knowledge (*pramā*) which is produced by the contact (*sannikarsa*) of an object (*artha*) with a sense organ (*indriya*). In this definition the word 'sense organ' indicates five external sense organs and one internal sense organ. The external sense organs include visual sense-organ (*caksu*), auditory sense-organ (*karna*), olfactory sense-organ (*nāsikā*), gustatory sense-organ (*rasanā*) and tactual sense-organ (*tvak*). The only internal sense-organ is called mind or *manas*. Object or *artha* signifies colour, sounds, smells, tastes, tactual qualities. Mental processes like pleasure, pain, desire etc are objects of internal perception. *Sannikarsa* or contact of a sense organ with an object should be understood as a particular type of relation between a sense and an object which produces a valid perceptual knowledge of the object or *Pratyaksa pramā*. According to *Cārvākas pramā* or valid knowledge has three features: (a) the actual presence of the object is required; (b) the presence of associative causes of perception like light etc. and (c) the sense organ must be free from all

deficiencies. Under the presence of all these conditions when the relation takes place from the contact between sense organ and object then the knowledge is called *pramā*.

The instrumental cause or *karana* of perceptual knowledge is known as *Pratyaksa pramāna*. The *Cārvākas* considered sense organ as the *karana* of *Pratyaksa pramā*. So, according to them, sense organ is the *pratyaksa pramā*.

Now the question is: why did the *Cārvākas* consider perception as the only *pramāna*. They forwarded following arguments in support of their views:

1) Only with the help of perception we can get proper or distinct knowledge. This knowledge is distinct and authentic because we do not express any doubt about what we know through our eye, ear etc. Knowledge through inference and testimony cannot be beyond doubt. But perceptual knowledge is so certain that there can be no doubt about the authenticity of this knowledge.

2) According to *Cārvākas*, perception is the basic *pramāna* of all *pramānas*. Inference and other *pramānas* are dependent upon perception. For this reason perception is to be regarded as the best and main *pramāna*. So, perception is the only dependable *pramāna*.

3) In cases of perception also there can be falsity. In these cases the *Cārvākas* said that there could be no falsity in cases of pure perception. Defect of sense organ, absence of light etc can cause falsity in cases of perception. But in cases of perception from perfect sense organs there can be no distraction of the knower because in cases of valid perceptions there can be no doubts and disaster in cases of valid perceptions.

4) The *Cārvākas* have mentioned three main features of valid knowledge or *pramā*. Firstly, valid knowledge must be true; Secondly, valid knowledge will be doubtless or distinct; Thirdly, valid knowledge is known from prior or *anidhigata*. Or, valid knowledge must be knowledge of new object. Only with the help of perception we can get this knowledge of true, distinct and new object.

With the help of these arguments the *Cārvākas* tried to prove that perception is the only *pramāna*. This is the positive side of their epistemological view. Negatively they tried to discard the necessity of Inference and other *pramānas*. From these two aspects the *Cārvākas* have proved their epistemological conclusion 'Perception is the only *pramāna*.'

The above opinion of the *Cārvākas* has been criticized from different corners in Indian philosophy. Inference and testimony, being based on inference, are regarded as unfounded and so they are not admitted as sources of valid knowledge. This prevalent sketch of Carvākā epistemology is gathered mainly from 'Sarvadarsana-samgraha' of Mādhavācārya.

Mādhavācārya has depicted only the view of unrefined Carvākas or Dhurta Carvākas in his treaties. His discussions regarding the Carvākas do not contain the views of the other groups of the Carvākas who admit the validity of inference so far as it relates to perceptible objects. His discussions do not contain the view of extreme skeptical Carvākas like Jayarāsi Bhatta who rejects the validity of all *pramānas* including perception. Mentioning the view of the refined Carvākas like Purandara, Prof. Surendranath Dasgupta has pointed out that the Carvākā opinion is not purely negative so far as the question of validity of inference is concerned. Purandara who is a refined Carvākā is of opinion that in knowing the nature of objects of our direct sense-experience, we cannot deny the necessity of inference.

But inference is useless so far as the objects lying beyond our ordinary experience like, God, life after death, transmigration of soul, law of karma, immortality of soul etc. are concerned. The distinction that the Carvakas make between inference about objects of ordinary experience and inference about objects of transcendental things has a strong basis. PBS – p160

(c) Refutation of Anumāna: Among all the *pramānas* admitted in Indian philosophy inference or *anumāna* is important. *Anumāna* is the *karana* of *Anumiti*. The basis of *Anumiti* is the knowledge of *Vyapti*. This is a relation of universal concomitance between *hetu* and *sādhya*. But it cannot be said that inference will be possible only due to *Vyapti* knowledge. With this knowledge the knowledge of *paksadharmatā* or the knowledge of *hetu* in the *paksa* will be required. But the joint occurrence of these two knowledge inference cannot take place. If a person had *Vyapti* knowledge from the past and when a person observes smoke in the hill and cannot memorize his *Vyapti* knowledge then his inference of fire on the hill will not be possible. But the memorization of *Vyapti* does not confirm the knowledge of fire on the hill. For this occurrence of *parāmarsha* or *paksadharmatā* qualified with *Vyapti*. The process of inference can be illustrated with the following example:

Where there is smoke there is fire. (*Vyapti* knowledge)

The hill has fire. (*Paksadharmatā* knowledge)

Where there is smoke there is fire. (Memorization of *Vyapti* knowledge)

The smoke of the hill is related to fire in the relation of *Vyapti* (*parāmarsha*)

Therefore, the hill has fire. (*Anumiti*)

The knowledge which we get after passing through these steps one after another is called *Anumiti*. The total process which we follow for getting *Anumiti* is called *Anumāna pramāna*.

Though almost all the philosophers of Indian philosophy have admitted the authenticity of *anumāna*, the *Cārvākas* did not admit *anumāna*. According to them, the knowledge obtained through *anumāna* is always probable, it never becomes certain. Besides, as *anumāna* is dependent upon *Vyapti* knowledge and as we can obtain *Vyapti* knowledge in no way so we cannot admit *anumāna* as a valid *pramāna*.

Vyapti relation is the universal concomitant relation between *hetu* (smoke) and *sādhya* (fire). The form of this relation is 'where there is smoke, there is fire'. We cannot establish this universal relation either with perception or with inference, analogy or with testimony.

Cārvākā said that *Vyapti* relation cannot be established through perception because in all cases of present we cannot perceive the joint occurrences of smoke and fire. So, in cases of past and future we cannot pass judgments about the joint occurrence of the two. Even if we pass such judgment there will be no certainty. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is no relation of universal concomitance or *Vyapti* though we may perceive the joint occurrence of smoke and fire in many instances.

The *Cārvākā* said that *Vyapti* relation cannot be established through inference. In Indian philosophy other Indian philosophers except the *Cārvākas* have admitted that through inference the *Vyapti* relation between *hetu* (smoke) and *sādhya* (fire) can be established. The *Naiyāyikas* said that *Vyapti* knowledge is necessary for inference. But, in this context *Cārvākā* thought that if any inference is known through *Vyapti* relation and again if inference is admitted for the knowledge of that *Vyapti* then there will be a process of infinity and the process will involve the Fallacy of Infinite Regress. Therefore, we cannot know *Vyapti* relation through inference. Thus we can solve the problem of infinity.

In *Nyāya* philosophy *Vyapti* is admitted as universal exceptionless relation. Though we can perceive coexistence of smoke and fire in many cases, then we cannot say that there is a *Vyapti* relation or universal concomitance between smoke and fire. So, we cannot say that 'where there is fire, there is smoke'. The case of red hot iron ball is an exception where there is fire, but there is no smoke. For this exceptional case of red hot iron ball we can become assured about the non-affirmation of the *Vyapti* relation between fire and smoke.

But, to establish the *Vyapti* relation between smoke and fire we do not get any instance of exception in our limited experience. But many instances remain outside our scope of experiences. Among those instances

we cannot overpower the possibility of presence of exceptional instances. For this the universal relation between smoke and fire is universal, but this is not necessarily exceptionless. Therefore, the *Vyapti* relation between smoke and fire is not certainly established. In this way the *Cārvāka* proved that the *Vyapti* relation cannot be established through inference.

The *Cārvākas* proved that *Vyapti* knowledge cannot be obtained through the application of testimony because this *pramāna* of *Sabda* or testimony. After knowing the teachings of any experienced or intellectual person or reading a reliable or authentic text we can have knowledge of object. That is called testimony or *Sabda pramāna*. But the *Cārvākas* said that whether the person is really dependable or *āpta purusha* or the book is really authentic or reliable can only be known through inference. Thus the *Cārvākas* showed that *Sabda pramāna* is dependent upon inference or *anumāna*. As *anumāna* is not reliable *pramāna* and *Sabda pramāna* is dependent upon *anumāna* so *Sabda pramāna* cannot be called dependable *pramāna*. In this way the *Cārvākas* tried to prove that *Vyapti* knowledge cannot be obtained through *Sabda pramāna*.

Upamāna pramāna or is not admitted by the *Cārvākas*. *Upamāna* is a process of obtaining knowledge based upon analogy or similarity. When a person identifies an animal as 'gabaya' on the basis of the analogy between *gabaya* and cow and on the basis of perception of *gabaya* then the *pramāna* will be called *Upamāna*. The *Cārvākas* thought that *Upamāna* is dependent upon *anumāna*. As *anumāna* is not dependable *pramāna* *Upamāna* cannot be called as dependable *pramāna*. So, the knowledge of *Vyapti* cannot be obtained also through *Upamāna*.

Among the *Cārvākas* Gross or *Dhurta Cārvākas* did not admit *anumāna*, but the Refined or *Sushiksita Cārvākas* admitted the importance of *anumāna pramāna* for the purpose of our daily practical life. If the object of inference or *anumāna* is supported by ordinary perception then *Sushiksita Cārvākas* is ready to admit the necessity of those *anumānas*. But the Gross or *Dhurta Cārvākas* said that it can be admitted that ordinary application can be possible through some inferences, but with them the

authenticity of those inferences are not established. Therefore, the *Anumiti* in general is probable, that can never be certain.

Refutation of Sābda: Verbal testimony or *sabda* is defined as '*āptavākyam sabdah*' or '*āptopadesah sabdah*'. Testimony as a *pramāna* consists in the statement or *vākya* or *upadesa* of a reliable person or *āpta purusha*. A person who is free from error or *bhrama*, inadvertence or *pramāda*, intention to deceive hearers or *vipralipsā* and weakness of senses or *karanā-pātava* is to be regarded as a reliable person. The sayings of such a reliable person are considered as *sabda pramāna* in Indian philosophy.

The *Cārvākas* do not accept testimony as a valid source of knowledge. According to them, testimony refers to words of reliable persons but whether a person is reliable or not can be known only through inference. It is on the basis of the conduct of a person, we infer if he is reliable or not. Besides this, knowledge obtained through testimony is based on inference. When we accept the words of a reliable person, we argue thus, the words of this man should be accepted because he is reliable and words of all reliable persons should be accepted. But as inference is not a valid source of knowledge, testimony, which is based on inference, cannot be accepted as *pramāna* or valid source of knowledge. Hence the *Cārvākas* refuse to accept testimony or *sabda* as a valid source of knowledge.

Moreover, the statement of a reliable person is taken as a *pramāna*, because as soon as we understand its meaning we have valid knowledge which it conveys. In order to understand the meaning of a statement we have to understand its component words. The meaning of a word consists in its relation to the object which it signifies. So the knowledge from testimony ultimately rests on the relation of a word to its meaning. Such a relation is known through inference. The *Cārvākas* do not admit inference as a source of valid knowledge. So testimony being ultimately based on the inferential knowledge of word-meaning cannot be a source of valid knowledge.

However, sometimes we become successful in our practical activities done on the basis of our knowledge from testimony. Sometimes such

knowledge fails to lead to success. So knowledge, from testimony is not a sure guide in our day to day life. The *Cārvākās*, therefore, are not ready to take it as a *pramāna*. They reject the testimony of the Vedas, because their authors are hypocrites, knaves and demons. The Vedas enjoins the performance of various kinds of rituals for the attainment of worldly benefits. But on many occasions the worldly benefits are not obtained by the performance of the rituals. The cunning and hypocritical priests have given these directions to perform rituals in order to cheat ignorant and credulous people for earning their livelihood. The Vedas are also full of inconsistent, obscure, contradictory and meaningless statements. For example, as regards the offering of *Agnihotra* oblation the Vedic injunctions are inconsistent with one another. Somewhere in the Vedic Texts it has been declared that the oblation should be offered before sunrise, whereas somewhere else it has been declared that the oblation should be offered after sunrise. Now, both the statements cannot be true. The Vedas also contain certain hymns having meaningless words, like 'Turfari', 'Jarbhari' etc. So the Vedic statements cannot be regarded as a *pramāna*.

The prevalent sketch of *Cārvākā* epistemology is gathered mainly from '*Sarvadarsana-samgraha*' of *Mādhavācārya*. There he depicted only the view of the unrefined *Cārvākās* or Dhurta *Cārvākās*. His discussions did not contain the views of refined *Cārvākās* or Susikshita *Cārvākās* like Purandara and others who accepted the validity of inference so far as it relates to perceptible objects. His treatise did not contain the views of extreme skeptical *Cārvākās* like Jayarashi Bhatta who rejected the validity of all *pramānas* including perception. Mentioning the views of Purandara Prof. Surendranath Dasgupta has pointed out that the *Cārvākā* opinion is not purely negative so far as the question of validity of inference is concerned. Purandara who is a refined *Cārvākā* is of the opinion that in knowledge the nature of objects of our direct sense-experience, we cannot deny the necessity of inference.

But inference is useless so far as the objects lying beyond our ordinary experience like, God, life after-death, transmigration of soul, law of karma, immortality of soul etc. are concerned. According to the view of *Jayanta Bhatta* expressed in *Nyāya-Manjari*, the distinction that the *Carvākās* make between inference about objects of ordinary experience and inference about transcendental things has a strong basis. In the world of ordinary experience, we often perceive two things together, e.g., we perceive smoke and fire together in kitchen, cow-shed and some other places. We also perceive that when one of them is absent, the other is also absent, e.g., When fire is absent, smoke is also absent. In this way, we may know a universal relation of concomitance between the two. This knowledge of universal concomitance may serve as the basis of inference. But the things of the transcendental world remain completely beyond the domain of our ordinary perception and no knowledge of universal concomitance between two things of that world is possible. Therefore, inference about the things of transcendental world is not possible, as there is no knowledge of universal concomitance as its basis. But though some *Carvākās* recognize the validity of inference relating to worldly things, they regard the results of such inferences as simply probable; there is no certainty about them. This view about inference is very important and relevant in the context of modern trend of thought.

(c) Materialism – Four different physical elements: Generally it is an important feature of Indian philosophy to believe in the existence of supernatural entities like God, Soul, Heaven, Hell, Moksa, and Life after death etc. But the materialists *Carvākās* did not admit these entities. According to them, everything of this universe is originated from matter. These are compositions of four perceptible material elements. The emergence of consciousness is due to the combination of material elements. Therefore, according to *Carvākās* philosophy matter is the one

and only supreme reality, nothing supernatural can exist. This view of the *Carvākās* is known as Materialism.

The Metaphysics of the *Carvākās* necessarily follows from the Epistemology of the *Carvākās*.

- ***Svabhāvavāda* or Naturalism *Yadṛcchāvadā* or Accidentalism:** The *Carvākās* philosophy maintains that the basic reality from which the world originates consists of four gross material elements. These elements, namely, earth, water, fire, and air are unconscious in nature. The *Carvākās* have regarded unconscious material elements as the source of life, consciousness and all other things of the world.

Now the question is: how does this world of multifarious things and beings arise from four material elements? We generally imagine the presence of an efficient cause or *nimitva karana* behind every effect. How can the unconscious material elements combine to produce this world without the guidance of a conscious element? Some Indian thinkers think that the omnipotent and omniscient God is the efficient cause of this world. He combines these material elements and produces the world that is full of innumerable things.

This explanation of the creation has not been accepted by the *Carvākās*. To them God is non-existent as he cannot be known through perception. The gross elements of earth, water, fire and air are perceptible and so they are real. These perceptible material elements are the constituents of this world and all other objects within it. Each of these gross and perceptible elements has got its own nature. The nature of objects lies in their constant potency. The burning power of fire, the coldness of water and all other things and beings of the world have been produced from four gross material particles according to their own nature. No efficient cause is seen in the production of any of these things. Their production can, therefore, be explained by the nature of the components from which they were

produced. The explanation of the origin of the world with the law that material elements have their own nature is known as naturalism or *Svabhāvavāda*.

Another group of *Carvākās* think that no cause is necessary for the production of an effect. Whatever happens accidentally without any cause. Fragrance of flowers, sweet chirping of birds, all these are normal accidental consequences of things. A transcendental entity like God is not responsible for their occurrence. The world is just an accident. The four gross material particles accidentally come together and form this world and all objects within it. This view about the creation of the world is called Accidentalism or *Yadricchāvāda*.

- ***Dehātmavāda***: The *Carvākās* react severely to the belief in the existence of traditional conception of soul. In their view there is no existence of an indivisible, unchangeable, immaterial soul which is immortal according to the *Carvākās*, soul is nothing but the living body invested with consciousness. There is no existence of an immaterial soul apart from the body; at least this cannot be proved.

The *Carvākās* admit that we have immediate knowledge of our mental states and processes through perception and on the basis of these mental states and processes we have direct knowledge of consciousness. So the existence of consciousness can be proved by perception, but the existence of any immaterial, unchanging soul-substance as the substratum of consciousness cannot be perceived and as such its existence cannot be proved. Consciousness is an emergent quality of the body; it is not a quality of a non-perceptible transcendental substance called soul. When a living body is formed by the combination of the four perceptible elements, e.g. earth, water, fire and air, then in that body a new quality emerges which is known as consciousness. Consciousness which is produced by the coalition of four elements does not exist separately from or outside the body. So soul is nothing but the conscious living body.

The soul's identity with the body is proved by our daily experience as 'I am fat', 'I am lean', 'I am blind' etc. Fatness, leanness, blindness etc. are thought by common people to be qualities of the body. When common

people make a statement like 'I am fat', what they mean by the term 'I' is their bodies. They do not differentiate between body and soul. When the body is destroyed, consciousness existing in the body is also destroyed.

The question may crop up, how can the four elements earth, water, fire and air form a living body? The *Carvākas* reply that a particular quality not present originally in any of the combining elements may emerge, when the elements are combined together. For example, when betel leaf, nut, lime and catechu get combined, they produce a red colour, though the same is originally absent in any one. In a similar way, these four elements though originally unconscious can give rise to a conscious living body, when they combine together. As consciousness has no separate existence distinct from body, consciousness is a by-product of matter.

So we may conclude that by saying that the soul is nothing but conscious living body and if the soul is identical with the body and as body is subject to decay, the immortality of the soul is absolutely meaningless. As there is no existence of any immaterial, indivisible and unchanging soul, the question of its immortality does not arise.

In order to refute the *Carvākā* view all the schools of Indian philosophy have put forward following arguments:

Firstly, if consciousness is regarded as an essential property of the living body, as the *Carvākās* claim, it must be inseparable from it. But in dreamless sleep we do not find the existence of unconsciousness in the living body.

Secondly, consciousness cannot be a property of the living body for when a man dreams consciousness remains active but the living body remains inactive. Thirdly, consciousness is never experienced outside the living body but that does not prove that consciousness is the product of the material body. Visual perception is not possible without light, yet light cannot be regarded as the cause of visual perception. The body serves as an instrument for the revelation of consciousness and must not be regarded as its cause. Fourthly, if consciousness is a property of the body, it must be perceived like other properties of material objects. But we cannot

perceive consciousness by our external senses. Fifthly, if consciousness is a property of the material body, then all could have perceived it in the same way as they perceive other material properties. But consciousness being intimately private, consciousness of one person cannot be shared by other persons. As Hiriyanna observes, "The form or complexion of our body, for instance is perceived not only by ourselves, but also by others. A person's thoughts, feelings, dreams and memories, on the other hand, while they are immediate facts to him are not known to any other in the same way." Sixthly, if the self is identified with the living body with the quality of consciousness, it becomes difficult to explain recollection and the synthesis of different sensations. As body is changeable, consciousness being the quality of the body should also be changeable and in that case recollection will not be possible.

- ***Sukhavāda or Hedonism:*** In Indian philosophy we find the presence of four *purushārthas* or goals of human life. These are Dharma, artha, kāma and moksa. Most of the Indian philosophers accepted *moksa* as the highest goal of human life. But only the materialist *Carvākās* considers enjoyment of sensual pleasure to be the highest good of life. They, to quote Hiriyanna, 'draw away man's mind altogether from the thought of a higher life and fix it upon the world of sense.' The Buddhists think that all pleasures are fraught with pain. The *Carvākās* argue that pain cannot be totally eliminated as worldly pleasures must be fraught with pain. The physical existence in this world is mixed with pleasure as well as pain. Sensual pleasure should not be given up because it is mixed with pain. One should try to avoid pain and enjoy pleasure as far as practicable. Would any wise man reject wheat because it is mixed with chaff? Would any wise person abandon farming for fear of animals devouring the crops? Would not a person take the pains of separating bones from the fish in order to eat it? A man should consider attainment of maximum pleasure with the minimum of pain to be highest aim of life. It is foolish to discard pleasure through fear

of the accompanying pain. A man should not abandon the pleasures of this life in the false hope of a future life. A bird in hand is worth two in the bush.

Some Indian philosophers think that there are four ends of human life or *purushārtha*, namely wealth (*artha*), sensual pleasure (*kāma*), virtue (*dharma*) and liberation (*moksa*). Of these four, the *Carvākās* regard wealth and enjoyment of sensual pleasure to be proper ends of life and reject the other two. Again, wealth, by itself is not an end but a means to the enjoyments of sensual pleasures.

An eminent scholar observes, "The *Carvākās* is so impatient of obtaining pleasure that he does not even try to secure freedom from pain. He makes a compromise with evil instead of overcoming it. Every man, according to him, must make the best of a bad bargain and enjoy himself as long as he lives."

As enjoyment of the maximum quantity of sensual pleasures is thought by the *Carvākās* to be the ultimate end of life they are regarded as advocates of gross egoistic hedonism.

- **Rejection of *Purushārthas*:**

- **Find out the correct alternative:**

1. The founder of Cārvāka philosophy is Sage _____.
(i) *Brhaspati* (ii) *Gautama* (iii) *Kapila* (iv) *Kanāda*
2. All other Indian philosophers except the Cārvākas have admitted _____ as the ultimate Sumum Bonum or the best *Purusārtha*.
(i) *Dharma* (ii) *Artha* (iii) *Kāma* (iv) *Moksa*
3. _____ philosophy is also known as *Lokāyata Darshāna* or popular philosophy.
(i) *Cārvāka* (ii) *Jaina* (iii) *Buddha* (iv) *Nyāya*
4. According to _____ philosophy, perception is the only *pramāna*.
(i) *Cārvāka* (ii) *Jaina* (iii) *Buddha* (iv) *Nyāya*
5. According to the *Cārvākas*, if we want to establish *Vyapti* knowledge with the help of *anumāna* or inference there will be Fallacy of _____.

(i) *Avyāpti* (ii) *ativyāpti* (iii) *anavyasthā* (iv)

asambhava

6. The *Cārvākas* did not admit _____ among the five material elements or *panchabhutas*.

(i) *Dharma* (ii) *Artha* (iii) *Kāma* (iv) *Moksa*

7. In _____ philosophy no separate existence of soul or *ātmā* without body is admitted.

(i) *Cārvāka* (ii) *Jaina* (iii) *Buddha* (iv) *Nyāya*

8. According to the *Cārvākas* _____ is nothing but the living conscious body.

(i) Soul (ii) Mind (iii) Consciousness (iv) World

9. According to *Cārvāka* naturalism _____ is originated from the special combination of four material elements.

(i) Body (ii) Soul (iii) Consciousness (iv) World

10. According to *Cārvāka* the world is created from the _____ material elements.

(i) Two (ii) Three (iii) Four (iv) Five

11. If we admit *Cārvāka* _____ then we cannot explain memory.

(i) Epistemology (ii) Metaphysics (iii) Ethics (iv) Accidentalism

12. The ethical view of the *Cārvākas* is known as _____.

(i) Hedonism (ii) Perfectionism (iii) Rigorism (iv) Intuitionism

13. According to the *Cārvākas* the ultimate aim of life is attainment of _____.

(i) *Dharma* (ii) *Artha* (iii) *Kāma* (iv) *Moksa*

14. The metaphysical view of the *Cārvākas* is dependent upon their _____.

(i) Epistemology (ii) Ethics (iii) Accidentalism (iv) Naturalism

15. _____ philosophers do not admit the existence of God as the creator of this world.

(i) *Cārvāka* (ii) *Jaina* (iii) *Buddha* (iv) *Samkhya*

16. _____ philosophers do not believe in the life after death.

(i) *Cārvāka* (ii) *Jaina* (iii) *Buddha* (iv) *Samkhya*

17. According to _____ philosophy *Moksa* or liberation can be attained in this life.

(i) *Cārvāka* (ii) *Jaina* (iii) *Buddha* (iv) *Samkhya*

18. According to *Cārvāka* philosophy _____ is the secondary *Purusārtha*.

(i) *Dharma* (ii) *Artha* (iii) *Kāma* (iv) *Moksa*

19. _____ philosophers admit naturalism and accidentalism in place of the application of causal principle.

(i) *Cārvāka* (ii) *Jaina* (iii) *Buddha* (iv) *Samkhya*

20. The _____ philosophers are called Extreme *Nāstika*.

(i) *Cārvāka* (ii) *Jaina* (iii) *Buddha* (iv) *Samkhya*

21. *Inference* is admitted by the _____ school of the *Cārvākas* under necessity of daily life.

(i) *Dhurta* (ii) *Sushiksita* (iii) *ādi* (iv) *No*

22. The theory of Soul or *ātma* of the *Cārvākas* is called _____.

(i) Naturalism (ii) Accidentalism

(iii) *Bhutachaitnyavāda* (iv) *Sukhavāda*

23. According to _____, the destruction of soul is admitted with the destruction of body.

(i) *Cārvāka* (ii) *Jaina* (iii) *Buddha* (iv) *Samkhya*

24. According to _____ School, the ultimate reality is materialistic in nature.

(i) *Cārvāka* (ii) *Jaina* (iii) *Buddha* (iv) *Samkhya*

25. According to _____ philosophy, the context of liberation of soul from the bondage of body is irrelevant.

(i) *Cārvāka* (ii) *Jaina* (iii) *Buddha* (iv) *Samkhya*

26. In the _____ of the *Cārvāka* philosophy the authenticity of the *anumāna* is discarded.

(i) Epistemology (ii) Metaphysics (iii) Ethic (iv) total philosophy

27. In _____ philosophy the knowledge of *Vyapti* is not possible.

(i) *Cārvāka* (ii) *Jaina* (iii) *Buddha* (iv) *Samkhya*

28. For the _____ view, the *Cārvākas* do not admit the *Vedās, Moksa, God, heaven, hell etc.*

(i) Materialistic (ii) Spiritualistic (iii) Idealistic (iv) Agnostic

29. According to _____ philosophy, the world is created from the natural combination of four material elements.

(i) *Cārvāka* (ii) *Jaina* (iii) *Buddha* (iv) *Samkhya*

30. According to _____ philosophy, four material elements are combined accidentally.

(i) *Cārvāka* (ii) *Jaina* (iii) *Buddha* (iv) *Sāmkhya*

*** Answer the following questions very short?**

1. Who is the founder of *Cārvāka* philosophy?
2. How many *pramānas* are admitted by the *Cārvākas*?
3. What is the ultimate *purusārtha* admitted by the *Cārvākas*?
4. What is the secondary *purusārtha* admitted by the *Cārvākas*?
5. How many components are admitted by the *Cārvākas* for the creation of this universe?
6. Why isn't *Byom* or *ākāsha* admitted by the *Cārvākas*?
7. Is the doctrine of *Karma* admitted by the *Cārvākas*?
8. What is the other name of the doctrine of soul of the *Cārvākas*?
9. Why is the *Cārvāka* called accidentalist?
10. Which element is not admitted by the *Cārvākas*?
11. Which elements are admitted by the *Cārvākas*?
12. How is the nature of soul described by the *Cārvākas*?
13. How many *purusārthas* are admitted by the *Cārvākas*?
14. Where do we find the mention of the *Cārvākas* views?
15. Why do we call *Cārvākas* philosophy *lokāyata Darshana*?
16. What are the features of the *Vaitandika Cārvākas*?
17. What are the features of the *Sushiksita Cārvākas*?

18. Why do the Cārvākas consider Perception as the most trusted Pramāna or Pramāna jyostha?
19. Why isn't the doctrine of Karma admitted by the Cārvākas?
20. With which philosophy does the name of book 'Tattopaplaba Singha' associated?
21. How many categories or classes do we find in Cārvākas philosophy?
22. Which sect among the Cārvākas is called sceptic or waitandavadi?
23. What is the positive conclusion of the Cārvākas?
24. What is the negative conclusion of the Cārvākas?
25. What is the definition of the perception according to the Cārvākas?
26. Which sect among the Cārvākas admitted the necessity of inference in our daily life?
27. Why is not the Vedas considered as pramāna by the Cārvākas?
28. From which philosophical conclusion of the Cārvākas does the metaphysics of the Cārvākas follow?
29. What is the meaning of Cārvākas *Bhutacatustayavada*?
30. Why don't the Cārvākas admit ether or ākāsha?
31. What is the meaning of Cārvākas naturalism or *swabhabavada*?
32. Is the principle of Causality admitted by the Cārvākas?
33. Why can't we explain memory if we admit Cārvākas Dehātmavāda?
34. Why don't the Cārvākas consider consciousness as the natural quality of the body?
35. Why don't the Cārvākas admit God as the creator of this universe?

Chapter – 8

BUDDHISM

(6 marks allotted)

MCQ – 1X4 = 4

SAQ – 1X2 = 2

(a) Main tenets of Buddhism :

(1) Four Noble Truths: The spiritual experience which Buddha gained through intense meditation to discover the cause of human sufferings and the means of complete freedom from them, generally called 'enlightenment' is comprehended in four noble truths or *catvāri āryasatyāni*. These four noble truths are as follows: (i) There is suffering, (ii) There is cause of suffering, (iii) There is cessation of suffering and (iv) There is a path which leads to the cessation of suffering.

(i) The First Noble Truth (There is Suffering): Human life is full of sufferings. In this world human beings are subject to disease, old age and death and as such cannot avoid pain. Even the so-called pleasures are fraught with misery and pain, because everything in this world is transitory and subject to decay and destruction. Sensual pleasures being transitory are attended with pain.

Buddha observes, "The whole world is on fire, where is the occasion for merry-making?" He says, "Human beings have shed more tears than all the water lying in the great oceans". So it cannot be denied that life is all pain and misery. All created things are subject to misery.

It may appear to some that Buddha is very pessimistic in presenting before men an exaggerated and incomplete view of human life and its sufferings. Buddha would perhaps say that everything that appears to be a pleasure is fraught with pain. Only short-sighted people fail to realize this truth and run after sensual pleasures. But conscientious and far-sighted people could easily realize that every pleasure is ultimately painful. Pleasures being transitory are always painful. Besides, the constant fear of a man that he would soon lose the pleasure he had got makes him give up all charm and attraction for worldly pleasures. The so-called worldly

pleasures become a source of anxiety for him. So, it is not true that Buddha has presented an incomplete view of human life.

(ii) The Second Noble Truth (There is cause of Suffering): The second noble truth relates to the origin of sufferings. Buddha explains this in the light of his theory of Dependent origination of Things. As everything is conditional, the sufferings of life must be due to some condition. This condition is birth. If a man was not born he would not have been subjected to the sufferings of old age, disease, death etc. But birth is also conditional. It is the will to be born or *Bhava* that causes birth and entangles a man in the wheel of the world. But why is there predisposition in man to be born? This is due to attachment or clinging or *Upādāna* to the objects of the world. The attachment again is due to some conditions and that is craving or thirst or *trsnā* for the enjoyments of the object of the world. Now, why do individuals have this craving for enjoyment? This is due to sense-experience creating pleasurable feelings or *Vedanā*.

But why do individuals have sense-experiences like these? That's because of contact or *sparsa* of sense-organs with external objects. But this contact is again due to six sense organs, (*sad-āyatana*) viz., eyes, ears, nose, tongue, skin and mind. But why do individuals have these six sense-organs? The existence of the six sense organs is due to the mind-body organism or *nāmarupa*. But from where does this mind-body organism originate? This is due to the initial consciousness or *Vijnāna* of the embryo in the mother's womb. But why do people have this consciousness? This is due to a man's predispositions or *samskāras* of karmas or deeds of past life. But why do people have these predispositions? They are also due to impressions which cause rebirth and this is due to ignorance or *avidya*. So, ignorance is the root cause of all sufferings of life.

(iii) The Third Noble Truth (The cessation of suffering): This third noble truth follows from the second. Every effect depends on some causes and conditions, so if the causes and conditions are removed the effect ceases to exist. As human sufferings are dependent on certain conditions, sufferings would cease to exist, when the conditions are removed. The

state of complete extinction of suffering is called Nirvana in Buddhist philosophy.

Nirvana is a state which signifies complete cessation of desire. As Nirvana literally means extinguished, it is a state where the fire of passions is completely extinguished. This is the ultimate end of an aspirant achieved through perfect control of passions by contemplation of 'Nothingness' or *Sunya*. It implies a perfect equanimity of mind undisturbed by worldly desire, passions and distractions. Constant contemplation of truth enables the aspirant to gain that perfect wisdom which creates utter desirelessness in him. There is no more attachment, hatred and infatuation for objects of enjoyment in him. He is no more bound to the world. He is liberated; he becomes an '*arhat*' – a person to be revered. He gets rid of all sufferings of human life. In fact, he attains complete deliverance from all pain and misery.

Buddha points out that every man may be following an ethical and spiritual path can attain 'Nirvana' in this very life. In the light of this view advocated by Buddha, it is not proper to characterize Buddhist philosophy as pessimistic.

(iv) The fourth noble Truth (The path to cessation of sufferings): The four noble truths refer to a path by following which miseries of life can be permanently stopped and liberation can be attained. This ethical and spiritual path is called Eightfold Noble path (*Astangikamarga*) because it consists of eight steps. This path has been characterized as the middle path by Buddha as it is a golden mean between two extremes – a life of self-indulgence and a life of self-mortification. Buddha has recommended this middle path to those who aspire after truth and has advised them to shun both indulgence in unrestrained sensual pleasures and resorting to severe physical austerities. The Eightfold Noble Paths are described in the following manner:

(a) Right vision (*Samyagdristi*): The first step in the eightfold path is right vision. It consists in right knowledge of the four noble truths. Ignorance creates wrong views regarding self and the world. So it is

necessary that wrong views should be abandoned and the real nature of the world and the self should be realized. Knowledge of the four noble truths alone and not fruitless theoretical speculation regarding the world and self can lead one towards the path of liberation.

(b) Right resolve (*Samyagsankalpa*): Right resolve must accompany right vision; otherwise knowledge of the truths will be of no use. Right resolve consists in giving up attachment to sensual pleasures, giving up ill-will towards other and giving up the idea of causing harm to others.

(c) Right speech (*Samyagvāk*): As right resolve should manifest itself through action, as a first step at least, an aspirant must try to control his speech. He must abstain from telling lies, slandering, abusing, and using harsh and unkind words. In short, right speech consists in avoiding bad speech and adopting good speech.

(d) Right conduct (*Samyakkarmānta*): It consists in abstention from killing, theft, sexual enjoyment, lying and drinking intoxicating liquor.

(e) Right livelihood (*Samyagajiva*): It consists in earning one's living by honest or right means. According to Buddha, to carry on trade in weapons, animals, flesh, wine and poison is forbidden. Earning money by unfair means like pressure, fraudulence, bribery, dacoity, plunder etc. is tantamount to living by dishonest means and so it is forbidden.

(f) Right effort (*Samyagvyāma*): it consists in stopping evil thoughts in the mind. Evil thoughts and ideas spoil the purity of moral life. If evil thoughts strike their roots deep into the mind, the aspirant must uproot evil thoughts, prevent evil thoughts aspiring afresh, awaken good thoughts in the mind and take care to retain them.

(g) Right mindfulness (*Samyaksṃriti*): It consists in remembering the real form of things. It includes the remembrance of the impurities of the body, the nature of feeling like pleasure; pain etc. the nature of mind, five skandhas, sensible objects, means to liberation and four noble truths. So, right mindfulness enables an aspirant to shun worldly attachment.

(h) Right concentration (*Samyaksamādhī*): It consists in deep concentration or meditation. The former seven steps prepare the

necessary ground for this meditation. It has four stages. Firstly, the aspirant concentrates his mind on reasoning (vitarka) and investigation regarding the four noble truths. At this there is a joy which springs from pure and detached thought. Secondly, as doubts are removed and faith in the noble truths increases, reasoning and investigation become unnecessary. At this stage there is joy, peace and tranquility born of profound contemplation or meditation. Thirdly, the aspirant becomes indifferent to the joy of concentration. In this deep kind of meditation the aspirant experiences perfect evenness of mind. A sense of bodily ease persists at this stage also. Fourthly, the sense of bodily ease vanishes. Then there is complete tranquility and self-possession. It is a stage of 'perfect indifference, perfect peace and perfect negation'. This is the nature of *Nirvāna*. As the aspirant possesses perfect wisdom, he realizes the true nature of the world and the self.

(2) Nirvana: According to the Buddhist philosophy, the third Noble Truth is that there is cessation or extinction of suffering. This truth follows from the second truth. Every effect depends on some causes and conditions, so if the causes and conditions are removed the effect ceases to exist. As human sufferings are dependent on certain conditions, sufferings would cease to exist, when the conditions are removed. The state of complete extinction of suffering is called 'Nirvana' in Buddhist philosophy.

Nirvana is a state which signifies complete cessation of desires. As 'Nirvana' literally means 'extinguished', it is a state where the fire of passions is completely extinguished. This is the ultimate end of an aspirant achieved through the perfect control of passions by contemplation of 'Nothingness' or 'Sunya'. It implies a perfect equanimity of mind undisturbed by worldly desires, distractions and passions. Constant contemplation of truth enables the aspirant to gain that perfect wisdom which creates utter desirelessness in him. There is no more any attachment, hatred and infatuation for objects of enjoyment in him. He is no more bound to the world. He is liberated; he becomes an 'Arhat' – a

person to be revered. He gets rid of all sufferings of human life. In fact, he attains complete deliverance from all pain and misery.

Nirvana is not a state of inactivity as has been wrongly supposed by many philosophers. For the attainment of Nirvana, it is necessary that one must engage one-self in deep meditation. This necessitates withdrawal of one's attention from all outside objects for a stipulated period. But once knowledge of the fourfold truth has been gained, withdrawal from active life is no more necessary. The life of Buddha can be cited as an illustration in this context. Buddha in his post-enlightenment period passed an active life when he preached his teaching far and wide by travelling from one place to another. In fact, *niskāma* karmas performed by a person after he has attained liberation do not cause bondage. So Nirvana is not a state of inactivity.

Nirvana does not mean the complete extinction of existence, i.e., end of life. The word 'Nirvana' literally means 'extinguished'. The literal meaning of the word 'Nirvana' and the negative description of the word have led many Buddhists and non-Buddhists to interpret Nirvana as the complete extinction of life. But such an interpretation is definitely erroneous. Had it been so, Buddha cannot be said to have attained liberation before his death. Nirvana means the extinction of passions and desires and not of one's existence. In this state the fire of passions, greed, jealousy, anger, hatred and doubt are extinguished. In Nirvana, there is no end of life, but there is an end of craving for pleasures of life. As regards the conditions of the liberated after death, Buddha used to maintain perfect silence without making any comment.

According to some philosophers, Nirvana is a state of positive bliss. As the fire of passions has been extinguished and the thirst for sense-enjoyment has been subsided, a state of utter desirelessness has been created in the mind of the liberated. As a result, the liberated is freed from all pain and is transported to a world of perfect bliss.

But according to some other philosophers, it is better not to describe Nirvana as a state of positive bliss. Nirvana is a state where there is

complete cessation of sufferings. It is not appropriate to describe it in terms of ordinary experience of worldly pleasures. In fact, the true nature of Nirvana can only be realized and not described. If it is to be described at all, it is to be described negatively. The best way to realize its nature is to think it as a state, completely free from all pain.

(3) Pratityasamutpādvāda: In our world nothings happens accidentally or without a cause. Whatever occurs in any place occurs on account of this or that cause. The law of Causation that every event must have a cause is a necessary and universal law. According to Buddhism, this law of universal causation operates spontaneously within this world. There is no intervention of God or any other supernatural entity in the operation of this law. This is known as the law of dependent origination (*pratityasamutpāda-niyama*) in Buddha philosophy. The word '*samutpāda*' means arising or appearance and '*pratitya*' means after getting. So, '*Pratityasamutpāda*' means after getting that, this arises, i.e. the effect will arise whenever its cause gets certain conditions fulfilled. Whatever comes into being comes into being from a succession of causes.

The doctrine of *Pratityasamutpāda* strikes a mean between two extreme theories regarding reality: eternalism (*sāsvatavāda*) and nihilism (*ucchedavāda*). Eternalism admits the existence of some eternal objects which have neither any beginning nor any end. They are uncaused and so they do not depend on anything for their existence. Nihilism, on the contrary, maintains that nothing remains of a thing after its destruction. Destruction means complete annihilation. *Pratityasamutpādvāda* holds that a thing is neither eternal nor completely non-existent. Whatever exists on being dependent on certain conditions. An existing thing sheds something behind it when it goes out of existence. From this point of view, neither being nor non-being is the truth, but it is only becoming. The world is simply a process and it is not a product. Nothing in this world including the world itself remains stable amidst various changes. This world process is governed by the law of dependent origination. According to it, one stage

of the world process is determined or caused by its immediately preceding stage.

Pratityasamutpāḍavāda also opposes two different explanations regarding the causal process. In one explanation it is said that every event has a cause, but besides the natural causes of an event, there is, behind it, a supernatural cause like God or any other supernatural entity. This entity is the ultimate determinant of every event. In another explanation the fact of succession is regarded as quite accidental. We have seen that a section of *Cārvākas* holds such a view. The law of dependent origination has denied both these explanations. If these two explanations are accepted, then a man becomes powerless and he loses his entire role in changing the course of events. Either he becomes an instrument in the hands of a supernatural entity or he is bewildered by the haphazard occurrence of causeless events. Buddha thinks that nothing happens without a cause and this cause is natural. There is no supernatural control behind the production of any event. So Buddha has removed both accidentalism and supernaturalism from his explanation of the causal process.

Moreover, though Buddhism admits the existence of causal necessity within the flow of events, it denies the naturalistic explanation of such necessity. Naturalism supposes that everything has an essential nature of its own. Production is the unfolding of that nature, e.g., in generating heat fire expresses its own nature. For Buddhism, production is not simply the expression of the inner nature of a thing. It is the result of certain external conditions co-operating with it. It is necessary succession, but the necessity is of a contingent kind. A series, generally called a thing, is not produced until certain conditions come together. For example, a plant (i.e., a plant-series) does not grow without the presence of some conditions like a seed, soil, water etc. But, once it grows, it goes on continuously till one or more of its supporting conditions are eliminated. So, the causal necessity is relative to the fulfillment of certain conditions. The doctrine of dependent origination is also against fatalism. Fatalism holds that any human action, whether good or bad is controlled by an

irristible and supernatural power called fate. But this view is contrary to the doctrine of dependent origination as it does not admit the principle of universal causation.

So the Buddhist explanation of the world-process through dependent origination has admitted the role of the individual in determining the course of events. Man must suffer or enjoy the fruits of his past actions. Here lies the necessity. Yet he can change or remove the sorrows and miseries of his life by changing his present trend of action. If the prior conditions change, the effect also changes. That means, the necessity is relative, and not absolute. The *Pratityasamutpādvāda* of Buddha, therefore, has admitted the presence of real freedom in human life.

(4) Karmavāda: The theory of *Karma* present in Buddha's teachings is another form of the doctrine of dependent origination. It is an application of the said doctrine in the domain of actions of living beings. The theory of Karma states that a man must enjoy or suffer the consequences of his actions. It also assumes that virtue leads to happiness and vice to pain.

Men differ among themselves owing to their different performances of the past. The fruits of our actions are never lost. We do not enjoy or suffer the consequences of those actions which we have not performed. If we do not enjoy or suffer the consequences of any of our actions in this life, we must have it in a future life. The Law of karma operates automatically without the control of any entity like God. It adjusts the fruits of our actions to our lives. The natures of the fruits of actions are determined by the character of the agent doing these actions.

Actions may be of two types: *Sakāma karma* or interested action and *Niskāma karma* or disinterested action. An action done without any desire, passion and worldly attachment is a disinterested action. When a man realizes the transitory nature of life and the world, he becomes free from the chains of attachment, desire and passion. His action then becomes disinterested action. But an action done with desire, passion and attachment is an interested action. We indulge in interested actions due to our ignorance to the real nature of life and the world. Ignorance gives rise

to desire and attachment and they in their turn lead to interested actions. Such actions produce fruits in the form of happiness and miseries. Fruits of actions which we do not enjoy in the present life lead to a next life. In this way the past life generates the present life which again leads to the next life. We are thus bound by the chain of birth and rebirth. Disinterested actions do not bear any fruit and so they do not give rise to any future life. An individual who has begun to perform such *niskāma karmas* achieves complete liberation from the chain of birth and rebirth as soon as the fruits of his past deeds are exhausted. Just as a fried seed does not produce any sprout, so also the actions of a liberated man do not produce any future shackle. Now if the theory of Karma is accepted, can there be any scope for human freedom?

If all the pleasures and pains of our life are determined by our past deeds, then how is it possible for a man to bring any change in his life? As an answer to this question it can be said that Buddha does not deny the freedom of human will. Rather he has emphasized that a man can put an end to the influence of the Law of karma by dint of his right resolve or *Samyak Sankalpa*. We have seen that there is no mechanical necessity in the process of life, the necessity present there is conditional. The Law of Karma is universal. But its operation in the world and life depends on the presence of some conditions. An individual has got his present painful life because of the presence of certain conditions in his past life. His present life would be different if he had performed his past deeds in a different way. We can eliminate all miseries from our life if we keep this teaching in our mind and arrange our deeds accordingly. By removing ignorance and worldly attachment and desire resulting from them, we can remove all the pains from our life and make ourselves completely free. Thus Buddhism is said totally against absolute determinism.

(5) *Kshasnikvāda*: According to Buddha, everything in this world is transitory – *sarvam aniyam*. Nothing is permanent and eternal. Whatever has origination has decay and destruction. A thing having origination cannot be imperishable. All mental processes and physical things are

changeable. Whatever is existent is unstable. This view about the impermanence of the world arises from the doctrine of dependent origination. Buddhists say that every event has a cause. When that cause disappears, the effect also disappears. The effect arises through the operation of its cause and it is destroyed with the destruction of the cause.

Every existent thing arises from a cause. So it is impermanent. That which appears to be stable and permanent is also destroyed. Wherever there is union, there is disunion. Wherever there is birth, there is death.

At the time of Buddha, two views were prevalent about the nature of reality. In one view reality is treated as something unchangeable. In another view things are thought to be devoid of any real essence. Everything is non-existent or non-being according to this view. Buddha reconciles these two views. He thinks that nothing is either absolutely stable or absolutely non-existent. Everything is a combination of these two. Everything is becoming. It is a process in which both being and non-being merges. Reality is in no way static, it is a dynamic process, it is a flow.

Later Buddhists, such as *Sautrāntikās*, have transformed this doctrine of impermanence into the doctrine of momentariness. According to them, things of the world are not only unstable, but they are also momentary. Each thing exists for a moment only. It goes out of existence just after one moment. Nothing is eternal. Whatever is existent is momentary (*Jat sat tat ksanikam*).

The later Buddhists define reality in terms of causal efficiency. '*Arthakriyākāritva laksanam sat*'. '*Arthakriyākāritva*' means efficiency to produce an effect. This causal efficiency is the essential mark of a real thing. A thing without it is not a real thing. Existence is identical with causal efficiency. On the basis of this definition of reality, later Buddhists have tried to prove the momentary nature of things.

Now, a real thing having the capacity to produce effects will produce all its effects simultaneously or successively. If a real thing produces all its effects at a particular moment, then it will have nothing to produce after

that moment. So after that moment it ceases to have any existence. In that case it is proved to be momentary.

Now the question is whether the thing was existent before the moment in which it produces its effect. If the thing is existent beforehand, then in those previous moments of its existence it must have causal efficiency. If it has got causal efficiency, why should it wait for producing its effects? It may be said that though the thing has the required capacity, it waits for certain helping conditions till the discharging of its capacity. If a thing waits for the helping conditions, then it cannot be said to have real capacity without those conditions. Had there been any such capacity in the thing, the thing would have exercised it at once without waiting for any help.

If, again, the thing had no capacity beforehand, its previous existence cannot be accepted. Moreover, the thing as it is in itself and the thing related to helping conditions are two different things. A seed kept in the earthen pot becomes a different seed when it is sown in the field. The first does not produce any sprout, whereas the second does the process of sprouting.

Again, if a thing exists for some moments, then it must successively produce some effects in those moments. Otherwise it cannot be regarded as existent in those moments. The effects that it produces in different moments may be identical or different. If the effects are different, then it is proved that the things producing them are also different. The same cause cannot produce different effects. In such case the momentariness of the thing is clearly established. The effects may be identical. In that case the thing must also be identical in several moments. But no evidences can be provided for proving that the effects produced in different moments are identical. We have seen that the seed in the house and the seed thrown in the field are two quite different seeds. So we see that if causal efficiency is the essential mark of existence, then all real things must be momentary.

(6) *Nairatmavāda*: In Indian philosophy both the Buddhists and the *Carvākās* deny the existence of any permanent self. But Buddhism, though denying a stable self, rejects the *Cārvākās* theory of self as living conscious body. They have shown that the *Cārvākā* idea of self as identical with body cannot explain knowledge, memory and recognition. Again the Buddhists do not accept any permanent self like other Indian philosophers for explaining these mental phenomena. They point out that we do not find any permanent self in our experience. Nor can we prove its existence through inference. Buddha has not accepted the existence of any permanent and eternal self. As everything is impermanent and momentary, the self will also be momentary. There can be no abiding self.

Generally we think that self is permanent and it acts as the substratum of all mental processes like thinking, feeling and willing. This permanent self is existent before its assumption of this life and it will continue to exist even after the destruction of the present living body. After the destruction of this body, it will have a new body.

But Buddha and his followers have rejected such a conception of self. They think that self is nothing but the current of conscious processes that we find at a particular moment within us. Our thoughts, wishes, pleasures and pains are continuously coming-to-be and going out of existence. Each of our mental processes exists for only a moment. There is no single self-contained entity behind them as their substratum, as no such abiding substratum is found in our introspection. Buddha does not deny self. What he denies is the existence of a permanent and eternal self that does not change with the change of body and mental processes. So self is merely a flow or current of mental processes.

Buddha has laid great stress on this theory of unstable self. He has asked his disciples and all liberation-seekers to give up the wrong idea of self as a permanent substance. He thinks that all our miseries arise from this wrong idea. Buddha maintains that self is not a simple entity. It is a combination of certain psychological and physical factors (*nāma-rupa samghāta*). The psychological factors (*nāma*) are feeling (*vedanā*), perception

(*samjnā*), consciousness (*vijnāna*) and mental dispositions (*Samstara*). The physical factor (*rupa*) is the body. Self is an aggregate or *samghāta* of these five factors these five factors. These five factors are known as five *skandha* of the five factors. These five factors are known as five *skandhas*. So self is an aggregate of five *skandhas*. Buddha thinks that there is nothing other than this aggregate. As an agreement self is always in a state of change, because all its five factors are changeable.

Now, if self is simply a flow of changing processes, how can we explain memory and recognition? If the past 'I' and the present 'I' are different then how can the experience of the past 'I' be recollected by the present 'I'? The Buddhists say that self changes in every moment. But the mental disposition of one phase of self is transferred to the immediately succeeding phase before its disappearance. These carried mental dispositions remain latent in the flow of consciousness. A particular latent disposition becomes patent when it obtains a favourable circumstance. This is how memory of past experience becomes possible. The Buddhists, however, rejected recognition as a form of erroneous cognition. In recognition, we know a familiar object as familiar. But the things of two different moments are quite different according to the Buddha conception of reality. So the recognition of a thing as the same thing that we knew beforehand is a wrong cognition. In this case we actually take two different things as identical.

Buddhists also have tried to explain the process of rebirth on the basis of their view of self. According to them, rebirth is not the transmigration of an abiding self from one body to another. It means generation of a next self-series from the present self-series. Self is actually a series of mental processes. The mental process of present moment arises from the process of previous moment and the process of the next moment will arise from the present process. In this way a series continue. The presence of ignorance and desire at the basis of a self-series will lead to its perpetuation with all its sufferings. It is like a burning flame which continues so long as its supporting conditions remain present. When the

supporting conditions disappear, the flame is extinguished. There can be no flame without fuel. Similarly, a self-series disappears with the disappearance of its root causes, namely, ignorance and desire. The abolition of a self-series leads to complete liberation or *nirvāna* from the burning flame of sufferings.

b) Main theory of *Sautrāntika* and *Vaibhāsika* School:

***Sautrāntika* School:** The *Vaibhāsikās* are realists because they admit the reality of mind as well as the reality of external objects existing independently of mind in the external world. This school of Buddhism is so named because they followed *Vibhāsā*, a commentary on an *Abhidhamma* treatise, which formed the general basis of the philosophy of the realists. This school belongs to the *Hinayāna* sect of Buddhism.

The *Vaibhāsikās* are *Sarvāstivādins* like the *Sautrāntikas*. They recognize the reality of both mind and external objects. The *Sautrāntikas* maintain that the knowledge of objects can be obtained indirectly, only through inference. The *Vaibhāsikās* do not agree with their views. They recognize the direct knowledge of object. They point out that unless we have direct knowledge of objects, the existence of external objects cannot be inferred. One cannot infer fire from smoke if in the past he has not perceived both smoke and fire together. So we perceive objects directly. In fact, objects can be known both with the help of perception and inference. External objects may be known through inference, but it is perception which gives us the knowledge of the existence of mental objects. Besides this if objects are not known directly, then how is it possible for us to know that the idea existing in the mind is a copy of the object?

According to the *Sautrāntikas* we directly perceive the idea of the jug and we infer the existence of the jug through inference. But if I have no chance to know the jug directly, how can I be satisfied that my idea of the jug is the true representation of the jug that exists outside my mind. When we say that the idea is the mental form of the external object, then we understand that we have known the external thing directly and my idea is the mental form of the object, otherwise the term 'mental form' will mean

nothing. The *Vaibhāsikās* criticize the *Sautrāntikas* doctrine of inferability of external objects from their knowledge. According to the *Vaibhāsikās*, if all the external things are inferred by their knowledge, then there are no objects of perception. There is, therefore, no perception of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) of the middle term with the major term which is the ground of inference. Inference, in order to become possible, presupposes the relation of concomitance between the middle and the major term. According to the *Vaibhāsikās*, the *Sautrāntikas* doctrine, if admitted, will make inference impossible.

So either we have to accept the view that we cannot know anything except our ideas of the mind or we have to admit that external objects exist independently outside our mind and they can be perceived directly. *Vijnāna-vāda* or Subjective Idealism admits that mind can only know its ideas, but this view is unsatisfactory. So we have to admit that we can have direct knowledge of objects. For this reason the *Vaibhāsikā* doctrine is called the doctrine of direct realism. As this doctrine holds a theory of direct realism, the doctrine is called *Vāhya-Pratyaksavada*.

Vaibhāsika School: The *Sautrāntikas* are realists because they recognize the reality of external objects, existing independently outside the mind. Much can be known about this school from *Abhidharmakosha* of *Vasubhandhu*. This school of Buddhism is called *Sautrāntika* as this school recognizes the authority of the *Sutta-pitaka*. The *Sautrāntikas* belong to the *Hinayāna* sect.

The *Sautrāntikas* are called *Sarvāstivādins* because they recognized the reality of matter and mind. *Vijnāna-vāda* does not admit the reality of the external objects. The *Sautrāntikas* criticize the view point of the *Vijnāna-vāda* by putting forward the following arguments.

Firstly, unless the existence of some external objects is assumed then it becomes difficult to explain illusions, hallucinations etc. If there be no external object, a *Vijnāna-vādin* cannot say that in case of illusion consciousness appears as an external object. It is as inconsistent as an expression like 'Devadatta looks like the son of a barren mother.

Secondly, the object and the consciousness of object are simultaneous, but that does not prove that they are identical.

Thirdly, whenever an external object, say a pot, is perceived then we have the consciousness that the pot is experienced as an object which is external and consciousness is something internal. The pot and the consciousness of the pot are separate and not identical. The recognition of this fact makes the perception of the pot possible. If the pot perceived and the consciousnesses of the pot were identical, then we would have remarked, 'I am the pot'. But we say 'this is a pot'; we don't say 'I am the pot'.

Fourthly, if the existence of external objects is not admitted, then it would be difficult to distinguish between the consciousnesses of different objects. Our consciousness of different colours – red, green, yellow etc. is possible because there is separate existence of different colours. Consciousness in fact is same in all the cases. It is due to different objects of knowledge; consciousness becomes different in relation to different objects.

Fifthly, if the existence of object outside consciousness is not recognized, it becomes difficult to determine whether consciousness agrees with the object or not. If there is no existence of external object, how can we ascertain whether our ideas correspond to objects or not?

Sixthly, the existence of external objects must be admitted, for they meet our practical needs. The idea of food cannot satisfy the hunger of a hungry man, he requires real food.

Seventhly, the existence of an external world is to be admitted because this external world does not depend on our arbitrary will. We perceive different objects with our sense-organs and for this we have to admit the existence of an external world which can produce the sensations of colour, sound etc. as well as the feelings of pleasure and pain.

According to the *Sautrāntikas* direct knowledge of objects is not possible. We can directly know the ideas which can come in our minds. These ideas are the copies or the representations of the objects. This

theory of the *Sautrāntikas* is known as the theory of the inferability of external objects or *Vāhyānumeyavāda*. Though the knowledge of the object is derived through inference yet the existence of the external object can never be denied.

The *Sautrāntikas* thought that the knowledge of the external objects becomes possible due to four causes or conditions. These are *Ālamban*, *Samānāntar*, *Adhipati* and *Sahakāri Pratyaya*. The first is the condition of the external object like a jug. The jug must be there to impart its form to consciousness. The second refers to the conscious mind to cause the consciousness of the form. The senses have been called the *Adhipati Pratyaya* which enable us to ascertain the kind of the consciousness, that is, whether the consciousness of the object visual, tactual, or of any other kind. At last, there are the *Sahakāri Pratyaya* or the subsidiary conditions necessary for knowledge, light, requisite distance, perceptible magnitude etc. in the absence of which knowledge becomes almost impossible. As our knowledge of external objects is dependent on the above four factors or conditions and is not dependent simply on our mind, it is not possible for a person to perceive any object at any time as per sweet will.

(c) Main theory of *Yogācāravāda*: *Asanga*, *Vasubandhu*, *Maitreyanātha*, *Dinnāga* are the prominent adherents of the *Yogācāra* or *Vijñānavāda*. But *Maitreyanātha*, the teacher of *Asanga* is its first systematic expounder. This school comes under the Mahayana sect. This view is called *Yogācāra*, because this theory emphasizes the importance of yoga for the realization of the highest truth. This theory is called *Vijñānavāda* because this theory regards vijñāna or consciousness as the one reality. *Lankāvatāra-sūtra* is one of the chief works of this school.

The *Sautrāntikas* admit the reality of both external objects and consciousness but they hold that reality cannot be known directly. Mind can know only its own ideas and through these ideas, with the help of inference can indirectly know the existence of external objects. But *Yogācārās* argue: if mind can know only its ideas and cannot attain direct knowledge of the object, then how is it possible for the mind to know the reality existing independently of the mind? The *Yogācārās* hold that in

order to trace the source of ideas, there is no reason to suppose that there is any external stimulus.

The *Yogācārās* put forward following arguments for the non-existence of external objects.

Firstly, in dreams and hallucinations cognitions arise, though there are no external objects corresponding to them; internal thoughts appear as external. Similarly, things that appear to be outside the mind are nothing but ideas in the mind.

Secondly, in a self-cognising cognition, whose essential nature consists in self-awareness, there is no apprehension of an external object. In self-aware cognitions what is known, is identical with what knows, and the *Yogācārās* argue that in all experience the same thing may occur. According to the *Yogācārās*, cognition and the object cognized, subject and object are the forms of cognition which is one and self-identical. The distinction of subject and object falls within cognition.

Thirdly, there is an invariable association between the object and the consciousness of the object. As object and its consciousness always appear together and neither without the other, there is no reasonable ground to suppose that they are distinct. The blue colour and the consciousness of the blue colour are identical. Their separate existence is never perceived. Though really one and identical, they appear as two just as the single moon illusorily appears double.

Fourthly, objects appear different to different persons and even different to the same person at different times. If the objects were real, each possessing its own definite character, they could not appear to different persons differently.

Lastly, if any reality outside consciousness is admitted, it cannot be known. The external reality, if there be any, is either atomic or made of several parts. If it is atomic it cannot be perceived because atoms are too small to be perceptible. Again if it is made of several atoms even then the whole thing cannot be perceived together because all its parts cannot be perceived simultaneously. Now if there is the question of perception of

one part, the difficulty is the same, that either it is made of one atom or it is made of several atoms and in both the conditions, it cannot be perceived. But if consciousness is regarded as the only reality all these difficulties do not arise because the relation between the whole and the parts does not arise with regard to consciousness.

Though the *Yogācārās* do not admit the existence of external reality, they maintain that the existence of consciousness can by no means be denied. For if the reality of the mind (*citta*) is not admitted, then the truth of any reasoning cannot be ascertained. In the absence of any mind, thinking and reasoning will not be possible. So the reality of the mind must be admitted. The mind consists of a stream of different kinds of ideas. There is no other reality except mind.

Consciousness, according to Vijnāna-vādin, is divided into individual consciousness (Pravrtti Vijnāna) and Absolute consciousness (Alaya-Vijnana).

Exercises

• **Find out the correct alternative:**

1. Sage _____ is the founder of Buddhism.
(i) Gautama (ii) Kapil (iii) Samkara (iv) Jaimini
2. Buddhism has _____ schools.
(i) Two (ii) Three (iii) Four (v) Five
3. The Hinayānas are called _____.
(i) Idealists (ii) Realists (iii) Nihilists (iv) Vijnanavāda
4. The sub-sections of Hinayāna school are _____.
(i) Two (ii) Three (iii) Four (iv) Five
5. There are _____ levels of Samadhi according to Buddhism.
(i) Two (ii) Three (iii) Four (iv) Five
6. 'What is momentary is true' – this is said by _____.
(i) Carvākā (ii) Buddha (iii) Jaina (iv) Vedanta
7. The name of the theory of self of Buddhism is _____.

- (i) Nairatmavāda (ii) Manātmavāda
 (iii) Advaitavāda (iv) Dehātmavāda
8. According to Buddhism, the cause of suffering is _____.
- (i) Avidya (ii) Vijnāna (iii) Birth (iv) Death
9. The number of Buddha realist school is _____.
- (i) One (ii) Two (iii) Three (iv) Four
10. According to Buddhism, Nirvana means _____.
- (i) Cessation of suffering (ii) Pleasure (iii) Heaven (iv) Death
11. *Astāngika Mārga* or the Eight fold Path is mentioned in the _____ Noble Truth.
- (i) First (ii) Second (iii) Third (iv) Fourth
12. The theory in which the Bauddha theory of Cause-effect is found is _____.
- (i) Pratityasamutpādvāda (ii) Kshasnikvāda (iii) Karmavāda (iv) Nairatmavāda
13. _____ is a realist school of Buddhism.
- (i) Sautrantika (ii) Mādhyamika (iii) Vijnanavāda (iv) Yogacāra
14. There are _____ Idealist schools of Buddhism.
- (i) Two (ii) Three (iii) Four (iv) Five
15. The Noble Truth in which the cause of suffering is mentioned is _____.
- (i) First (ii) Second (iii) Third (iv) Fourth
16. The school of Buddhism which is known as Bāhyānumeyavāda is _____.
- (i) Vaibhāsika (ii) Sautrāntika (iii) Mādhyamika (iv) Vijnanavāda
17. The _____ of Buddhism is also called Vijnanavāda.
- (i) Sautrantika (ii) Vaibhāsikā (iii) Mādhyamika (iv) Yogacāra
18. _____ Philosophers of Buddhism are called Hinayāna.

- (i) Sautrantika (ii) Mādhyamika (iii) Yogacāra (iv) Vijnanavāda
19. Two Mahayana schools of Buddhism are _____.
- (i) Sautrantika and Vaibhāsika (ii) Vaibhāsika and Yogacāra
(iii) Yogacāra and Mādhyamika (iv) Mādhyamika and Sautrantika
20. The theory of soul or ātmā of Buddhism is called _____.
- (i) Nairatmavāda (ii) Karmavāda (iii) Kshasnikvāda (iv) Pratityasamutpāda
21. The founder of Yogacāra is _____.
- (i) Vasubhandhu (ii) Maitreyañātha (iii) Nagarjuna (iv) Dharmakirti
22. In Bauddha philosophy the person who attains Nirvana is called _____.
- (i) Jina (ii) Purusha (iii) Arhat (iv) Jiva
23. The path or way of attainment of Nirvana is called _____.
- (i) Karmavāda (ii) Astāngika Mārga (iii) Avidya (iv) Vijnāna
24. _____ school of Buddhism considers knowledge and its objects as one and identical.
- (i) Sautrantika (ii) Mādhyamika (iii) Vaibhāsikā (iv) Vijnanavāda
25. The Noble truth in which we get the mention of Bhava Chakra is _____.
- (i) First (ii) Second (iii) Third (iv) Fourth
26. The contradictory view of Eternalism and Nihilism is _____.
- (i) Pratityasamutpādavāda (ii) Karmavāda (iii) Ksniavāda (iv) Vijnanavāda
27. In Buddhism the definition of reality or sattā is _____.
- (i) Arthakriyātva (ii) Nirvana (iii) Eternality (iv) Samskāra
28. According to Buddhism, the cause of rebirth is _____.
- (i) Vedanā (ii) Samskāra (iii) Trishnā (iv) Sadāyatana
29. The basis of Bauddha Karmavāda is _____.

(i) Pratityasamutpāda (ii) Nairatmavāda (iii) Kshasnikvāda (iv) Astāngika Mārga

30. External objects are flow of *Svalaksana* --- this is the view of _____ of Buddhism.

(i) Sautrantika (ii) Mādhyamika (iii) Vaibhāsikā (iv) Vijnanavāda

• **Answer the following questions:**

1. Who is the founder of Buddha philosophy?
2. What is the basic text of Buddha philosophy?
3. What are three pitakas of the text Tripitaka?
4. What is the subject matter of Binaya Pitaka?
5. What is the subject matter of Sutta Pitaka?
6. What is the subject matter of Abhidhamma Pitaka?
7. What is the meaning of Hinayāna?
8. What is the meaning of Mahayana?
9. How can we classify Buddha realism?
10. How can we classify Buddha idealism?
11. Name some of the main philosophical schools of Buddhism.
12. What are the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism?
13. What is the basis of the Second Noble Truth of Buddhism?
14. What do you mean by Bhaba Chakra or Dwadasa Nidana?
15. In which Noble Truth of the Bauddhas do we find the mention of Eight-fold Paths?
16. What is the meaning of Nirvana?
17. Why is the Eight fold paths called middle path?
18. What are the Eightfold Nobel paths of Buddhism?
19. What is the meaning of Right vision or Samyagdristi?
20. What is the meaning of Right resolve or Samyagsankalpa?
21. What is the meaning of Right speech or Samyagvāk?
22. What is the meaning of Right conduct or Samyakkarmānta?
23. What is the meaning of Right livelihood or Samyagajiva?
24. What is the meaning of Right effort or Samyagvyayama?
25. What is the meaning of Right mindfulness or Samyaksamriti?

26. What is the meaning of Right Concentration or Samyaksamādhi?
27. What are the four steps of Right concentration or Samyaksamādhi?
28. Why is not Nirvana called a state of inactiveness?
29. What does one get after the attainment of Nirvana?
30. Which Buddha philosopher has described Nirvana with the help of metaphor?
31. What is the meaning of accidentalism or Yadricchāvāda?
32. Between which two theories can we place the theory of Dependent Origination?
33. What is the meaning of Eternalism?
34. What is the meaning of Nihilism?
35. What is the definition or reality or Sattā according to Buddhism?
36. What is the nature of soul according to Buddha theory of momentariness?
37. Why is the Vijñānavādins known as Yogācāra?
38. Why is the Yogācāra known as Vijñānavādins?
39. Who identified Yogācārās as Vijñānavādins for the first time?
40. Mention some main tenets of Buddhism.
41. What is the meaning of the theory of dependent origination or Pratītyasamutpādvāda?
42. What is the name of the causal theory of Buddhism?
43. What is the significance of the twelve links or Dvādaśānidāna?
44. Name some of the supporters of Vijñānavādins.
45. Why is the Vaibhāsika School known as pluralists?
46. Why do the Vaibhāsikās consider Nirvana as a positive state?
47. What is the meaning of Nairātmaivāda?
48. What are the two meanings of the term 'Nairātmaivāda'?
49. What are the five Skandhas admitted by the Buddhists?
50. Why is Nirvana considered as a negative state by the Sautrāntikas?
51. What is the meaning of 'Arhat' or a person to be revered in Buddha philosophy?
52. What is the meaning of naturalism?
53. What is the meaning of Fatalism?

54. What are four conditions admitted by the Sautrāntikas for the possibility of the knowledge of the external objects?
55. Why do the Vaibhāsikās and the Sautrāntikas deny determinate perception or Nirvikalpaka perception?

Chapter – 9
NYAYA DARSHANA
(11 marks allotted)

MCQ – 1X3 = 3

DAQ – 8X1 = 8

(a) The different *Pramānās* accepted by the *Nayāyikās*: Sage Gautama is the founder of *Nyāya* philosophy. The main text of this school is *Nyāya-sutra*. *Gangesa Upādhyāya* is the founder of the modern *Nyāya* philosophy. His main text is *Tattvachintāmani*. In *Nyāya* philosophy knowledge can be classified into two types, valid or *yathārtha* and invalid or *ayathārtha*. Valid knowledge is called *pramā* and invalid knowledge is called *apramā*. *Pramā* can be of four types: Perception or *Pratyaksa*, Inferential knowledge or *Anumiti*, knowledge through comparison or *Upamiti* and knowledge through testimony or *Sābda*. *Apramā* or invalid knowledge can also be of four types: memory or *Smriti*, Doubt or *Samsaya*, Error or illusion or *Bhrama* or *Viparyaya* and hypothetical argument or *Tarka*. According to *Nyāya* philosophy, there are four distinctive *pramānas* or sources of four kinds of valid knowledge, viz., Perception or *pratyaksa*, inference or *anumāna*, comparison or *upamāna* and testimony or *sabda*.

Definition of *Pratyaksa*: The Sanskrit word ‘*Pratyaksa*’ has been described in three senses. In one sense it means valid knowledge that we acquire through our external and internal senses. ‘*Pratyaksa*’ may also mean the objects of perceptual knowledge. In a third sense *Pratyaksa* means the way or source of perceptual knowledge or *pratyaksa pramā*.

Gautama, the founder of *Nyāya* philosophy, defines perception or *pratyaksa-pramā* as a ‘non-erroneous cognition which is produced by the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object, which is not associated with a name and which is well defined.’ Perception is produced by the contact of a present object with an external sense-organ, the conjunction of the sense-

organ with the manas and the conjunction of the manas with the self. So sense-object contact necessarily presupposes the manas-sense contact and the self-manas contact. The manas act as the mediator between the self and the sense organs.

Some Naiyāyikas, the Vedantins and others however reject the above analysis of perception on the ground that there may be perception without sense-object contact. When one perceives a snake in a rope, there is no sense-object contact, because there is really no snake to come in contact with one's eyes. One perceives the feelings of pleasure and pain directly and such knowledge occurs without ostensible contact with the sense organs. There are cases of divine and intuitive perceptions where there is no intercourse between sense-organ and object. God perceives everything without the help of sense organs. The intuitive perceptions of the Yogins do not presuppose sense-object contact. From all these one may conclude that sense-object contact is not the general characteristic of perception; rather a feeling of directness or immediacy of cognition may be regarded as the defining character of perception.

Gautama's definition of perception does not apply to perceptions which are non-sensuous in character. This definition, according to the critics, involves the fallacy of too narrow definition. So Biswanātha defines perception as immediate cognition (*saksāt pratiti*) which is not derived through the medium of any other cognition. This definition embraces all kinds of human perception, divine perception and non-sensuous yogic perception. This definition excludes other sources of knowledge, i.e., inference, comparison and testimony. These cannot be regarded as direct cognition, for inference is produced by the knowledge of vyāpti, comparison by the knowledge of similarity and testimony by the knowledge of words. Gangesha also defines perception as immediate knowledge. Through this definition of perception we can exclude all other knowledge except perception.

(b) Sannikarsha – laulika and alaukika, Different types of Sannikarsha: Perception is produced by the contact of a present object with a sense-organ. So far as

human perception is concerned there cannot be any perception without sense-object contact. We cannot see things which do not come in contact with our eyes. For example, a blind man cannot see colour. So for the perception of a particular object we require a particular sense-organ and a contact of that sense-organ with its own particular object. The relation or contact of a sense-organ with its own object that gives rise to the perception of the concerned object is known as *Sannikarsha*.

Sannikarsha or contact can be divided into two types: *Laukika* or ordinary contact and *Alaukika* or extraordinary contact. In case of ordinary contact the object of perception appears ordinarily before our sense organ actually and the contact takes place in reality between the object and the sense organ. But in case of extraordinary contact the object of perception does appear before our sense organ in reality and the contact does not take place ordinarily. We take this relation or contact extraordinarily.

Ordinary contact can be of six types. These contacts can be of six types. These contacts are described with example in the following manner:

1) *Samyoga Sannikarsa*: A relation between two substances is a relation of conjunction or *samyoga* if they are not part or whole. Our sense of sight and the table seen through it are not related by way of part or whole. So the direct contact between them in the perception of the table is a relation of conjunction (*Samyoga*).

2) *Samyukta-samavaya Sannikarsa*: In the instance of our perception of the colour of a table, our sense of sight comes in contact with the colour by way of *Samyukta-samavaya Sannikarsa*. Here table is a perceptible substance and colour means its perceptible qualities, actions and universals of those substances. Qualities, actions and universals are present in substances in the relation of inference. Now, when we perceive the colour of a table our sense of sight comes in contact with the table and through it with the colour which is present in it as its inherent quality. So in the perception of colour through the sense of sight, the sense-object contact assumes the form of *Samyukta-samavaya Sannikarsa*.

3) ***Samyukta-samaveta-samavaya Sannikarsa***: A table is related to its qualities by way of inherence and the universals of these qualities inhere in them. For example, 'Colourness' is a universal present in the colour of a table. Colourness inheres in the colour and the colour inheres in the table. So when we perceive a universal like 'colourness' with our sense of sight, our sense comes in contact with colourness through *Samyukta-samavaya Sannikarsa*.

4) ***Samavāya Sannikarsa***: The auditory sense-organ is nothing but the cavity of the ear which is a portion of ākasa or ether. Sound is quality that inheres in the substance, ākasa. So when we perceive sound with the auditory sense organ, the sense-object contact assumes the form of *Samavāya*. Here the contact is not conjunction, for conjunction occurs between two substances. But here the sense of hearing is a part of ākasa of which sound is a quality.

5) ***Samaveta-samavāya Sannikarsa***: Sound inheres in ākasa and soundness as a universal inheres in particular sounds. We perceive a particular sound with our sense of hearing through *Samavāya Sannikarsa* and in perceiving a particular sound we perceive the universal, soundness or *sabdatva* through the sense-object contact known as *samaveta-samavāya Sannikarsa*.

6) ***Visesya-Visesanabhāva Sannikarsa***: The Nayāyikās admitted the independent existence of non-existence or *abhāva*. According to the Nyāya system, non-existence can be perceived. When we perceive non-existence with the help of our senses, the sense-object contact assumes the form of *Visesya-Visesanabhāva Sannikarsa*. In our visual perception of the non-existence of an ink-pot qualifying a table, the contact of the sense of sight with the said non-existence of an ink-pot is *samyuktavisesanata Sannikarsa*.

In case of extraordinary contact or *alaukika sannikarsa* the object does not come in contact ordinarily with our sense organ. These can be classified into three types.

1) ***Sāmanyalaksana Sannikarsa***: *Sāmanyalaksana perception* is the perception of all the members of a class through the perception of its generic character or *Samanyadharmā* in a particular member of that class. A generic character means that character which is being known as the common character of many things or individuals. The generic character may be universal of a class, or a quality or substance found to be present in many particulars. For example, our sense of sight is conjoined with a tree and we perceive its generic character, treeness through *Samyukta-samavaya sannikarsa* as treeness inheres in the tree. Such perception of treeness in a tree is *sāmānya-jnana*, i.e., knowledge of generic character. In such a case knowledge of treeness present in the particular tree conjoined with our visual sense acts as *sannikarsa* and brings about the perception of all trees. Here the knowledge of generic character takes the role of sense-object contact.

2) ***Jñānalaksana Sannikarsa***: When through a previous knowledge of an object, a sense-organ establishes a contact (*sannikarsa*) with that object which cannot ordinarily be perceived by it, the sense-object contact is called *Jñānalaksana Sannikarsa*. Here the memory of a previous knowledge acts as a *sannikarsa* and produces perception. This memory-cognition establishes a contact between a sense-organ and an object which is not perceptible through the sense in question. For example, the sense of sight is capable of perceiving colours, but it cannot ordinarily perceive smell or coldness. But I look at a piece of sandalwood from a distance and say 'I see a piece of fragrance.' Now, fragrance can be ordinarily perceived by the sense of smell. Visual perception of fragrance is not possible. Then how can fragrance be seen? Here there is some extraordinary contact between fragrance and the sense of sight. Here the visual perception of sandalwood receives in memory the idea of fragrance by association which was perceived in the past through the sense-organ of smell. This revived memory of past knowledge of sandalwood establishes a contact between the visual sense and the fragrance which is a quality of sandalwood. So the perception of fragrance of the sandalwood through

the visual sense which is not ordinarily capable of perceiving it is possible due to the extraordinary sense-object contact established on the basis of memory of previous experience. The knowledge resulting from such sannikarsa is known as *Jnānalaksana* pratyaksa.

3) **Yogaja Sannikarsa:** The third type of extraordinary contact according to *Naiyāyikas* is Yogaja Sannikarsa. If a man completely devotes himself to a long course of Yogic practices then he attains a special type of extraordinary power. This Yogic power born of intense meditation enables him to have intuitive and immediate perception of past, future, remote, hidden and subtle objects. These objects cannot be ordinarily perceived by us. In such Yogic perception the extraordinary power attained through Yogic practices acts as the sense-object contact. This extraordinary power establishes a connection of our senses with those subtle or remote or past objects that cannot come in contact we at once perceive those subtle, past and remote objects. This perception is called Yogaja perception as it is produced by the supernatural power attained through the practices of Yoga.

Men having extraordinary power can be of two types: (a) persons who have attained perception (*Yukta Yogi*) and (b) persons who are on the way to attain perfection (*Yunjān Yogi*). The *Yogins* who have achieved perception can perceive all things at all times simply if they wish to do so. In these cases the perception are constant and effortless. In cases of *Yunjān Yogi* extraordinary perception of past, remote and subtle objects requires efforts of will. It is not spontaneous in their case. But if a *Yunjān Yogi* attains perfection he will also be able to perceive all objects of all times constantly.

(c) Distinction in brief between Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka Pratyaksa: According to *Naiyāyikas* ordinary perceptions have different levels or stages. These may be classified under two heads, *Nirvikalpaka* or indeterminate perception and *Savikalpaka* or determinate perception. While *Nirvikalpaka* is the first step, *Savikalpaka* is the second. The nature of these two perceptions can be discussed in the following manner:

(i) Nirvikalpaka or Indeterminate perception is immediate apprehension of an object and its qualities unrelated to each other. It is a knowledge of the uncharacterized object. Though the object along with its diverse character is cognized in Nirvikalpaka perception, they are not brought under the substantive-adjective relation (*Visesyavisesana-sambandhanavagãhi*). When we look at an orange and there is contact between our eyes and the object, we apprehend its diverse characters, namely, colour, shape, etc., along with a general character called orangeness, but we have no immediate cognition that it is an orange possession the qualities of redness, roundness etc. That is, though there is simple apprehension of the existence of something there is no definite cognition of its nature. This kind of perception is called indeterminate perception. It is devoid of subject-predicate relation. It is a simple apprehension of the existence and attributes of an object without any corresponding judgment of it in words or by way of predication.

(ii) Savikalpaka or determinate perception is the knowledge of an object as related to certain qualities. It is a form of cognition in which the object is judged as possessed of some character. In Nirvikalpaka perception we have the primary cognition of some object not qualified with its qualities. But in Savikalpaka perception we have a definite cognition that what is perceived is an object possessed of certain attributes. For example, when I look at a pot, I judge within myself that 'It is a pot', 'It is of brown colour' and so on. So it is a judgment in which certain attributes are related to the object by way of predication. In the above instance the attribute of potness is predicated of the present object. So in the Savikalpaka perception when the object is perceived along with its diverse characters, they are brought under the substantive-adjective relation. It is determinate and associated with a name. Savikalpaka perception is expressed in a proposition of which the subject is the thing perceived and the predicate is the character present in the thing. So the subject-predicate relation is present here.

Nirvikalpaka perception is the ground of the Savikalpaka perception. Unless there is a Nirvikalpaka perception of a thing we cannot have any *Savikalpaka* perception of it. The contents of the Nirvikalpaka perception are the same as those of the *Savikalpaka* perception. In both cases of perception, the thing and its diverse characters are present, but while the former is 'a non-predicative judgment of the same object or fact, the latter is predicative.'

The indeterminate perception is neither valid nor invalid. A *pramā* apprehends that character in an object in which it really exists. In an indeterminate perception we just know a thing and its qualities, but we do not know the thing as characterized by those qualities. We do not have a consciousness that this property exists in that object. So *Nirvikalpaka* perception cannot be judged to be true knowledge or *pramā*. For the same reason it cannot be said to be *apramā*. It consists in knowing a character in a thing in which it does not exist. As our indeterminate perception is the apprehension of a thing as uncharacterized it cannot be judged to be *apramā*.

Ground for admitting Nirvikalpaka perception: When we cognize a particular cognition of an object through another cognition which follows it, our cognition of that particular cognition is known as *anuvyavasāya* or after-cognition. For example, our perception of a table can be cognized through the after-cognition, 'I know that I perceive the table' or simply 'I know the table'. Now *anuvyavasāya* is always cognition of the cognition of a qualified object. Nirvikalpaka perception is the cognition of an unqualified object. So its *anuvyavasāya* is not possible. How then can we accept it as the first step of our perception?

It is known through inference. It is admitted as a logically prior stage of determinate perception. In the determinate stage a thing is known as related to certain qualities. A Savikalpaka perception is a complex cognition of a complex object having certain mutually related elements in it. But how can we know these elements as mutually related and forming a complex whole, if we do not know them previously as they are in themselves. If

these elements are not at first known separately, then there can be no knowledge of them as they are mutually related. A relational experience of the elements of a thing presupposes a non-relational apprehension of them. So the Nirvikalpaka perception or non-relational cognition of a thing must be presupposed as a logical prior to its relational or determinate perception. This is how the *Naiyāyikās* justify their acceptance of Nirvikalpaka perception.

(d) Definition of Anumiti: Anumiti is the second kind of pramā or valid knowledge admitted by the Naiyāyikas. After perceiving smoke on the hill if we know the fire there our knowledge will be called Anumiti. But in this case two intermediate knowledge will be necessary for production of Anumiti. These two knowledge are pakadharmatā and vyāpti knowledge. After perceiving smoke on the hill we memorize our knowledge of vyāpti or the knowledge of universal relation between smoke and fire and for that we get that knowledge that the smoke of the hill is universally related with fire. The knowledge of hetu smoke in the paksa hill is pakadharmatā knowledge. The knowledge of universal concomitance between hetu smoke and sādhyā fire is called vyāpti. The knowledge consisted of these two knowledge is called parāmarsha. According to Nyāya philosophy, parāmarsha is the pakadharmatā qualified with vyāpti knowledge. In this knowledge it is said that the smoke of the hill is universally related to the fire of the hill. After forming these knowledge when we have the knowledge of fire on the hill then the knowledge is called Anumiti.

Regarding the nature of Anumiti Naiyāyikas is of same opinion, but about the definition of Anumiti they differ. According to the Old Naiyāyikas, Anumiti is a knowledge produced from the knowledge of parāmarsha. Just after the knowledge of parāmarsha we get the knowledge of fire on the hill. So for this reason parāmarsha is the karana of Anumiti.

According to Modern Naiyāyikas, like Gangesa Upādhyāya the knowledge in which vyāpti knowledge is the karana is called Anumiti. The relation of universal concomitance between hetu (smoke) and sādhyā (fire) is called vyāpti knowledge. According to this view, vyāpti knowledge is the

karana of Anumiti and parāmarsha is the vyapāra of this karana. Parāmarsha becomes the supreme cause of Anumiti after vyāpti knowledge. So according to this view, parāmarsha is the karana of Anumiti.

Concepts of *Paksa*, *Sādhya* and *Hetu*: An inference must have three terms and at least three propositions. These three propositions are major premise, minor premise and conclusion. The three terms are major, minor and middle. These terms are called *Sādhya*, *Paksa* and *Hetu* or *Linga* respectively in Indian Logic. Let us illustrate the nature of these terms in the following manner:

(i) *Paksa* or minor term: The *Paksa* is the subject in which the existence of a character is sought to be proved. It is that part of inference about which something is inferred. That which possesses the inferable character is called *Paksa*. At the sight of smoke on the hill we infer there is fire, because ‘where there is smoke there is fire’. In this inference the hill is the *Paksa*, because it is on the hill that the presence of fire is inferred. *Paksa* corresponds to minor term in Western Logic. In the proposition ‘the hill is fiery’, the hill is the subject, the term fiery is the predicate. ‘Fiery’ is the character which is predicated of the minor term, i.e., the hill.

Paksa is defined as ‘*Samdigha sādhyavan Paksa*’. The *Paksa* is that where the existence of the character which is to be predicated is suspected. ‘The hill is smoky’ – in this proposition of the inference, the hill is *paksa* because before we make the inference ‘the hill is fiery’, there is doubt in our mind about the existence of fire in the hill. This is the view of the Old *Naiyāyikas*. According to them, the *paksa* is that individual or class about which we want to prove the existence of something which is suspected but not definitely known.

The modern *Naiyāyikas*, however, do not accept this view of *paksa*. According to them, there are certain cases where inferential knowledge is possible even in the absence of any doubt about the presence of *sādhya*.

(ii) *Sādhya* or major term: The *Sādhya* is the inferable character of the *Paksa*. It is that whose existence we want to know or prove by inference. ‘The hill is fiery’ – in this inference fire is the *sādhya*, because we want to

prove the existence of fire on the hill. The *Sādhya* is that character of the paksa which is not perceived by us but which is indicated by some sign or mark present in it. *Sādhya* is also known as *Lingi* in Indian philosophy. It corresponds to major term in Western philosophy.

(iii) *Hetu* or middle term: In Indian philosophy *hetu* is also known as *Linga* because it is a sign or mark which indicates the existence of something. It is also known as the means. We perceive smoke on the hill and infer that there is fire, because where there is smoke there is fire. Smoke is the *hetu* for it establishes that there is relation between the *sādhya* and the paksa.

Hetu occurs twice in an inferential reasoning. It is once found related to the paksa or minor term and then related to the *sādhya* or the major term. It is through an invariable relation between the *hetu* and the *sādhya* that the paksa which is related to the *hetu* becomes connected with the *sādhya*. That is, the paksa is related to the *sādhya* through their common relation to the *hetu*.

There are five characters of the *hetu*. The first is *paksadharmatā* or its existence in the paksa, i.e., the smoke must be present in the hill. The second is *Sapakṣasattva* or its existence in similar instances in which the *sādhya* exists; smoke must be present in a kitchen in which fire exists. The third is *Vipakṣāsattva* or its non-existence in dissimilar instances in which the *sādhya* does not exist, i.e., smoke must be absent from a lake in which fire does not exist. The fourth is *abadhitavisayatva* or the uncontradictedness of the object. It must not aim at establishing absurd and contradictory conclusion, viz., Fire is cool. The fifth character of the middle term is *asatpratipakṣatva* or the absence of counteracting reason leading to a contradictory conclusion, e.g. 'the fact of being cause' should not be used to prove the 'eternality of sound'. These are the five characteristics of a valid *hetu*. Now, at least four characteristics must be found present in the *hetu* or middle term of a valid inference.

(e) Vyāpti as Sahacāra Niyama: *Vyāpti* or *Sahacāra Niyama* means invariable concomitance or co-existence. *Vyāpti* between the *hetu* (smoke) and

sādhya (fire) means generally a relation of co-existence between the two, e.g., 'Wherever there is smoke there is fire'. Two things are said to be concomitant or co-existent if they are present in the same locus. The relation of invariable or universal concomitance between the *hetu* and the *sādhya* of inference is technically called *Vyapti* by the *Naiyāyikas*.

In the absence of this universal concomitance between the *hetu* and the *sādhya* there will be no relation of *Vyāpti*. In many instances we may find the co-existence of fire and smoke, but on the basis of that we cannot establish relation of *Vyapti* between fire and smoke. We cannot say wherever there is fire, there is smoke because we find many instances where co-existence between fire and smoke is wanting. As for example, a red hot iron ball is smokeless. So if there is no invariable concomitance between the *hetu* and *sādhya*, there is no relation of *Vyāpti*.

Vyāpti implies a correlation between *vyāpya* and *vyāpaka*. *Vyāpya* means that which is pervaded and *Vyāpaka* means that which pervades. When one fact always accompanies the other, we say, it pervades the other. The fact which is always accompanied by the other is said to be pervaded by the other. Fire is *vyāpaka* and smoke is *vyāpya*. Smoke is pervaded by fire since, it is always accompanied by fire. But fire is not always accompanied by smoke. A red-hot iron ball is smokeless. So we cannot say fire is pervaded by smoke.

There are two types of *Vyāpti*: *Samavyāpti* and *Asamavyāpti*. A *vyāpti* between two terms which are co-extensive is called *Samavyāpti*. For example, the two terms 'knowable' and 'namable' are of equal extension. So we can infer any one of them from the other. We may say 'whatever is knowable is namable' and vice versa. A *vyāpti* between two terms which are not co-extensive is called *asamavyāpti* or *visamavyāpti*. This relation prevails between 'smoke' and 'fire'. These two terms are not co-extensive equally extensive. If we perceive smoke, we may infer fire, but we cannot infer smoke from our perception of fire.

Vyāpti is the logical condition of inference. Without *vyāpti* no inference is possible. We have already seen that *vyāpti* implies relation of

co-existence between the hetu (smoke) and the sādhyā (fire). Vyāpti is that invariable relation of concomitance which is unconditional. It is the unconditional uniform relation of the hetu to the sādhyā. It is free from conditions (*upādhi*). Smoke has unconditional relation to fire but fire has no unconditional relation to smoke. There may be fire without smoke, for example, there is no smoke in a red hot iron ball. So vyāpti is an invariable and unconditional relation of concomitance between the hetu and the sādhyā.

Vyāptigraha: Regarding the origination of Vyapti knowledge Indian philosophers have differences among them. Bauddha philosophers thought that two principles are necessary for Vyapti knowledge. These are the law of Identity and law of cause-effect. According to Advaita Vedanta, Vyāpti knowledge is obtained the knowledge of the absence of exception and concomitance or co-existence. Naiyāyikas have mentioned repeated perception or Sahacāra Darshana, absence of exception or adarshana of vyābhicara, Tarka or argument and Sāmānyalaksana perception as the factors for obtaining Vyapti knowledge.

For obtaining the knowledge of Vyapti between the hetu and sādhyā we have to perceive the presence of hetu (smoke) and sādhyā (fire) repeatedly in many instances. This is the first step of the establishment of Vyapti. But only with the help of repeated observation we cannot establish vyāpti. There should not be any exception of these instances. We can observe the repeated occurrence of fire and smoke together in many instances. But there is at least one case of exception. This is the case of red hot iron ball. In this case there is fire, but there is no smoke. For establishing Vyapti knowledge we must observe the absence of exception between the hetu and sādhyā. So these two steps must occur together for the establishment of Vyapti.

Knowledge of vyābhicara is a hindrance for the knowledge of Vyapti. If there is doubt of vyābhicara then we cannot establish vyāpti from our repeated observation of hetu and sādhyā. According to Nyāya, doubt about the exception can be solved with the help of Tarka or argument.

Tarka is kind of imposition or objection. But it is not any kind of objection. It is a kind of imposition or objection of Vyapaka with the vyapya in such a place where there is absence of vyapaka. If there is vyapya there must be vyapaka and if there is absence of vyapaka then there must be absence of vyapya. Smoke is vyapya and fire is vyapaka. Whether there is smoke in a place if there is no fire? If we have such knowledge we cannot infer fire from smoke.

For resolving this doubt the Naiyāyikas said that 'If smoke may occur without fire then we should not put fire for having smoke'- this is called Tarka or imposition. Smoke is the effect and fire is the cause. Where there is effect, there must be cause. It cannot be that fact that there is effect but there is no cause. For the presence of the law of causation there can be no doubt in saying that 'where there is smoke, there must be fire' as smoke is created by fire. If we doubt 'there may be smoke if there is no fire' there will be violation of law of causation. This imposition or objection is called Tarka. Thus the doubt of exception or vyābhicara can be resolved with the application of Tarka. So, it can be said that if there is smoke there must be fire.

According to Nyāya philosophy, Sāmānyalaksana perception is an important method of vyāpti. The person who perceives the vyāpti between smoke and fire perceives the vyāpti between all smoke and all fire. But that person observes the co-presence of smoke and fire in places like kitchen etc. For this that person gains the vyāpti knowledge of smoke and fire. But cannot have contact with all smoke and all fire. As we do not have Sahacāra Darshana or repeated perception of all smoke and all fire then how can we have perception of Vyapti between all smoke and all fire?

In response to this question the Naiyāyikas said that it is possible with the application of Sāmānyalaksana perception. According to them, when a person observes smoke and fire, then he perceives universal features like smokeness and fireness. For the knowledge of those universal features our sense organ comes in contact with all smoke and all fire. The knowledge of that universal feature is universal extraordinary contact. For this contact

the extraordinary perception of all smoke and all fire takes place. This is called Universal Extraordinary Perception. Thus with the help of this extraordinary perception the universal concomitance of all smoke and all fire is perceived and the perception of Vyapti between all smoke and all fire is possible.

(f) ***Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna***: From the point of view of our purpose or use of inference, our inferential knowledge can be divided into two kinds: (i) *Svārthānumiti* and (ii) *Parārthānumiti*. The Sanskrit word, 'artha' here means purpose or use. *Svārthānumāna* serves the purpose of the person who infers something somewhere. This inferential knowledge removes the doubt about the presence of sādhyā in the pakṣa from the mind of the person who infers or it produces knowledge of sādhyā in his mind. The instrumental cause of this Anumiti is called *Svārthānumāna*. It does not aim at establishing any theory about anything to others. This kind of inference is not, generally expressed through any statement as it does not seek to prove anything to others. For example, a man perceives smoke on a distant hill. Then he recollects his previous knowledge of the universal relation between smoke and fire which he obtained through repeated observation of smoke and fire. This memory-cognition leads to the knowledge that smoke universally related to fire is present on the hill. Immediately after this knowledge he knows the presence of fire on the hill. This kind of Anumiti is called *Svārthānumiti*.

Parārthānumiti is the inferential knowledge which is used for the purpose of proving or demonstrating the truth of a conclusion to other persons. Such Anumiti is expressed through five mutually connected statements. These statements are together known as *nyāyavākya*. This *nyāyavākya* produces in the mind of its hearer the knowledge of parāmarsha which in its turn leads him to the intended inferential knowledge.

Svārthānumāna differs from *Parārthānumāna* in two important respects:

Firstly, Parārthānumāna depends on a previous Svarthānumāna. A man is able to demonstrate a truth through an inferential statement when he has already formed the said inference for himself. But Svarthānumāna does not depend on Parārthānumāna. A man can infer something without taking the help of any nyāyavākya.

Secondly, there is no need to express a Svarthānumāna through a formal inferential statement consisting of five propositions. But a Parārthānumāna must be stated formally so that it may produce the intended parāmarsha in the minds of other persons and lead them to the intended truth.

Pancāvayavi Nyāya: According to the Nayāyikās, inference for others consists of the following five members or *avayavas*. Such syllogisms are called *Pancāvayavi* Syllogism or Five-membered Syllogism. For example,

- 1) There is fire on the hill (Pratijnā)
- 2) Because there is smoke on the hill (Hetu)
- 3) Where there is smoke, there is fire, as in the kitchen (Udāharana)
- 4) The has smoke which is invariably associated with the fire (Upanaya)
- 5) Therefore there is fire on the hill (Nigamana)

The first proposition is called Pratijnā. It is the proposition to be established. The second proposition is hetu or reason which states the reason for the assertion made in the proposition. Third is called Udāharana which gives the universal concomitance between the reason and the inferable predicate supported by an example. The fourth is Upanaya or the application of the universal concomitance to the present instance. The fifth is Nigamana or conclusion drawn from the preceding members.

The question arises; does the five-membered syllogism of the Nayāyikās possess any special merit? In answer to this question, it is said that the third proposition (Udāharana), to quote Prof. C. D. Sharma, “is a

special feature of the Nyāya syllogism and illustrates the truth that the universal major premise is the result of a real induction based on the law of causation and that induction and deduction cannot be really separated.” The fourth proposition of the Nyāya syllogism has also got a special feature. To quote S. C. Chatterjee, “It is a synthesis of the second and the third members of the syllogism. It shows that the middle which is universally related to the major term is also present in the minor term and is very useful for the purpose of proof.” The last proposition of the Nyāya syllogism is not a meaningless repetition of the first proposition. The first proposition, which is merely an assertion, is proved in the conclusion.

EXERCISES

Find out the correct alternative from the given options:

- 1) The founder of Nyāya philosophy is _____.
(i) Gautama Buddha (ii) Sage Gautama (iii) Sage Vātsāyana (iv) Sage Kapila
- 2) _____ Philosophy is called *apshapāda* philosophy.
(i) Nyāya (ii) Buddha (iii) Sāmkhya (iv) Yoga
- 3) Nyāya philosophy is _____ philosophy.
(i) Realist (ii) Idealist (iii) Materialist (iv) Internationalist
- 4) The first commentary of Nyāya-sutra was written by Sage _____.
(i) Vātsāyana (ii) Prasastapāda (iii) Gangesa (iv) Biswanātha
- 5) The writer of Tattvachintāmani is Sage _____.
(i) Vātsāyana (ii) Prasastapāda (iii) Gangesa (iv) Biswanātha
- 6) According to Nyāya School, Ordinary contacts can be of _____ types.
(i) Two (ii) Three (iii) Four (iv) Six
- 7) The name of Ordinary contact between two substances is _____.

(i) Samyoga (ii) Samyukta-samavāya (iii) Samavāya (iv) Samaveta-samavāya

8) According to Nyāya, extraordinary contact can be of _____ types.

(i) Three (ii) Four (iii) Five (iv) Six

9) In Nyāya philosophy, _____ levels of Ordinary perceptions are admitted.

(i) Two (ii) Three (iii) Four (iv) Six

10) The existence of Nirvikalpaka knowledge can be known through _____.

(i) Perception (ii) Inference (iii) Anuvyavasāya (iv)

Parāmarsha

11) According to Nyāya School, Paksadharmatā knowledge qualified with Vyāpti is called _____.

(i) Parāmarsha (ii) Anumiti (iii) Anuvyavasāya (iv)

Nirvikalpaka

12) According to Nyāya, Vyapti knowledge can be of _____ types.

(i) Two (ii) Three (iii) Four (iv) Six

13) In case of Svārthānumiti there are _____ stages or levels.

(i) Two (ii) Three (iii) Four (iv) Six

14) In case of Parārthānumiti there are _____ stages or levels.

(i) Three (ii) Four (iii) Five (iv) Six

15) In Indian philosophy _____ school only admitted determinate perception.

(i) Nyāya (ii) Buddha (iii) Sābdika (iv) Vedānta

16) According to Old Naiyāyikas, _____ is the karana of Anumiti.

(i) Parāmarsha (ii) Vyapti (iii) Paksadharmatā (iv)

Anuvyavasāya

17) According to Modern Naiyāyikas, _____ is the karana of Anumiti.

(i) Parāmarsha (ii) Vyapti (iii) Paksadharmatā (iv)

Anuvyavasāya

18) According to _____, Vyapti relation can be established on the basis of Cause-effect and Law of Identity.

(i) Nyāya (ii) Buddha (iii) Vedānta (iv) Mimāṃsā

19) According to Modern Nyāya, _____ is the karana of Svārthānumiti.

(i) Parāmarsha (ii) Vyapti (iii) Paksadharmatā (iv) Vyapti smriti

20) In Parārthānumāna _____ proves linga or hetu qualified with vyāpti.

(i) Udāharana (ii) Upanaya (iii) Pratijnā (iv) Nigamana

Answer the following questions (not more than 200 words):

- 1) Critically explain the definition of Perception given by Sage Gautama.
- 2) What is the meaning of Sannikarsa or Contact? Explain different Laukika Sannikarsa or Ordinary Contacts with example.
- 3) Distinguish between Ordinary Contact or Extraordinary Contact with suitable examples.
- 4) Distinguish between Nirvikalpaka or Indeterminate and Savikalpaka or Determinate perception according to Nyāya philosophy. How can we know Nirvikalpaka perception?
- 5) What is the meaning of Anumiti according to Nyāya? What is the role of Parāmarsha in case of Anumiti?
- 6) What is the difference between Anumāna and Anumiti? Explain the role of Paksa, sādhyā and Hetu in the context of Anumiti.
- 7) What is Vyāpti? What are the kinds of Vyāpti? How can we ascertain the knowledge of Vyāpti?
- 8) What is the difference between Svārthānumiti and Parārthānumiti? What is the nature of Pancāvayavi Nyāya?

Chapter – 10
ADVAITA VEDANTA
(4 marks allotted)

MCQ – 1X2 =2

SAQ -- 1X2 =2

Introduction: Sankara wrote Bhashyas or commentaries on the Brahma Sutras, the Upanishads and the Gita. The Bhashya on the Brahma Sutras is called *Sareerik Bhasya*. Sankara wrote commentaries on *Sanat Sujatiya* and *Sahasranama Adhyaya*. It is usually said, “For learning logic and metaphysics, go to Sankara’s commentaries; for gaining practical knowledge, which unfolds and strengthens devotion, go to his works such as *Viveka Chudamani*, *Atma Bodha*, *Aparoksha Anubhuti*, *Ananda Lahari*, *Atma-Anatma Viveka*, *Drik-Drishya Viveka* and *Upadesa Sahasri*”. Sankara wrote innumerable original works in verses which are matchless in sweetness, melody and thought.

(a) Nature of Brahman in brief:

Sankara’s supreme Brahman is Nirguna (without the Gunas), Nirakara (formless), Nirvisesha (without attributes) and Akarta (non-agent). He is above all needs and desires. Sankara says, “This Atman is self-evident. This Atman or Self is not established by proofs of the existence of the Self. It is not possible to deny this Atman, for it is the very essence of he who denies it. The Atman is the basis of all kinds of knowledge. The Self is within, the Self is without, the Self is before and the Self is behind. The Self is on the right hand, the Self is on the left, the Self is above and the Self is below”. *Satyam-Jnanam-Anantam-Anandam* are not separate attributes. They form the very essence of Brahman. Brahman cannot be described, because description implies distinction. Brahman cannot be distinguished from any other than He. The objective world-the world of names and forms-has no independent existence. The Atman alone has real existence. The world is only Vyavaharika or phenomenal.

Sankara was the exponent of the Kevala Advaita philosophy. His teachings can be summed up in the following words:

*Brahma Satyam
Jagat Mithya,
Jeevo Brahmaiva Na Aparah*

Brahman alone is real, this world is unreal; the Jiva is identical with Brahman. Sankara preached Vivarta Vada. Just as the snake is superimposed on the rope, this world and this body are superimposed on Brahman or the Supreme Self. If you get a knowledge of the rope, the illusion of the snake will vanish. Even so, if you get a knowledge of Brahman, the illusion of the body and the world will vanish.

Sankara is the foremost among the master-minds and the giant souls which Mother India has produced. He was the expounder of the Advaita philosophy. Sankara was a giant metaphysician, a practical philosopher, an infallible logician, a dynamic personality and a stupendous moral and spiritual force. His grasping and elucidating powers knew no bounds. He was a fully developed Yogi, Jnani and Bhakta. He was a Karma Yogin of no mean order. He was a powerful magnet.

There is not one branch of knowledge which Sankara has left unexplored and which has not received the touch, polish and finish of his superhuman intellect. For Sankara and his works, we have a very high reverence. The loftiness, calmness and firmness of his mind, the impartiality with which he deals with various questions, his clearness of expression-all these make us revere the philosopher more and more. His teachings will continue to live as long as the sun shines.

Sankara's scholarly erudition and his masterly way of exposition of intricate philosophical problems have won the admiration of all the

philosophical schools of the world at the present moment. Sankara was an intellectual genius, a profound philosopher, an able propagandist, a matchless preacher, a gifted poet and a great religious reformer. Perhaps, never in the history of any literature, a stupendous writer like him has been found. Even the Western scholars of the present day pay their homage and respects to him. Of all the ancient systems, that of Sankaracharya will be found to be the most congenial and the easiest of acceptance to the modern mind.

The Atman is self-evident (Svatah-siddha). It is not established by extraneous proofs. It is not possible to deny the Atman, because It is the very essence of the one who denies It. The Atman is the basis of all kinds of knowledge, presuppositions and proofs. Self is within, Self is without; Self is before, Self is behind; Self is on the right, Self is on the left; Self is above and Self is below.

Brahman is not an object, as It is Adrisya, beyond the reach of the eyes. Hence the Upanishads declare: “*Neti Neti*—not this, not this, not that.” This does not mean that Brahman is a negative concept, or a metaphysical abstraction, or a nonentity, or a void. It is not another. It is all-full, infinite, changeless, self-existent, self-delight, self-knowledge and self-bliss. It is Svarupa, essence. It is the essence of the knower. It is the Seer (Drashta), Transcendent (Turiya) and Silent Witness (Sakshi).

Sankara’s Supreme Brahman is impersonal, Nirguna (without Gunas or attributes), Nirakara (formless), Nirvisesha (without special characteristics), immutable, eternal and Akarta (non-agent). It is above all needs and desires. It is always the Witnessing Subject. It can never become an object as It is beyond the reach of the senses. Brahman is non-dual, one without a second. It has no other beside It. It is destitute of difference, either external or internal. Brahman cannot be described, because description implies distinction. Brahman cannot be distinguished from any other than It. In Brahman, there is not the distinction of substance and attribute. Sat-Chit-Ananda constitute the very essence or Svarupa of Brahman, and not just Its attributes.

The Nirguna Brahman of Sankara is impersonal. It becomes a personal God or Saguna Brahman only through Its association with Maya. Saguna Brahman and Nirguna Brahman are not two different Brahman. Nirguna Brahman is not the contrast, antithesis or opposite of Saguna Brahman. The same Nirguna Brahman appears as Saguna Brahman for the pious worship of devotees. It is the same Truth from two different points of view. Nirguna Brahman is the higher Brahman, the Brahman from the transcendental viewpoint (Paramarthika); Saguna Brahman is the lower Brahman, the Brahman from the relative viewpoint (Vyavaharika).

(b) Relation of Brahman with Jiva (Self) and Jagata (World): The world is not an illusion, according to Sankara. The world is relatively real (Vyavaharika Satta), while Brahman is absolutely real (Paramarthika Satta). The world is the product of Maya or Avidya (ignorance). The unchanging Brahman appears as the changing world through Maya. Maya is a mysterious indescribable power of the Lord which hides the real and manifests itself as the unreal. Maya is not real, because it vanishes when you attain knowledge of the Eternal. It is not unreal also, because it exists till knowledge dawns in you. The super-imposition of the world on Brahman is due to Avidya or ignorance.

To Sankara, the Jiva or the individual soul is only relatively real. Its individuality lasts only so long as it is subject to unreal Upadhis or limiting conditions due to Avidya (ignorance). The Jiva identifies itself with the body, mind and the senses, when it is deluded by Avidya or ignorance. It thinks, it acts and enjoys, on account of Avidya. In reality, it is not different from Brahman or the Absolute. The Upanishads declare emphatically: "Tat Tvam Asi" (That Thou Art). Just as the bubble (foam) becomes one with the ocean when it bursts, just as the space within a pot becomes one with the universal space when the pot is broken, so also the Jiva or the empirical self becomes one with Brahman when it gets knowledge of Brahman. When knowledge dawns in it through annihilation of Avidya, it is freed from its individuality and finitude and realises its essential Satchidananda (Existence, Consciousness, and Bliss) nature. It merges itself in the ocean of bliss. The river of life joins the ocean of existence. This is the Truth. The

release from samsara means, according to Sankara, the absolute merging of the individual soul in Brahman due to dismissal of the erroneous notion that the soul is distinct from Brahman. According to Sankara, Karma and Bhakti (devotion) are means to Jnana (knowledge) which is Moksha (liberation).

Vivarta Vada or the Theory of Superimposition

To Sankara, this world is only relatively real (Vyavaharika Satta). He advocated Vivarta-Vada or theory of appearance or superimposition (Adhyasa). Just as snake is superimposed on the rope in twilight, this world and body are superimposed on Brahman or the Supreme Self. If you get knowledge of the rope, the illusion of snake in the rope will vanish. Even so, if you get knowledge of Brahman or the Imperishable, the illusion of body and world will disappear. In Vivarta-Vada, the cause produces the effect without undergoing any change in itself. Snake is only an appearance on the rope. The rope has not transformed itself into a snake, like milk into curd. Brahman is immutable and eternal. Therefore, It cannot change Itself into the world. Brahman becomes the cause of the world through Maya, which is Its inscrutable mysterious power or Sakti.

When you come to know that it is only a rope, your fear disappears. You do not run away from it. Even so, when you realise the eternal immutable Brahman, you are not affected by the phenomena or the names and forms of this world. When Avidya or the veil of ignorance is destroyed through knowledge of the Eternal, when Mithya Jnana or false knowledge is removed by real knowledge of the Imperishable or the living Reality, you shine in your true, pristine, divine splendour and glory.

EXERCISES

- **Find out the correct alternative from the given options:**

1) According to _____, reality is one and identical.

(i) *Advaitavāda* (ii) *Dvaitavāda* (iii) *Visistādvaitavāda* (iv)

Kevalādvaitavāda

2) _____ is the first philosopher of Advaita Vedanta.

(i) *Gourpada* (ii) *Samkara* (iii) *Ramanuja* (iv) *Gautama*

3) According to Samkara, Brahma is the only _____ *sattā* (reality).

(i) *Pratibhāsika* (ii) *Pāramārthika* (iii) *Byabhārika* (iv) *Kālpanika*

4) According to _____, Brahma or Soul is the only reality.

(i) *Gourpada* (ii) *Samkara* (iii) *Ramanuja* (iv) *Gautama*

5) According to _____, Brahma is devoid of any kind of difference.

(i) *Gourpada* (ii) *Samkara* (iii) *Ramanuja* (iv) *Gautama*

6) According to _____, Brahma is self-expressive, He cannot be expressed through any *Pramāna*.

(i) *Gourpada* (ii) *Samkara* (iii) *Ramanuja* (iv) *Gautama*

7) According to _____, God has empirical reality, but Brahma has transcendental reality.

(i) *Gourpada* (ii) *Samkara* (iii) *Ramanuja* (iv) *Gautama*

8) The name of the theory of _____ regarding the origin of the world is known as *Vivartavada* or Evolutionism.

(i) *Gourpada* (ii) *Samkara* (iii) *Ramanuja* (iv) *Gautama*

9) According to _____, Brahma transcendently real, but the world is empirically real.

(i) *Gourpada* (ii) *Samkara* (iii) *Ramanuja* (iv) *Gautama*

10) According to _____, *Maya* is an ignorance producing false knowledge.

(i) *Gourpada* (ii) *Samkara* (iii) *Ramanuja* (iv) *Gautama*

11) According to Samkara, the _____ *laksana* or definition of Brahman is 'Brahman is *Sat, Cit, Ananda*'.

12) According to *Advaitavāda*, the power of _____ is to conceal the Brahman or present the World in that place.

(i) Brahman (ii) Jiva (iii) Jagat (iv) Maya

13) According to *Advaitavāda* of Samkara, _____ gives a logical explanation of the creation of the World.

(i) Satkāryavāda (ii) Asatkāryavāda (iii) Vivartavāda (iv) Parināmvāda

14) According to _____, the cause does not really become transformed in to effect; the effect is a quasi-transformation of the cause.

(i) Satkāryavāda (ii) Asatkāryavāda (iii) Vivartavāda (iv) Parināmvāda

15) According to the Advaitavāda of Samkara, objects of the knowledge of illusion and imagination have _____ reality.

(i) Transcendental (ii) Empirical (iii) Practical (iv) Logical

• **Answer the following questions:**

1. Who is the first philosopher of Advaita Vedanta?
2. In which book did Acharya Gourpada spread the thought of Advaitavāda?
3. What is the main statement of the teaching of Advaitavāda of Samkara?
4. Why do we call the Advaitavāda of Samkara Kevalādvaitavāda?
5. Why did Samkara call Brahma 'sarbaveda barjita' or devoid of all differences?
6. What is Svajātiya Veda?
7. What is Bijātiya Veda?
8. What is Swagata Veda?
9. Why does Samkara say that Brahma cannot be the object of inference?
10. Why does Samkara say that Brahma cannot be the object of pratyaksa pramāna?
11. What is the Sarupa Laksana of Brahma?
12. Why cannot we consider the world mutually true according to Samkara?
13. What is the meaning of Falsity according to Samkara?
14. What is Maya according to Samkara?

15. What are the functions of Maya according to Samkara?
16. What is the meaning of Tatvamasi?
17. What is the meaning of Sat according to Samkara?
18. What are the two forms of Satkãryavãda?
19. What kind of difference is admitted between Brahma and Jiva according to Samkara?
20. Find out some sentences from the Upanishads expressing the identity between Jiva and Brahma.

Chapter – 11
CONTEMPORARY INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
(8 marks allotted)

DA – 8X1 =8

(a) Swami Vivekananda: Philosophical thoughts on Karma-yoga

According to the philosophical teaching of the Karma yoga of Vivekananda knowledge and action or karma are not contradictory but complementary to each other. Vivekananda said that if theory is not materialized in practice then that theory would be useless and unnecessary. Besides, the practice if not based upon any theory would be illogical. For this reason a real knowledgeable person must be equally untiered or restless performer. He thought that the actual development of the society would be possible by the mutual help or understanding of wise and performer. As per Swamiji the role would be possible by the mutual help or understanding of wise and performer. As per Swamiji the role of the youths or students community is very much important for the development of the society. He believed that the main hindrance of development is idleness or lack of energy. The students can be influenced in the path of Karmayoga as early as these problems are resolved. He observed the widespread influence of *Tamaguna* or quality of *tamas* all over the country and wanted to perish it. *Tamaguna* means idleness, effortlessness. Swamiji thought that this quality can be suspended by practicing right behaviour and proper education. To him we may have the chance of being criticized for our action but should not give up our actions. If our nation has to go forward towards the path of development and if

we want to become alive we must have continuous effort, efficiency and devotion to action. According to Swamiji, we have natural tendency towards spiritualism either for the quality of the soil of India or for the prayer or offerings of the past generations. But if we cannot make our normal life healthy and wealthy we cannot live properly. So, how can we think about the attainment of spiritual life? To quote Vivekananda, "... every nation has to save him. Our boys have to become ready for jumping into fire to attain the goal of action. ... Now we should think about work, work, and work."

The term 'Karma', generally signifies the action or disposition of body, mind and sense organ. In the Gita, Yoga is the performance of action or Karma along with its process or ways. The way of Karma is the performance of Karma without thinking about the outcome or results. Karma binds a man as there is desire for results or outcome. Good and bad actions consequently produce good and bad results respectively. As per the Law of Karma a man has to suffer the result or outcome of the Karma performed by him. The person who performs an action has to suffer its results. It may not be possible for a person to suffer his suffering of results in a life. So, he has to take another birth to meet the residual sufferings. Man cannot get escape from this necessary law of Karma. But if we perform our actions without thinking about the results we can get liberation from this bondage. So, the performance of the *Niskāma Karma* is the actual meaning of Karmayoga.

Generally a person performs an action for the fulfillment of a desire. But according to Swamiji this type of action makes a soul bound or confined. If action is done selflessly the covering of the soul becomes perished and we can get right knowledge and the liberation of the soul is obvious due to the exposure of this

knowledge of reality. To him, the person who works selflessly will consider all duties as equal and he will work accordingly. The habit of this selfless action will perish the selfishness and sensuality of the performer.

In *Karmayoga* Swamiji has mentioned that man performs for different objectives. Someone performs for fame, someone performs for money and someone performs for becoming superior or master. So, the question is: Is it all possible to perform selflessly or only for the sake of duty? According to Vivekananda, Performance of an action only for sake of duty means actions done for self-knowledge or *atma-jnana* or action done for the attainment of liberation. Again a question is raised: Isn't self knowledge or knowledge for liberation selfishness? To him, liberation is not self-feeling. The feeling of pleasure of body, mind and sense-organ is self-feeling. He thought that in every country there must be some people whose influence is really blissful for the mankind. They perform their actions only for the sake of duties. They don't bother name, fame and money. Even they don't want to go to the heaven. They perform only for doing well to others. We also find people who perform their actions for helping the poor people.

At the same time Swamiji said that we should act only for the wellbeing of others not for the purpose of own liberation. This according to him is the symbol of more liberal attitude. To him those persons get their own liberation automatically who try to act for the liberation of others. Though the aim of *niskāma karma* is liberation we should not think about liberation while doing *niskāma karma*. According to Samkhya Nature or *Prakriti* is composed of three qualities of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Among these three qualities *Sattva* is of the nature of pleasure and is light and illuminating, *Rajas* is of the nature of pain, and is mobile and

stimulating and Tamas is of the nature of indifference and is heavy and enveloping. In the Gita it is said that it is not at all possible for a living being without doing any action. Therefore *niskāma karma* does not intend to mean worklessness. Now the question is: which actions are to be identified as Karmayoga? In the *Sāstras* or scriptures daily actions, offerings, prayers etc. are considered as Karmayoga. Swamiji mainly has considered actions done for the betterment of others as Karmayoga. These actions are *niskāma karma*. To him a person becomes benefitted by doing well to others, he becomes satisfied and uplifted. In this course he considers men as God. This is the main principle of Karmayoga of Vivekananda.

In the *Karmayoga* portion of the Gita it is said that we must try to remain balanced whether the result of an action is good or bad. In this way we will become *Sthitaprajna* while doing our actions. There the term 'Karma' indicates the practice or exercise of *Swadharma*. In case of *Jajnartha Karma* we must act as per some rule and rituals, we cannot act as per our own will. Similarly in case of *Jajnartha karma* we have to surrender before God by following some rules and rituals.

In the Karmayoga of Vivekananda detachment of *asakti* is the basis all yogas. According to Swamiji there are two ways to sacrifice affinity. Those who do not believe in god or in the help of any other outer source will have to depend upon their own will and power of mind and reason and they have to say strongly that 'I will certainly become detached'. Besides, those who believe in God will have to think whatever they do, they do for the God. The results of their actions will be entrusted to God. Detached actions of surrender to God are Dutiful action. Our actual actions are becoming detached, acting like a liberated soul and surrendering all our actions to God. According to Swamiji, only those who are wholeheartedly satisfied,

those who do not desire anything other than soul, those whose mind do not go to any other place except soul, those who consider soul as their everything do not need to perform. But rest other persons must perform. As per Swamiji, Karmayoga is a religion and system of principles for liberation through selflessness and right actions. Karmayoga must not believe in any particular religion. He does not believe in any religion, does not try to search about soul. His special aim is to attain selflessness by his own effort. Wise persons do it through wisdom, devotees do it through devotion and *Karmayogins* do it through Karma.

(b) Rabindranath Tagore: Philosophical Thoughts on Humanism

If we want to know the nature of Humanism of Rabindranath and its associations then we have to consider the books 'jje^a-ol djÑ' in Bengali and two books in English 'The Religion of Man' and 'Man'. The first is the written documentation of the lecture of 1933 given at the University of Calcutta. The second is the lecture given at the Oxford University and the last is the lecture given at Andhra University. Generally it can be said that the humanism of Rabindranath is dependent upon individual consciousness. The universe is reflected in the creative consciousness of individual and that universe is actually the human universe. Rabindranath has expressed the feelings of his poetic mind in his writings in theoretical form. But in the language of philosophy his main concern is philosophical anthropology. He was very much eager to establish the universal idea of humanity. This universal ideal of humanity is implied within every individual human being. The exposition or revelation of this ideal is the religion of man. According to Rabindranath, this universal ideal is the ideal of highest level of human being.

According to Rabindranath, man has two aspects: on the one side he has animality and on the other side he has universality. From the first aspect man lives with the present, his living from this aspect is in the world of idea or theory. The existence of human universality deals with ideal. From the influence of this ideal man transcends his empirical border or limit. He becomes directed towards universality after becoming free from specialty of individual interest. Rabindranath understood the nature by the religion of man. In one side of human existence there is animality; on the other hand there is devotion of humanness. From one side he has desire to 'is' and on the other it has attraction towards 'ought'. On the one there is pleasure, but on the other it has happiness. The first is the kingdom of nature, but the second is open area or dimension of imagination and ideal of man. On the one side there is the self-feeling of man; on the other there is the world of exposition of human soul. The identity of man is the devotion of man from one nature to another nature. In the one nature he has concealment and in the other he has liberation. This liberation is universal human religion.

The humanism of Rabindranath has metaphysical significance. In that case the question arises: if there is any traditional God in the humanism of Rabindranath in reality? In his 'The Religion of Man' he quoted a part of hymn of Brihadranaka Upanishad which actually means 'my God of revelation and me are different'—this idea is not consistent with human title. In this way man is deprived or expelled by his own God or by his own soul. The exact nature of human religion cannot be understood with the help of traditional theology. Rabindranath has used terms or ideas like 'World God', 'S̄he-chaḥ', 'j-el jje᳚o', 'ḥhnÄjjeḥ' etc. All these are objects of internal realization and these are synonymous with the idea of human superiority. When Rabindranath said 'Bḡl -k hÉḥ²Na-Bḡj

aj-L hÉiç L-l B-R çhnÄNa Bçj' or when he said '-k Bçj pL-ml -pC Bçj BjilJ' then his intended thought becomes 'çkçe flj Bçj, çkçe pL-ml Bçj, -pC Bçj--LC Bjil h-m pL-ml j-dÉ Sjei -k fçlj-Z Bj-cl S£h-e, Bj-cl pj-S Efmì q-µR -pC fçlj-ZC Bjli paÉ jjeºo q-u EWçRz' It means that the idea of perfection or superiority which is obtainable in future space or time is present in the realization of partial consciousness and in our partial world in the relation of *vyapya -vyapaka*. The God is that ideal of superiority which is exposed in future. Rabindranath thought, 'one man is exposed or presented with all human beings, by overcoming all men and by overcoming limited time.' The duality of is in the scope of human being from one side. Rather human individual internally is expanded to human universal. When this realization is expressed through knowledge and actions then the religion of man emerges. This religion is not an issue of realization through following traditional laws and rituals. It becomes exposed through the exposure of creative exposition. This liberation is revelation or exposition of self. This liberation is gradual liberation. The prayer of this liberation is:

-q çQLi-ml jjeºo, -q pL-ml jjeºo
 fçlœiZ L-li
 -icçQ-q²l çamL-flj
 pwL£ZÑajl EÜaj -b-Lz

.....
 pLm jç³⁄₄c-ll hijçq-l
 Bjil f§Si BS pjic qm
 -ch-mjL -b-L
 jjeºh-mj-L
 BLi-n -SÉiçajÑu fªli-o
 Bl j-el jjeºo-o Bjil Aç¹laj Be-³⁄₄cz
 (fœfªV,15)

According to Rabindranath, morality can never be based upon hedonism. There the context of ideal and attraction of human superiority remain implied or do not become exposed. The identity of man for the fulfillment of desire is external, limited and subjective; but his actual identity lies in the infinite nature of ideal or *bhuma*. The real identity of man is in his creativity surpassing the necessity of nature. Rabindranath considered this excessive or surplus 'the Surplus in man'. We feel this entity of surplus overcoming the limit of animality and by adding all human qualities. Rabindranath considered this entity as 'supreme man' or 'j'eh hĒp'. We make this supreme man the subject of our self in the truth and religion. Supreme man is human idea or jjeϕhL i"ji which is the subject of satisfaction or fulfillment of our mind-body and character.

The humanism of Rabindranath is derived from positivism. There are free intellectual man, his best ideal and creative imagination and his total mental human features in the centre of humanism of Rabindranath. From one view point his view is compared to the Copernican revolution of Kant. But his main tune is morality. The soul substance as described in Indian philosophy is considered by Rabindranath as objective animality of man. He also considered it identical with best active nature of man. To him, human soul overcomes his limited self feeling of desire and takes him towards the ideal of universal unity. This theory of ontology is idealistic.

Another feature of humanism of Rabindranath is its dynamism nature. No particular level or statue of human expression is supreme. Newer probability of expression becomes exposed in the universe. The expression of human expression is '-qbj eu, -qbj eu, AeÉ -Ljbj, AeÉ -LjeJMj-ez' Man always tries to define himself by constant creative form of manness. These definitions

are expressed differently in different space and time. For this reason it becomes the responsibility of every individual to materialize the ideal of superiority of man. Man is world citizen. His relativity is with the expression and creation of all round human world. In the humanism of Rabindranath there is no institutional exclusiveness of space and time. To him, 'j² e_ie_i j₂caÑ d₁-cM_i c₂-a B-p e_ie_i S-e, HL f₂Û_i e-qz'

Rabindranath realized the nature of man with the use of the term 'the religion of man'. Religion means nature. In the nature of man there is animality in one side and in the other side there is the possibility of his manliness. One side there is desire towards desired and other side there is attraction towards desirable. On one side it has pleasure and in the other side it has delight. On one side there is the issue of getting something and in the other side it has the issue of becoming something. The first is the kingdom of nature and the other is the area of dream, imagination and ideal of man. One side there is self-feeling of man and in the other side there is the world of action of soul. The nature of man is the devotion to go to one nature from another. His one nature is covering and the other nature is liberation this liberation is the religion of man or humanism.

Exercises

Answer the following questions (not more than 200 words):

- 1) Mention the philosophical teachings of Swami Vivekananda's practical Vedanta.
- 2) What is Karmayoga? How does Vivekananda explain it in his philosophical thoughts?
- 3) Elucidate the concepts of Sakāma and Niskāma Karma. Which kind of Karma is considered desirable by Vivekananda in his Karmavāda?

- 4) What is the meaning of Niskāma Karma? How is this ideal explained by Vivekananda in his philosophical thoughts?
- 5) Discuss the way of getting liberation through the practice of Karmayoga according to Vivekananda.
- 6) What is the meaning of humanism? How does Rabindranath explain it?
- 7) What are the different sources of the philosophy of humanism of Rabindranath? Explain it in brief.
- 8) Humanism is the upliftment of animal nature of man to universal nature of man. - Explain it with the philosophy of Rabindranath.
- 9) How does Rabindranath distinguish between 'is' and 'ought'? Discuss is in the context of Humanism of Rabindranath.
- 10) How does Rabindranath assimilate different ideals of east and west in his humanistic thought? Explain in brief.
- 11) Explain the role of morality in Tagore's humanism.
- 12) Mention some features of Tagore's humanism.

